State v. Heston

• Decision Date: 08 March 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71-533,71-533
• Citation: 280 N.E.2d 376,58 O.O.2d 349,29 Ohio St.2d 152
• Parties: , 58 O.O.2d 349 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. HESTON, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 152

29 Ohio St.2d 152

280 N.E.2d 376, 58 O.O.2d 349

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. HESTON, Appellee.

No. 71-533.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

March 8, 1972.

Syllabus by the Court

1. An unidentified informer's tip that a defendant has committed a felony, which is corroborated by evidence uncovered by independent police work verifying in detail the information supplied by the informer and makes apparent its trustworthiness, is sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest.

2. An arrest without a warrant is valid where the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that a felony was committed by defendant and the circumstances are such as to make it impracticable to secure a warrant.

3. A handwriting exemplar, given by defendant to the police while he is in custody pursuant to a valid arrest, is admissible in evidence against him at his trial.

On June 21, 1966, Delbert O'Hara, a special agent for the American Express Company and former police officer, suppolied Cleveland police with the following information: On June 20, he received a telephone call from an unidentified person who told him that certain stolen American Express money orders, two I. B. M. machines, a checkwriter and stolen Alcraft Manufacturing Company checks were located at 1734 West 28th Street in Cleveland.

The caller stated that these articles were in the possession of Michael Heston, John Burke, Ronald Burgan and Herbert Rice at that address, and that a girl named Jerillyn Coutoure resided there. O'Hara was told that the named men all had police records; that they intended to cash the money orders and checks and leave town; and that Heston had recently been arrested in Bedford for burglary.

O'Hara related to the police that on the day after receiving the call he had verified with the Bedford police that Heston had been charged there with burglary in connection with the theft of two I. B. M. machines.

Upon being advised of the information furnished by O'Hara, Detective Sergeant Frank Corrigan of the Cleveland Police Department checked police files and discovered forged Alcraft Company checks had recently been passed in the vicinity of the West 28th Street address. Further checking disclosed that the checks and a checkwriter had been taken in a burglary of the Alcraft Company, that Burgan had been arrested for forgery, that Heston and Burke had burglary and forgery records and that Rice had a record for burglary.

Sergeant Corrigan and another police officer went to Burke's apartment at 1740 West 28th Street while other officers proceeded to the 1734 address. Burke could not be found, but a woman told the officers that Burke had 'left in a hurry.' Sergeant Corrigan then joined the other officers at the 1734 address, where Heston, defendant-appellee herein, was found and arrested without a warrant.

Heston was taken to the police station for interrogation. He was asked to provide the police with a handwriting exemplar. When he declined, he was told that if he would furnish the handwriting specimen he would be released, but that, if it was later ascertained that his handwriting matched that on the forged Alcraft checks, he would be rearrested.

Heston complied, and was released. Several days later, after the checks and exemplar had been examined by a handwriting expert, he was taken into custody.

In a jury trial, Heston was convicted of eight counts of forgery. At the trial, the handwriting expert testified to the effect that the handwriting on the forged checks was written by the same hand that had written the exemplar for the police.

Defendant Heston appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, setting forth therein the following assignments of error:

'I. The trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion to exclude evidence obtained following an arrest made without probable cause as it violated his Fourth Amendment guarantees.

'II. The trial court erred in overruing appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of appellant's detention as such evidence was surrendered to police officials over appellant's objections and constitutes illegally obtained evidence in violation of his Fourth Amendment guarantees.

'III. The admission into evidence of a coerced handwriting exemplar is a denial of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.'

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, stating: 'Lack of probable cause to arrest rendered the product of the consequent search illegal. Cf. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113-114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 * * * especially fn. 4, on founding probable cause on 'suspicion,' 'belief,' or 'mere conclusion.' Failure to suppress the illegal product constituted prejudicial error to substantial rights of the defendant.'

The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of the state's motion for leave to appeal.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and Robert S. Stone, Shaker Heights, for appellant.

Harry E. Youtt, Cleveland, for appellee.

CORRIGAN, Justice.

The central issue in this appeal by the state is whether the handwriting exemplar was the product of an invalid arrest and thus inadmissible. Related issues raised by defendant in the Court of Appeals are whether the exemplar was coerced, whether its admission in evidence violated defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and whether in the circumstances presented a warrant should have been obtained.

As to the latter issue, whether a warrant should have been obtained, in State v. Woodards (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 14, 20, 215 N.E.2d 568, 574, this court stated that:

'Under certain circumstances, a warrant need not be obtained in order to render an arrest valid. The arresting officer must have probable cause to believe that a felony was committed by defendant, and the circumstances must be such as to make it impracticable to secure a warrant. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436; Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499, 500, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514; Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828.'

The circumstances surrounding the warrantless arrest here are that when the police left the police station they had information from the informer that defendant and the others intended to leave town and at the time defendant was arrested this information had been buttressed by discovery of the fact that one of defendant's alleged accomplices had already fled.

We are of the opinion that in such circumstances the police were justified in proceeding without a warrant. The holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 593, 'that the police must obtain a warrant when they intend to seize an object outside the scope of a valid search incident to arrest,' is not helpful to defendant. Although, in the opinion in that case, there is some discussion concerning whether entry into a person's house without a warrant for purposes of arrest is permissible in the absence of exigent circumstances, the court found it unnecessary to pass upon that question.

We turn now to the principal issue: Was there probable cause for the warrantless arrest?

Whether a warrantless arrest is '* * *...