State v. Hill

• Decision Date: 15 December 1943
• Docket Number: 649.
• Citation: 28 S.E.2d 100,223 N.C. 711
• Parties: STATE v. HILL et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

28 S.E.2d 100

223 N.C. 711

STATE v. HILL et al.

No. 649.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

December 15, 1943

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Hosea Price, of Winston-Salem, and H. L. Koontz, of Greensboro, for appellant Clarence Hill.

Harry McMullan, Atty. Gen., and George B. Patton and Hughes J Rhodes, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

SEAWELL Justice.

The defendant was convicted of perjury. His appeal challenges the sufficiency of the charge as an explanation of the law relating to that crime and its application to the facts. C.S. § 564. In view of the nature of the crime and the restrictions which are thrown around the evidence which must be adduced to procure conviction, we are of the opinion that the objection is well taken. We do not find, on an inspection of the instructions, that the jury was advised that the defendant could not be convicted except upon the testimony of at least two credible witnesses or one such witness and corroborative circumstances The rule is stated by Chief Justice Stacy in State v. Rhinehart, 209 N.C. 150, 154, 183 S.E. 388, 391, as follows: 'In prosecutions for perjury, it is required that the falsity of the oath be established by two witnesses, or by one witness and adminicular circumstances sufficient to turn the scales against the defendant's oath.' State v. Hawkins, 115 N.C. 712, 20 S.E. 623; State v. Peters, 107 N.C. 876, 12 S.E. 74; State v. Sinodis, 205 N.C. 602, 172 S.E. 190.

Conceivably, the uncorroborated testimony of one witness might produce in the minds of the jury the satisfaction to a moral certainty of the guilty of the accused; in other words, convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of such guilt; but it is not sufficient in law, and the instruction, therefore, that if the jury is so satisfied from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt they should return a verdict of guilty, while a satisfactory formula in most cases, disregards conditions which the law declares essential to conviction of perjury, and therefore is not adequate.

The criminality of perjury is the violation of the sanctity of the oath, which, traditionally with English speaking people is supposed to afford some security for a truthful statement. If the witness in his solemn adjuration has not the fear of God, a supplemental statute making perjury a felony might induce some fear of the law. However reprehensible and socially disturbing, a man cannot be convicted of crime for merely lying, although it may be a 'lie with circumstance' or a 'lie direct.' But it takes the false testimony to falsify the oath. And, since experience has shown that frailty in that respect may not be confined to the one suspected person, the law, from ancient times, has not been willing to 'take one man's word against another' upon a question of veracity, since, roughly speaking, it merely establishes an equilibrium. 41 Am.Jur. p. 37. At one time the law required the testimony of two witnesses; now, in almost every jurisdiction in this country, conviction may be had upon the testimony of one witness, corroborated by circumstances inconsistent with defendant's innocence and directly tending to corroborate the accusing witness. Anno. 111 A.L.R. 825. In many jurisdictions it is required that the evidence corroborating the witness for the prosecution must be of a 'strong character,' 'strongly corroborative.' The requirement as to the strength of such evidence is variously expressed. Practically all of the opinions require it to...