State v. Hill
| Decision Date | 24 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | A13-1803 |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Richard Ellis Hill, Appellant |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
Affirmed
Dakota County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Phillip D. Prokopowicz, Chief Deputy Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reyes, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges his first-degree controlled-substance-crime conviction, arguing that the district court improperly admitted evidence, that he was denied due process, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
On April 20, 2010, a confidential informant (CI) paid $950 for two bags of a crystalline substance, purportedly methamphetamine, from appellant Richard Ellis Hill and another individual. Hill and his companion were immediately arrested and officers searched them and their vehicle. Officers found small baggies containing a crystalline substance, money, and drug paraphernalia. Officers seized two baggies of a crystalline substance (marked as evidence numbers 5 and 7) in addition to the two baggies surrendered by the CI (collectively marked as evidence number 9, but individually as 9a and 9b). The items were placed in a secure evidence locker.
The following day an evidence technician, Ronald Gjorvad, weighed the contents of each individual bag and performed preliminary Narcotics Identification Kit (NIK) testing on samples from each bag. Samples from all four bags tested positive for methamphetamine. Gjorvad did not note any signs of tampering or cross-contamination before heat-sealing the bags and returning them to the evidence locker.
Later that day, Gjorvad brought the evidence to the Saint Paul police department crime lab. A crime lab employee received the bags, signed a transfer-of-custody form, logged the transfer in their computer system, and deposited the bags into a bin forincoming drug cases. She did not inspect the seals on the bags, but did not alter the evidence in any way. A criminalist at the crime lab then performed analysis on the four bags, adhering to her normal testing procedure. After all items were processed and resealed, they were placed in a vault in the lab. The criminalist noted that while bag 9a was not completely heat-sealed, the zip-lock seal was secure and there was no evidence of contamination.
On April 29, 2010, the evidence was returned to Gjorvad, who stored the items in a secure property room until August 6, 2012, when the evidence was transferred to the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA). The evidence was received by the BCA, logged, and placed in a vault. On September 19, 2012, Sara Goldstrand, a forensic scientist with the BCA, tested the items according to her normal procedure. Preliminary testing was positive for methamphetamine, and Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GCMS) testing indicated the presence of methamphetamine. Gjorvad picked up the items on September 27, 2012, and stored them in a secure property room until Hill's trial.
The net weight of each item of evidence as recorded by the three testers followed a predictable pattern, with one exception. While three of the four bags reduced in weight following each test,1 bag number 5 indicated the following weights: .47 grams when first tested, then .45 grams, and finally .452 grams.
Hill was charged with first- and second-degree aiding and abetting the sale of a controlled substance and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. The matter was tried before the district court.
Goldstrand testified that she performed GCMS analysis on 9a and found that it contained methamphetamine. She testified that the preliminary analysis of 9b indicated the presence of methamphetamine and that 9b weighed 4.818 grams. Goldstrand testified that 9a and 9b had a combined weight of 12.025 grams and contained methamphetamine. The district court found Hill guilty of the first-degree charge and dismissed the remaining charges. This appeal followed.
Evidence admission
Hill first argues that the district court erroneously applied the chain-of-custody standard in addition to the second prong of the Frye-Mack test in admitting the controlled substances. Appellate courts review de novo whether the correct legal standard was applied in determining the admissibility of evidence. See State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 230-31 (Minn. 2005) ().
Under Frye-Mack, new or novel scientific evidence may be admissible when (1) it is shown to be generally accepted in the scientific community, and (2) the particular evidence from the technique has a foundation that is scientifically reliable. State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Minn. 2002). The parties do not contend that GCMS testing is new or novel. See id. at 819 (). "When the scientific technique that produces the scientific evidence is no longer novel or emerging, then the pretrial hearing should focus on the second prong of the Frye-Mack standard." Id.
Chain of custody State v. Johnson, 307 Minn. 501, 504, 239 N.W.2d 239, 242 (1976). Admissibility does not depend on negating "all possibility of tampering or substitution," but is governed by a reasonable probability that tampering or substitution did not occur. Id. at 505, 239 N.W.2d at 242. "Contrary speculation may well affect the weight of the evidence accorded it by the factfinder but does not affect its admissibility." Id.
Hill argues that under the second prong of Frye-Mack the controlled substances lack foundational reliability because they were handled by the crime lab.2 But while the crime lab handled the evidence for a period of time, no testing results from the crime lab were offered or admitted into evidence. Because the evidence was first handled by several parties and then tested using a scientific technique, the district court correctly concluded that both the second prong of Frye-Mack and the chain-of-custody standard apply. The former applies because GCMS testing is a scientific technique that producedevidence in this case; the latter because it must be shown that the controlled substances were not altered or contaminated prior to testing.
Hill argues that even if the chain-of-custody standard is proper, the chain of custody was inadequate, and the evidence was inadmissible, because there is "definitive proof of alteration or substitution" of the substances when handled by the crime lab. "Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the [district] court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003).
Hill asserts that one of the bags of methamphetamine gained weight from the time it was measured at the crime lab to the time it was measured at the BCA. The weight went from .45 grams to .452 grams, despite a small sample being taken at the crime lab. The record does not support Hill's claim that this slight discrepancy shows a breach in the chain of custody. The crime lab measured to the one-hundredth of a gram; the BCA measured to the one-thousandth. Additionally, there may have been varying calibration of one of the scales by a one-hundredth of a gram or less. Regardless, because chain of custody is the applicable standard at the weighing stage of the evidence-handling process, any issues go to the weight of the evidence, not admissibility. The district court properly applied the chain-of-custody standard and the second Frye-Mack prong, and did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
Due process
Hill next argues that he was denied due process of law because his trial was unfair. "Defendants have a due process right to a fair trial and a defendant is entitled to a newtrial if the errors, when taken cumulatively, had the effect of denying [a defendant] a fair trial." State v. Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted) (brackets in original).
Hill asserts that the state: (1) created a system of testing controlled substances at the crime lab that lacked scientific procedures or protocols; (2) failed to show that the crime lab complied with standards and controls; (3) should have known about, and disclosed, the problems at the crime lab; and (4) established a system of processing evidence at the crime lab that improperly tracked evidence, thereby preventing a defense challenge to the evidence.
Hill's first two allegations essentially repackage his evidence-admission argument as a due-process argument—the mismanaged crime lab tainted the controlled substances, which was a fundamentally unfair trial practice denying due process. Because we have concluded that the district court properly admitted the evidence, we similarly conclude that there was no due-process violation. See State v. Fulford, 290 Minn. 236, 238-39, 187 N.W.2d 270, 272-73 (1971) ().
Hill's contention regarding...
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