State v. Hill
| Decision Date | 27 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 70742-6-I,70742-6-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. KAVEN LIONEL HILL, Respondent. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DWYER, J. — Kaven Hill appeals from his conviction of forgery. He contends that (1) insufficient evidence supports his conviction, (2) he was entitled to have the jury instructed on the "rule of efficacy," and (3) his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when the "money order" at issue, upon which the notations "Return Unpaid" and "Non-Treasury Item" appeared, was admitted into evidence.1 Because Hill was entitled to have the jury instructed on "the rule of efficacy," we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.
Using his home computer, Hill created a "money order" that was drawn on the United States Treasury (the Treasury) and, by its terms, entitled a business of his to an amount in excess of $377,000.00. This "money order" possessed, inpertinent part, the following characteristics:
• it read "Pay to the order of," followed by the name of a business owned by Hill;
• it was written in the amount of $377,986.00;
• it was signed by Hill;
• it read "Payable to the U.S. Treasury without recourse" below the signature line;
• there was an unusually long statement in the "memo" section; and
• there was a routing number and what appeared to be an account number at the bottom.
At trial, Hill testified that he had created the "money order" on his home computer following instructions that he had found on the Internet. He claimed that he had been attempting to lawfully access a limitless account in his name at the Treasury Department.
On August 17, 2012, Hill presented the "money order" for deposit in a newly-opened business account at Verity Credit Union. Because of irregularities on the face of the money order—including the misspelling of Hill's name, the excess verbiage, and the fact that it was written for hundreds of thousands of dollars, whereas money orders are usually capped at $1,000.00—Verity employees were suspicious of the "money order." The "money order" was nevertheless accepted for deposit and sent to the Treasury for processing. Despite being informed by the Verity branch manager that a hold would be placed on the funds deposited into Hill's account until the "money order" cleared, Hill called Verity later that day and attempted to convince an assistant managerto release the funds to him.
After Hill deposited the "money order," Verity's fraud officer, Melissa Mutic, further investigated the item. She was able to verify that the routing number at the bottom of the check, "000000518," was an actual routing number for the Treasury. She testified that, if the "money order" had been accepted, it would have resulted in a transfer of money from the Treasury into Hill's account. Mutic also discovered videos on YouTube containing instructions on how to create the type of "money order" that had been presented by Hill.
The "money order" was eventually returned to Verity unpaid. It was stamped "Return Unpaid" and "Non-Treasury Item" on the front. Verity closed all of Hill's accounts and contacted law enforcement.
Thereafter, Hill was charged with one count of forgery. At trial, before jury selection, Hill sought to exclude the "money order" from being admitted into evidence with the notations on the front. Hill argued that the stamped statements were testimonial and, therefore, admitting the statements without testimony from a Treasury Department official violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. The trial court ruled that the "money order" was admissible notwithstanding the notations.
After the close of evidence, Hill proposed a jury instruction that provided the common law definition of the term "instrument." The trial court refused to give the proposed instruction.
The jury found Hill guilty as charged. Hill moved for arrest of judgment and dismissal, contending that the State failed to establish his guilt at trial. Hismotion was denied. Hill was sentenced within the standard range, and now appeals.
Hill first contends that the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to support his forgery conviction. He maintains that the State failed to prove that (1) he acted with intent to defraud, (2) he knew the instrument was forged, and (3) the "money order" had apparent legal efficacy. Hill's contention is unavailing.
The due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions require that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. "[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be . . . to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence. State v. Kintz, 169 Wn.2d 537, 551, 238 P.3d 470 (2010). Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence can be equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). We defer to the jury on questions of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses,and the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Killingsworth, 166 Wn. App. 283, 287, 269 P.3d 1064 (2012).
"A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to injure or defraud: . . . He or she possesses, utters, offers, disposes of, or puts off as true a written instrument which he or she knows to be forged." RCW 9A.60.020(1)(b). To convict Hill of forgery, the jury was required to find that each of the following elements of the crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
Jury Instruction 13.
Thus, in order to convict Hill as charged, the State had to prove that he acted with intent to injure or defraud. Specific intent is intent "to produce a specific result, as opposed to intent to do the physical act that produces the result." State v. Elmi, 166 Wn.2d 209, 215, 207 P.3d 439 (2009). Specific intent cannot be presumed, but it can be inferred as a logical probability from all of the facts and circumstances. State v. Pedro, 148 Wn. App. 932, 951, 201 P.3d 398 (2009).
Here, the evidence established that Hill created a homemade "money order" and, in an attempt to have his account credited with more than $377,000.00, presented it to Verity as a valid money order drawn on the Treasury. These facts permit an inference to be drawn that Hill intended todefraud either the credit union or the Treasury. The inference that Hill acted with the requisite intent is bolstered by evidence that Hill, despite being told by the Verity manager that a hold would be placed on the funds until the "money order" was verified, attempted to persuade an assistant manager to release the funds to him later the same day. Although Hill testified that he did not intend to injure or defraud anyone, the jury was not required to credit his testimony. Sufficient evidence was adduced by the State with regard to Hill's intent.
The State was also required to prove that Hill knew that the written instrument was forged. The jury was given the following instruction as to the knowledge requirement:
Jury Instruction 12. Thus, the State may have established the knowledge element by proving either that Hill actually knew that the "money order" was forged or that, based on the information that he knew, a reasonable person in his situation would have believed that it was forged.
The "money order" presented by Hill purported to be drawn on the Treasury. By his own admission, however, Hill produced the "money order" on his home computer. Therefore, the evidence established that, although Hill presented the "money order" as drawn on the Treasury, Hill was aware that itwas not, in fact, issued by the Treasury. These circumstances give rise to an inference that Hill knew that the homemade "money order" was not a legal means of acquiring Treasury funds. Although Hill testified that he believed that the "money order" was a valid means of accessing the Treasury money, again, the jury was not required to credit this testimony. Sufficient evidence was adduced by the State with regard to Hill's knowledge.
Finally, the State had to prove that the item Hill presented to Verity was a "written instrument." The definition of "written instrument" includes "[a]ny paper, document, or other instrument." RCW 9A.60.010(7); Jury Instruction 6 (emphasis added). The criminal statute does not define "instrument." Our Supreme Court, however, has held that the relevant statute is supplemented by the common law definition of "instrument."2 State v. Scoby, 117 Wn.2d 55, 57-58, 810 P.2d 1358, 815 P.2d 1362 (1991). "[U]nder...
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