State v. Hill

• Decision Date: 16 July 1985
• Docket Number: No. 11934,11934
• Citation: 196 Conn. 667,495 A.2d 699
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Danny HILL.

Page 699

495 A.2d 699

196 Conn. 667

STATE of Connecticut v. Danny HILL.

No. 11934.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 6, 1985.

Decided July 16, 1985.

A.A. Washton, New London, with whom was Peter W. Rotella, New London, for appellant (defendant).

John F. Cocheo, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was C. Robert Satti, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY and S. FREEDMAN, JJ.

DANNEHY, Associate Justice.

After a jury trial the defendant was found guilty of arson murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54d. ¹ Thereafter, in accordance with the provisions of that statute, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to a term of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole. ² In his appeal from that judgment the defendant claims that: (1) the trial court unduly restricted his voir dire examination of the individual jurors; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to permit evidence of another's motive to commit the arson; (3) the arson murder statute violates his right to due process; and (4) the arson murder statute does not restrict the trial court's power to suspend or reduce the sentence required thereunder.

There is no dispute but that on February 7, 1982, at 11:28 p.m., a fire was reported in progress at 28 Beldon Street in New London. In the course of extinguishing the blaze, a fireman discovered in the top floor apartment of the building the dead body of an elderly woman. It was later determined that her death had resulted from asphyxiation due to smoke inhalation.

At the trial, the state introduced the testimony of an eyewitness who stated that, while at the first floor apartment of 28 Beldon Street on the evening of the fire, she saw the defendant sprinkle what smelled to her like gasoline onto some objects on the floor and then light a match. The landlord of the building testified that he had instituted proceedings to evict the defendant from the apartment he rented on the first floor and further that, on the night of the fire, he saw the defendant at the scene "with a big smirk" on his face. A New London police officer, who was also at the scene of the fire, testified that he, too, saw the defendant there and that he could smell gasoline emanating from the person of the defendant. Another police officer testified that, as a result of the ensuing investigation, an arrest warrant was issued for the defendant. He and another officer went to the defendant's home to advise him that he was under arrest. The defendant attempted to flee. He was apprehended after a short chase on foot.

The defendant offered an alibi defense. In support thereof, he introduced the testimony of two witnesses who testified that the defendant was watching television with friends at the time the arson was committed. The defendant also attempted to offer evidence of a possible motive on the part of the landlord to commit the arson.

After the jury returned its verdict, the trial judge ruled that § 53a-54d mandated that the defendant be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole.

The defendant first contends that the trial court unduly restricted the scope of the voir dire examination by refusing to permit defense counsel to inquire of prospective jurors whether they would be inclined to attach greater credence to the testimony of a law enforcement officer merely because that witness was a law enforcement officer. We agree.

The record discloses that the panel of prospective jurors was comprised of approximately fifty people. During its examination of the first juror, the state asked: "Would the mere fact that a witness is a police officer mean to you that his testimony or her testimony is worth any more or any less than any other witness?" Defense counsel posed a similar question to the second juror. Prior to the examination of the third juror, the trial judge informed counsel that "I won't allow any further questions along the lines of the credibility of police officers; that is, merely because he is a police officer. That is an area that is covered in the Judge's charge to the Jury." Defense counsel indicated to the court that he believed this was a proper question but that he would try to "work it in another way" so as not to disobey the court's ruling.

The third juror was then asked by defense counsel whether she would attach more weight to the testimony of any witness merely because of that person's profession or occupation. The trial court would not allow the question and an exception was duly noted. The same question was rephrased and repeated many times but to no avail. Thereafter, defense counsel attempted to question several more jurors regarding the credibility they would attach to the testimony of a police officer. Each time the trial court disallowed the question. Eventually, defense counsel realized the futility of pursuing this line of inquiry and refrained from doing so throughout the remainder of the voir dire examinations.

The right to a voir dire examination of each prospective juror in a criminal action is provided by § 54-82f of the General Statutes. ³ This right was established as a constitutional one in 1972 by inclusion in article IV of the amendments to the state constitution of the provision that "[t]he right to question each juror individually by counsel shall be inviolate." See State v. Haskins, 188 Conn. 432, 446, 450 A.2d 828 (1982); State v. Anthony, 172 Conn. 172, 174, 374 A.2d 156 (1976).

Examination of jurors on voir dire has a two-fold purpose; first, it permits the trial court to determine whether the prospective juror is qualified to serve and second, it aids counsel in exercising their rights to peremptory challenges. State v. Haskins, supra, 188 Conn. at 446, 450 A.2d 828. It is true that the extent to which the parties may go in such an examination rests largely within the discretion of the trial court and the exercise of that discretion will not constitute reversible error unless it has clearly been abused or harmful prejudice appears to have resulted. State v. Anthony, supra, 172 Conn. at 174, 374 A.2d 156. "Nevertheless, in exercising its discretion, the court should grant such latitude as is reasonably necessary to fairly accomplish the purposes of the voir dire. Clearly, therefore, if there is any likelihood that some prejudice is in the juror's mind which will even subconsciously affect his decision of the case, the party who may be adversely affected should be permitted questions designed to uncover that prejudice. This is particularly true with reference to the defendant in a criminal case." State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 142, 120 A.2d 152 (1956).

In this case, almost half of the witnesses called by the state were either police officers or fire officials. Their testimony was crucial to the state's case as it tended to corroborate the testimony of the sole eyewitness, a witness whose credibility was highly questionable in light of the conflicting statements she had made prior to the trial. ⁴ Similarly, crucial testimony of police officers concerning the strong odor of gasoline emanating from the defendant on the night of the fire and his attempted flight upon arrest was evidence which, if believed, would have supported an inference of guilt. When important testimony is anticipated from certain witnesses whose official or semi-official status is such that a juror might reasonably be more, or less, inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to whether a juror would have such an inclination should be permitted. See Harvin v. United States, 297 A.2d 774 (D.C.1972); Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C.Cir.1964); Sellers v. United States, 271 F.2d 475 (D.C.Cir.1959). It was of vital importance to the defendant that if any such inclination existed it be brought to light. He was entitled to explore this area of possible disqualification prior to the impanelling of the jury. Only then could he intelligently challenge for cause or exercise his right of peremptory challenge. State v. Higgs, supra, 143 Conn. at 144, 120 A.2d 152.

Nothing could be plainer than that a predisposition to attach greater or less credence to a witness' testimony simply because of that witness' position as an officer is inconsistent with the defendant's constitutional and statutory right to an impartial jury. The denial of such a fundamental right cannot be countenanced. The trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel to ask prospective jurors whether they would be inclined to give more weight to the testimony of a police officer merely because of that person's official status constituted an abuse of discretion. We find error and order a new trial.

Our holding is dispositive of this appeal; however, we will consider certain of the defendant's other claims of error which are likely to arise upon retrial.

During the course of the trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of a financial motive on the part of the landlord of the burned building, John M. Piscezek, to commit the arson. In his cross-examination of Piscezek, defense counsel established that the defendant and his wife had entered into an option agreement with the witness to purchase the building at 28 Beldon Street. The witness was then asked when he purchased the property. The state objected, claiming that the question was irrelevant. In the...