State v. Hinkle

• Decision Date: 04 October 1924
• Docket Number: 18931.
• Citation: 131 Wash. 86,229 P. 317
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LA FOLLETTE et al. v. HINKLE, Secretary of State.

229 P. 317

131 Wash. 86

STATE ex rel. LA FOLLETTE et al. v. HINKLE, Secretary of State.

No. 18931.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 4, 1924

Department 1.

Mandamus by the State of Washington, on the relation of Robert M. La Follette, as an individual and as an independent candidate for the Presidency of the United States, and others against J. Grant Hinkle, as Secretary of State of the State of Washington. Decree for relators for part of relief prayed for.

John H Dunbar and R. G. Sharpe, both of Olympia, for respondent.

Chas E. Claypool, Z. B. Rawson and William A. Gilmore, all of Seattle, for State party.

BRIDGES J.

By this procedure the relators seek a writ of mandate prohibiting the secretary of state from certifying to the proper officers of the state the name of persons nominated to fill various state offices (but not presidential electors) such nominations being made by the 'La Follette State party.' The petition alleges that Mr. La Follette appears as an individual and as an independent candidate, under the party name 'Progressive party,' for the presidency of the United States, and that the other relators are qualified voters and taxpayers of this state, and are the duly organized and acting members of the state executive committee of the Progressive party in the state of Washington, and as such exercise, and have a right to exercise, control of the affairs of that party and constitute the governing board thereof; that the Progressive party is a political organization regularly formed and existing under the laws of this state; that at a convention duly called and held on the 9th day of September, 1924, national electoral candidates were selected on behalf of the said party and to further the interests of Mr. La Follette's candidacy for President of the United States and Mr. Burton K. Wheeler, as candidate for Vice President, and that on the day named a certified copy of the proceedings of the convention was duly filed with the secretary of state; that on the 30th of August, 1924, certain citizens of the state issued a call for a state convention to be held on September 9, 1924, for the purpose of forming a political party to be known as 'the La Follette State party,' to nominate a full state ticket, and that on September 9th, pursuant to such call, certain persons met and organized the La Follette State party, adopted resolutions promising adherence to the candidacies of Mr. La Follette and Mr. Wheeler, and nominated a ticket for the various state offices, to be placed on the ballot for the general election to be held on November 4, 1924, under the title and designation of 'the La Follette State party'; that the use of Mr. La Follette's name in connection with such organization was unauthorized by him and was against his wishes; that the La Follette State party is in no wise affiliated with, or recognized by, the national organization known as the Progressive party, which supports Mr. La Follette's and Mr. Wheeler's candidacies; that, if the La Follette State party's ticket is printed and distributed on election day, the rights of the relators will be greatly prejudiced and they will suffer great and irreparable damage, in that such ticket will appear under the name of Mr. La Follette, and voters desiring to vote for him for President of the United States will be misled into the belief that, in voting for the candidates of the La Follette State party, they will be voting for electoral candidates pledged to support Mr. La Follette for President of the United States, when, as a matter of fact, such will not be the case; that the rights and interests of the relators and the public importance thereof make it imperative that the matter should be speedily determined, and that there is no speedy or adequate remedy at law.

The answer of the respondent admits that 'the La Follette State party' was organized, and that a state ticket was nominated by it and has been duly certified to him as secretary of state, and that, unless prohibited, he will certify the names of such candidates to the various election boards in the state as required by law; that the proceedings of the La Follette State party convention were duly and regularly certified and presented to him for filing. While the State party was not made a formal respondent in the case, it has appeared.

While the case was presented to us only two or three days ago, we feel, because of the emergency, that we should proceed at once to a decision of the matters involved.

Section 5173, Rem. Comp. Stat., provides that, not less than 20, nor more than 30, days before an election, the secretary of state shall certify to the clerk of the board of county commissioners of each county the name and place of residence of each person nominated by any party convention.

Section 5203, Rem. Comp. Stat., provides that any political party which at the last preceding election cast less than 10 per cent. of the votes may nominate candidates in the manner provided by existing laws for conventions.

Section 5172, Rem. Comp. Stat., provides that certificates of nomination shall be filed with the secretary of state not more than 60, nor less than 30, days before the date fixed for election.

Section 5167, Rem. Comp. Stat., provides that 'any convention * * * as hereinafter defined, held for the purpose of making nominations for public office, and also electors to the number hereinafter specified, may nominate candidates for public office, to be filled by election within the state. A convention * * * within the meaning of this chapter, is an organized assemblage of electors or delegates, representing a political party or principle. * * *'

At the outset we are met with the vigorous contention of the respondent, to the effect that this court should not exercise its original jurisdiction by issuing or refusing to issue the writ asked for, and that it has no power so to do or to consider the merits of the matter. Whether we will issue a writ of mandate is not a question of jurisdiction, but one of discretion, because article 4, section 4, of the state Constitution authorizes this court to exercise its original jurisdiction in the issuance of such writs. We should, and always will be, slow to exercise our original jurisdiction in this regard, for the reason, among others that we have not been provided with the machinery necessary for the taking of testimony or the settling of disputed facts, and also because applications for such writs are always hurriedly made and counsel have not the opportunity to fully and deliberately present the matter to us, nor have we, because of the emergency, proper time to give to the matters involved. But proceedings for a writ of mandate, while unusual and extraordinary, are but another form of civil action. Its ancient use was, and present purpose is, to permit ...