State v. Hirata

• Decision Date: 31 October 2022
• Docket Number: SCWC-20-0000689
• Citation: 152 Hawai‘i 27,520 P.3d 225
• Parties: STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Chanse HIRATA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

152 Hawai‘i 27

520 P.3d 225

STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Chanse HIRATA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

SCWC-20-0000689

Supreme Court of Hawai‘i.

October 31, 2022

Hayley Y.C. Cheng (Jon N. Ikenaga, on the briefs) for petitioner.

Brian R. Vincent for respondent.

McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.; AND RECKTENWALD, C.J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J., JOINS

OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.

A jury found Chanse Hirata guilty of violating Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 707-733.6 (2014), continuous sexual assault of a minor under the age of fourteen years.

Hirata wants a new trial. He argues two of the deputy prosecuting attorney's closing argument remarks prejudiced his right to a fair trial: (1) Hirata had "a motive to lie"; and (2) the complaining witness (CW) testified "consistent with a child who is traumatized."

We hold that each of these remarks constitute misconduct, and that neither was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

We vacate Hirata's conviction and remand the case to the trial court.

I.

The deputy prosecuting attorney's (DPA) opening statement previewed the State's theory of the case. The case turned on CW's credibility.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, during the course of this trial, you will not be presented with DNA evidence, you will not be presented with surveillance videos, you will not be presented with eyewitnesses, because there is none. But you will hear from the one person that lived through all of this. You'll hear from [CW].

CW testified. The State also presented testimony from her parents, a police officer, a detective who interviewed CW, a doctor who examined CW, and an expert in the dynamics of child sexual abuse.

Hirata, his parents, and his girlfriend testified for the defense.

Both the prosecution and the defense acknowledged that the case hinged on the jurors' assessments of Hirata and CW's relative credibility.

The DPA's closing argument circled back to the theme introduced in her opening statement. The jury's decision "comes down to one question, is [CW] believable?" The DPA continued: "the answer is clear to this question. Yes [CW] is believable." Then to support CW's credibility, the DPA explained that her "brave" testimony is "consistent with a child who is traumatized."

The DPA began her closing argument:

[DPA]: Now, at the beginning of this trial I told you you were not gonna hear about DNA evidence. You weren't gonna see surveillance videos. You weren't gonna hear from eyewitnesses because in a case like this, there is none. But you would hear from the one person that lived through it, and at the end of this, it comes down to that one person, comes down to [CW]. And it also comes down to one question, is [CW] believable?

Now, the Court gave you the jury instructions that you all have in front of you, and on page 8, there are a list of factors that you can consider when you deliberate to determine if a witness is credible. So you look at their demeanor, their candor, lack of motive, and if what they say makes sense.

So when you look at the factors – and I'll go through them with you, ladies and gentlemen – the answer is clear to this question. Yes, [CW] is believable. And because [CW] is believable, it's – it is the testimony that has a convincing force upon you that counts, and the testimony of even a single witness, if believed, can be sufficient to prove a fact.

So let's go through the factors of [CW]'s credibility. Her appearance, demeanor, her manner of testifying. She came here last week. You saw her. She's 11 years old. She was nervous and understandably so. And she tried to be brave up there on the stand. She answered all of my questions. She answered all of the defense attorney's questions. Almost three hours up there.

And then at the end of almost those three hours, she couldn't be brave anymore, and you saw her when she got emotional. She broke when the defense attorney continued to call – to question her credibility and if she was making this up, and her answer to you was this really happened. It's consistent with a child who is traumatized.

(Emphases added.)

The court's jury instruction on credibility listed the factors the DPA referenced. Before the closing arguments, the court read this standard instruction about witness credibility. See Hawai‘i Standard Jury Instructions Criminal (HAWJIC) 3.09.¹ Because Hirata testified, the court also gave the standard instruction directing the jury to treat him like other witnesses.² Those instructions allowed the jury to consider Hirata's "interest, if any, in the result of this case" as it evaluated the weight and credibility of his testimony.

During her closing, the DPA spotlighted the court's instructions: the jury had to assess Hirata's credibility just like that of the other witnesses and could consider his interest in the case's result. Then the DPA declared that none of the defense's witness – Hirata included - could be believed because "[t]hey have a motive to lie":

Additionally, the defendant also testified, and the jury instructions say that when a defendant testifies, his credibility is to be tested in the same manner as any other witness. So we still need to use – or you still need to use those factors on page 8.

So is the defense's story believable? We look at the same factors. They have bias. They have a motive to lie. What they said doesn't make sense, and at times, they even contradicted each other. The defense's story is not believable. The defense's story is not believable, and this is what their story is.

(Emphases added.)

The jury found Hirata guilty as charged of continuous sexual assault of a minor under the age of fourteen years. Hirata appealed.

In a Summary Disposition Order, the ICA held that the DPA improperly undermined Hirata and his witnesses' testimony by saying they had a motive to lie. But, it said, this misconduct was harmless because "[t]he evidence against Hirata was overwhelming." The ICA did not address Hirata's argument that the prosecutor crossed the line by claiming the CW testified "consistent with a child who is traumatized."

In his cert application, Hirata presents a single question: "Whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the misconduct by the DPA was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not violate Hirata's constitutional right to a fair trial?"

II.

Hirata did not object to the DPA's closing argument, so his appeal is subject to plain error review.³

We apply the plain error standard of review "to correct errors which seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, to serve the ends of justice, and to prevent the denial of fundamental rights." State v. Williams, 146 Hawai‘i 62, 72, 456 P.3d 135, 145 (2020).

Prosecutorial misconduct claims concern violations of the right to a fair trial. That's a fundamental right. See State v. Williams, 149 Hawai‘i 381, 392, 491 P.3d 592, 603 (2021) ("The constitutions of the United States and the State of Hawai‘i guarantee every individual accused of a crime the fundamental right to a fair trial.").⁴

Because prosecutorial misconduct impacts the fundamental right to a fair trial, there is no difference between the plain error and harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standards of review. See State v. Riveira, 149 Hawai‘i 427, 431 n.10, 494 P.3d 1160, 1164 n.10 (2021) (observing that "courts have considered the same three [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt] factors" when considering prosecutorial misconduct claims under plain error review).

In prosecutorial misconduct cases, then, once the defense establishes misconduct - objection or no objection - appellate review is the same: "After considering the nature of the prosecuting attorney's conduct, promptness or lack of a curative instruction, and strength or weakness of the evidence against the defendant, a reviewing court will vacate a conviction if there is a reasonable possibility that the conduct might have affected the trial's outcome." Id. at 431, 494 P.3d at 1164.

III.

Both the motive-to-lie remark and the prosecutor's claim that CW testified "consistent with a child who is traumatized" were prosecutorial misconduct.

To the extent the motive-to-lie remark concerns Hirata's testimony (as opposed to that of his parents and girlfriend), it is misconduct because it suggests that Hirata had a motive to lie without presenting any evidence in support of that claim other than Hirata's party status.⁵

Our caselaw forbids "arguments that are uncoupled from evidence showing the defendant has a particular interest in the outcome separate from the generic interest shared by all defendants in criminal cases." State v. Salavea, 147 Hawai‘i 564, 585 n.29, 465 P.3d 1011, 1032 n.29 (2020).⁶ Our law is clear: prosecuting attorneys "cannot ask the jury to infer a defendant's lack of credibility based solely on the fact that [they are the] defendant." State v. Basham, 132 Hawai‘i 97, 117, 319 P.3d 1105, 1125 (2014).

In both Basham and Salavea, we gave defendants new trials when the prosecuting attorneys suggested they had a "motive to lie" to the police (in Basham ⁷ ) and to the jury (in Salavea ⁸ ).

Here, the State argues that unlike in Basham and Salavea, the prosecuting attorney discussed specific evidence justifying its claim that Hirata had a motive to lie: "When discussing[ ] Hirata's credibility," the DPA "argued that Hirata's testimony contradicted other witnesses' testimony."⁹

This argument makes no sense.

There is no logical relationship between the claim that Hirata's testimony contradicted that of other witnesses and the claim that Hirata had an interest in lying on the stand. Discussing inconsistencies or discrepancies between witnesses is a traditional evidence-based method to undercut credibility. But that routine credibility attack does not provide an evidentiary bridge to support a motive-to-lie comment.

Here, there were no specific facts or evidence to justify the DPA's credibility attack, only Hirata's defendant status could explain the remark. S...