State v. Hocker

• Decision Date: 16 June 1894
• Citation: 34 Fla. 25,15 So. 581
• Parties: STATE ex rel. AMBLER v. HOCKER, Circuit Judge.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

15 So. 581

34 Fla. 25

STATE ex rel. AMBLER v. HOCKER, Circuit Judge.

Florida Supreme Court

June 16, 1894

Application by the state of Florida, ex rel. Daniel G. Ambler, against William A. Hocker, circuit judge, for mandamus. Motion to strike the answer of defendant for insufficiency. Denied.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. The previous relation of attorney and client, as shown in this case, disqualifies a judge in this state.

2. The principle of disqualification of a judge by reason of a previous relation of attorney and client should not be given a narrow and technical construction, but should be applied to all classes of cases and to all judicial officers.

3. A judge who, previous to his commission, was an attorney of record in a suit in which an execution issued, is disqualified to try a claim interposed to property levied upon under such execution.

4. A judge who, previous to his commission, was a solicitor of record for complainant in a chancery cause, brought for the purpose of having receivers appointed for certain property is disqualified from trying a claim interposed by said receivers to said property, when the same is levied upon under execution in favor of third parties.

5. A judge who, previous to his commission, has been an attorney in a case, is disqualified to adjudicate, not only all matters arising in that identical case, but also all supplemental matters or proceedings had or taken to enforce or to resist the enforcement of, any judgment or decree rendered in such case.

6. The question of the disqualification of a judge, by reason of a former relation of attorney and client, is entirely distinct and independent of any question of present interest in the case, and of the payment of any fee or reward therein.

7. An act done by a partner in the firm name in the pursuit of its ordinary business is the act of the firm. A judge who, prior to his commission as such, was a member of a law firm which began a suit, using the name of such firm as attorneys for the plaintiff, is disqualified from trying a claim interposed to property levied upon by virtue of an execution issued in such main case, although the management of such suit may have been exclusively under the direction of the other member of such firm, and not within the knowledge of such judge.

8. A judge who, previous to his commission, was an attorney of record in an attachment suit at the time of the levy of the writ of attachment upon certain property, is disqualified to try a claim interposed to said property, when the same is afterwards levied upon under an execution issued in the same suit.

COUNSEL

Edgar P. Allen, for relator.

Cooper & Cooper, for defendant.

OPINION

LIDDON C.J.

This is a case of original jurisdiction. The petition, filed May 1 1894, alleges, in substance, that the relator began on February 10, 1893, an action by attachment against G. C. Stevens and H. H. Graham, copartners under the firm name of Stevens, Graham & Co., in the circuit court of Marion county; that, the case having been referred to Jesse J. Finley, a parcticing attorney, the relator, on December 15, 1893, obtained a judgment against Stevens, Graham & Co., the defendants, for $11,216.66 and costs; that execution issued upon said judgment, and was levied upon certain personal property, being the same property upon which attachment had been levied; that said property was advertised for sale on the first Monday in March, 1894, but that, before the legal hours of sale on said day, Enoch W. Agnew and John A. Bishop, receivers, appointed by the United States circuit court for the northern district of Florida, filed a claim to said property, and obtained possession thereof from the sheriff; that on the following day the relator, in the circuit court of Marion county, caused said case to be called for trial, whereupon the Honorable William A. Hocker, the defendant, judge of said court, adjudged himself disqualified to sit in the trial of said claim case, and refused to do so, alleging the following ground of disqualification, to wit: That he was one of the attorneys of record in the principal case of D. G. Ambler v. Stevens, Graham & Co. The petition further alleges that prior to said suit or premises, to wit, in November, 1892, the relator brought the written contract therein sued upon to the said William A. Hocker, then a practicing attorney; but thereafter the said Hocker formed a copartnership with the present attorney of the relator, and when action was brought thereafter, on the 10th day of February, 1893, the management of the matters pertaining thereto was turned over to the latter; and, although William A. Hocker's name appears as an attorney of record in the case in the firm name of Hocker & Allen until his (Hocker's) appointment to the circuit bench, that he at no time took any part in the direction of said case, and since his appointment as aforesaid has had no interest in said case, or its outcome, by reason of fees or otherwise. The petition further states that the issues in the claim case which the said Judge William A. Hocker refuses to try are not in any way connected with the issues in the main case, in which said Hocker was attorney of record, and have arisen since said Hocker was appointed a judge of the circuit court of Florida, and long after his connection with said case had been severed. The petition concludes with a prayer for an alternative writ of mandamus, commanding the defendant to try the aforesaid claim case, or show cause why he should not do so. This writ issued, and the defendant has answered the same.

The answer expressly admits all of the allegations of the petition in reference to the suit by the relator against Stevens, Graham & Co., and the issuing and levying of the execution. The answer also admits that the defendant adjudged himself disqualified for the reasons alleged in the petition and that the allegations of the petition are true which state his connection with the suit of Ambler v. Stevens et al., and that he had turned over all matters connected with said case to Mr. Edgar P. Allen, as his attorney, and that he had no interest in the same. The answer sets up other matters of disqualification of the...