State v. Hockett

• Decision Date: 21 December 1886
• Citation: 70 Iowa 442,30 N.W. 742
• Parties: STATE v. HOCKETT.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

70 Iowa 442

30 N.W. 742

STATE

v.HOCKETT.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

December 21, 1886.

Appeal from district court, Mahaska county.

Indictment for murder in the first degree. The jury found the defendant guilty “as charged in the indictment, and that he should be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, at hard labor;” and judgment was accordingly entered. The defendant appeals.

ADAMS, C. J., dissenting.Bolton & McCoy, John F. Lacey, and Liston McMillen, for appellant.

A. J. Baker, Atty. Gen., for the State.

SEEVERS, J.

1. It is provided by statute that, “upon trial of an indictment for murder, the jury, if they find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, must designate in their verdict whether he shall be punished by death, or imprisonment for life, at hard labor, in the penitentiary.” McLain's Code 1886, p. 972. The constitution provides that “the judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, district court, and such other courts, inferior to the supreme court, as the general assembly shall, from time to time, establish. The district court shall consist of a single judge. Article 5, §§ 1, 5, Const. It is insisted, with much earnestness, by counsel for the defendant, that the statute which authorizes the jury to say whether a defendant, who is found guilty of murder, shall be punished by death, or imprisonment at hard labor, is unconstitutional, because it conflicts with the foregoing provisions of the constitution, the argument being that all judicial power is vested in the courts, and that they, and not the jury, must declare the law; “that a judgment, though pronounced by the judge, is not his sentence, but the sentence of the law. It is the certain and final conclusion of the law, following upon ascertained premises.” Conceding these propositions, the inquiry, then, is, what is “law?” It is, and must be, such rules as are prescribed by the supreme power. How is this to be ascertained? In this state it is the general assembly or law-making power that enacts law. The courts simply pronounce judgment in accordance with the declared will of the general assembly. In so doing, they declare the law. They cannot make law, but it is their province to pronounce judgment according to law. It is fundamental that the constitution does not confer any power on the general assembly, but is restrictive only. It, however, gives to the courts judicial power, and it will be conceded that such power is exclusive. But such power only confers on the courts the power to declare the law as enacted by the general assembly; and, as applied to the case at bar, it is the province and duty of the court to pronounce judgment on the verdict of the jury, for such is the law. The constitution does not prohibit the general assembly from enacting such a law as the one in question, and therefore it had the power to enact it. We are of the opinion that the statute under consideration is not unconstitutional.

2. It is insisted that the defendant was insane at the time of the homicide, and that the instructions of the court upon the subject of insanity are erroneous.

It is proper that the material facts should be stated. The defendant lived some 15 miles east of Oskaloosa, and, a day or two preceding the homicide, he learned that the deceased and his sister had gone to Oskaloosa; and he assumed, perhaps justly, that their conduct towards each other was not what it should be, and that improper relations existed. He followed them to Oskaloosa, but was not able to find them, and, they having returned in the direction of home, he followed. They separated, and he stated to more than one person that he intended to shoot the deceased. He met or saw the deceased walking along a road, and the defendant told him to “halt,” and pulled a revolver out of his pocket, and started towards the deceased; and the latter hallooed, “for God's sake, not to shoot me!” The defendant shot at the deceased, who ran, and the defendant after him, and then he shot again. The deceased ran behind an oak tree, and the defendant, who was two or three steps therefrom, told the deceased to come out, and tell what he had done. The deceased came from behind the tree, kneeled down, and said: “For God's sake, don't shoot me! It was not my fault; it was the girl's. I was tight. I knew nothing about it.” The defendant again shot at the deceased, who again got behind the tree, and hallooed: “For God's sake, do not shoot me any more! You have shot me through my eye, and through my heart. What more can you do than to take my life?” The defendant said again, as he had previously, “You started to run off with my sister;” and shot again, and the deceased fell to the ground, when the defendant jumped on him, and stamped him in the face, and turned to go away, and said to a witness: “Don't worry, El.; he is done for. Come up to the house.”

The actions and conduct of the defendant in pursuing the deceased, and after the homicide, together with the brutality exhibited, and his acts and conduct, are relied on as sustaining the defense of insanity. It is also claimed that there was evidence showing that, when the defendant was about three years old, he had “fits” while teething, and that his grandmother was insane at one time, brought on by menstrual difficulties, when the change of life occurred. She recovered, however, three or four months before she died. The instructions on the question of insanity are quite lengthy. We do not think it necessary to set them out in full, but will notice the objections urged by counsel.

First. It is said that the court, “over and over again, instructed the jury that although the defendant was insane at the time of the homicide, that would not be a defense.” This is a grave mistake, inadvertently made, we will assume.

Second. “The court took the theory, in effect, that the defendant might be insane on one subject, and not another.” What the court did say is as follows: “It does not necessarily follow that, if defendant was insane, the alleged killing * * * was the result of such insanity; or, if he is possessed of an insane impulse, that he could not have successfully resisted it. The insanity which absolves one for acts which otherwise would be criminal must be of that character which caused the act, and irresistibly compelled it. If the defendant was afflicted with insanity, but this has no connection with the alleged criminal act, or if it did, yet he could have controlled his acts, and refrained from perpetrating them, then he cannot be guiltless. In other words, the alleged insanity and the alleged crime must be connected, the one with the other, and the latter be the offspring of the former, in order to have the effect of rightfully declaring one irresponsible for his acts.” The last clause of this instruction is deemed by counsel to be objectionable, and in relation thereto it is said: “The court should have instructed the jury, if it was shown that defendant was substantially insane on any subject, he was entitled to an acquittal, if the evidence left a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury as to whether the homicide proceeded from that insane condition.” Omitting what is said as to a reasonable doubt, it seems to us this is precisely what the court did say. The meaning of the court was that the defendant should not be acquitted because he was clearly insane on the subject of religion, or some other subject, if the crime was not connected with, and the offspring of, such belief. There is no evidence tending to show that the defendant was insane on all subjects, or that he was homicidally insane. If insane, he became so because of the wrong he believed the defendant did. Now, was the criminal act the offspring of the insane delusion? In other words, did he kill the deceased while insane by reason of the wrong done? This was for the jury to say, and this is the question submitted to them. The instruction is correct. The jury was properly and sufficiently instructed as to the doctrine of reasonable doubts, and we shall again have occasion to refer to the question of insanity.

3. The defendant introduced several witnesses as medical experts, and lengthy hypothetical questions were put to and answered by them, and the defendant claims that such evidence tended to sustain the defense of insanity; and in relation thereto the court instructed the jury as follows: “These opinionswill be of greater or less aid to you in your deliberations, depending very much on the skill, knowledge, and experience of the witness, and his acquaintance with the subject under investigation. It will readily occur to you that this kind of evidence may be found quite reliable and satisfactory, or the reverse, and entitled to little, if any, consideration. It may be further remarked, too, in regard to evidence which is made up largely of mere theory and speculation, and which suggests mere possibilities, that it ought never to be allowed to overcome clear and well-established facts. In this connection, I deem it proper to say that while, perhaps, the profession of law has not fully kept pace with that of medicine on the subject of insanity, medical theorists have propounded doctrines respecting it, as an excuse for criminal acts, which a due regard for the safety of the community, and an enlightened public policy, must prevent juries from adopting as a part of the law of the land.”

The objections urged by counsel are-- First, that the “expert evidence was not made up of mere theory and speculation, but respectable physicians gave their opinion, based upon well-established principles of medical science.” The respectability, knowledge, and honesty of the physicians is conceded, but their evidence, however, was largely mere theory and speculation. They, we feel satisfied, would not claim otherwise. No man can look into the body of another, and tell certainly, if he is diseased, what caused the disease. Experience and knowledge may...