State v. Hodges

• Citation: 144 Mo. 50,45 S.W. 1093
• Parties: STATE v. HODGES.
• Decision Date: 17 May 1898
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

45 S.W. 1093

144 Mo. 50

STATE v. HODGES.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

May 17, 1898.

FORGERY — EVIDENCE — OTHER OFFENSES — APPEAL — RECORD — INSTRUCTIONS.

1. Evidence tending to show that one tried for forging a check had, a few days previous to the forgery in question, forged another check, is admissible to show the intent with which the act charged was done.

2. On a trial for forgery, a witness for defendant was asked if the defendant was not addicted to the use of opium, and if she was not sometimes demented. Held that, no offer being made to show that defendant was insane or demented when the offense was alleged to have been committed, the evidence was properly excluded.

3. Where the instructions are not all copied into the record on appeal, it is presumed they covered every phase of the case correctly.

Appeal from criminal court, Greene county; C. B. McAfee, Judge.

Emma Hodges was convicted of forgery, and she appeals. Affirmed.

John Schmook, Jr., and F. M. Wolf, for appellant. Edward C. Crow, Atty. Gen., and Sam. B. Jeffries, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BURGESS, J.

From a conviction in the criminal court of Greene county of knowingly uttering a forged instrument, and the fixing of her punishment at two years' imprisonment in the state penitentiary, defendant appealed.

At the time of the commission of the alleged offense, the defendant lived with her stepfather, Herman Bauer, in the city of Springfield, Mo. On the last day of February, 1897, she engaged a horse and buggy from the Pickwick Livery & Transfer Company, in Springfield, which was delivered to her by one Merrell Skinner, who was at that time in the employ of the livery company. In payment for the hire of the horse and buggy, defendant asked a gentleman who was with her to give her a check, which he did. She, in turn, handed it to Skinner. Skinner asked the gentleman to sign his name to the check, as it had no name on the back of it, but defendant took it, and said she would sign it. She then signed Bauer's name to the check, in the presence of Skinner. The check purported to be drawn upon the Springfield Savings Bank, and signed by defendant's stepfather, H. R. Bauer. Upon being presented to the bank for payment, it was refused. Bauer testified that he did not sign the check, and had given no one authority to sign it for him. Other facts connected with the case will be hereafter stated, should it be deemed necessary.

During the trial, the state was permitted to introduce in evidence, over the objection and exception of defendant, another check, other than the one described in the indictment, which the evidence tended to show was a forgery, and that defendant had a few days previous to the last day of February, 1897, in the same city, uttered knowing it to be such. It is insisted by defendant that this evidence was improperly admitted, because it tended to show that defendant was guilty of another separate and distinct offense. Such evidence is not permissible for the purpose of proving the commission of other and distinct crimes by the defendant than that for which she is upon trial; but when, as in this case, guilty knowledge is an ingredient of the offense charged, it is admissible, for the purpose of showing the intent with which the act was done. State v. Myers, 82 Mo. 558, was a prosecution for obtaining property by means of a trick and fraud, and acts of the defendant similar to the one for which he was being tried, committed on the same day and in the same town, were admitted in evidence against him for the purpose of showing the intent with which the act was done. In State v. Bayne, 88 Mo. 604, it was held that acts of the defendant similar to the one for which he was being tried, committed near the same time and in the same city, were admissible against him for a like purpose. The same rule was announced in State v. Cooper, 85 Mo. 256; in State v. Sarony, 95 Mo. 349, 8 S. W. 407; in State v. Turley (Mo. Sup.) 44 S. W. 267; and in State v. Balch, 136 Mo. 103, 37 S. W. 808. This evidence was restricted by the court when admitted, and also by an instruction as to the intent of the defendant at the time she was alleged to have uttered the check described in the indictment, and for that purpose it was clearly admissible. There was no evidence tending to show that defendant had, or that she had reasonable grounds for believing that she had, authority to sign Bauer's name to the check described in the indictment. Upon the contrary, while he testified that she was...