State v. Hofland

• Decision Date: 20 November 2012
• Docket Number: Docket No. Wal–11–180.
• Citation: 2012 ME 129,58 A.3d 1023
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Randall HOFLAND.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

58 A.3d 1023

2012 ME 129

STATE of Maine

v.Randall HOFLAND.

Docket No. Wal–11–180.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs: Oct. 10, 2012.

Decided: Nov. 20, 2012.

Randall Hofland, pro se appellant.

Geoffrey Rushlau, District Attorney, Prosecutorial District Six, Rockland, for appellee State of Maine.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and JABAR, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

[¶ 1] Randall Hofland appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in the trial court ( Hjelm, J.) finding him guilty of four counts of criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. §§ 209, 1252(4) (2011); eleven counts of criminal restraint with a dangerous weapon (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. §§ 302(1)(A)(1), 1252(4) (2011); twenty-two counts of kidnapping (Class A), 17–A M.R.S. §§ 301(1)(A)(2), 301(1)(B)(1), 1252(4) (2011); one count of burglary (Class A), 17–A M.R.S. § 401(1)(B)(1) (2011); and one count of criminal restraint (Class D), 17–A M.R.S. § 302(1)(A)(1). The court imposed sentences of thirty years and five years, to be served consecutively, and sentences of ten years and 364 days, to be served concurrently. Hofland now appeals, raising numerous issues. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] On the evening of October 23, 2008, Hofland was involved in an altercation with law enforcement officers at a roadblock during which officers allege Hofland pulled a gun and then sped off. Hofland spent the next eight days in the woods evading law enforcement.

[¶ 3] When he emerged from hiding on October 31, 2008, Hofland walked into the Stockton Springs Elementary School gymnasium with a loaded handgun and attempted to forcibly gather children and bring them into a school bathroom. When school officials interceded, Hofland pointed his gun at them. Hofland then forced his way into a classroom full of fifth grade students and held those students against their will until law enforcement officials arrived.

[¶ 4] On December 30, 2008, the Waldo County grand jury indicted Hofland for his conduct at the school. He entered a plea of not guilty and later amended that plea to add a plea of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity.

[¶ 5] On June 11, 2009, Attorney Jeffrey Toothaker was appointed to represent Hofland. At a motion hearing held on June 26, 2009, Hofland argued that the Maine and United States Constitutions afforded him both the right to represent himself and the right to representation by court-appointed counsel. Hofland asserted that he would act as lead counsel and Attorney Toothaker would work for him.

[¶ 6] In light of his insistence on taking a lead role in his own defense, the court asked Hofland about his educational background and his familiarity with legal proceedings. The court informed him that there were risks associated with self-representation, that he would be held to the same standards as an attorney, that he would not receive legal advice from the court, and that the prosecutor was a trained and experienced attorney. Hofland indicated that he understood and was making the decision to proceed as lead counsel voluntarily. Attorney Toothaker also expressed his satisfaction and understanding that Hofland was undertaking the role of lead counsel in a knowing and informed manner.

[¶ 7] In the time between his indictment on December 30, 2008, and his trial in January 2011, Hofland filed well over one hundred motions. The court addressedmotions as they came in, and held testimonial hearings on some of the motions. The majority of the hearings centered on two issues: a motion to suppress all evidence based on Hofland's contention that the October 23, 2008, roadblock was unconstitutional, and a motion to dismiss all charges based on an assertion that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The court upheld the constitutionality of the roadblock, and found that although the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial as early as June 2009, the trial was delayed by the “extraordinary number of motions filed by the defendant himself,” and that the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay.

[¶ 8] A bifurcated trial began on January 10, 2011, and on January 28 the jury returned its verdict of guilty on all counts except one count of criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon (Class C) on which the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. At the close of evidence, Hofland requested that the jury be instructed on the Second Amendment right to bear arms, but this request was denied. The second phase, regarding criminal responsibility, lasted only two days, and the jury returned a verdict of criminally responsible as to all counts.

[¶ 9] At sentencing, the court merged the twenty-two separate kidnapping charges into eleven charges, reflecting one charge per child present in the classroom. The court then refused to merge the criminal restraint charges with the kidnapping charges, ruling that they were separate offenses. The court imposed sentences of thirty years and five years, to be served consecutively; two other smaller sentences were to be served concurrently. The thirty-year sentence stemmed from the convictions relating to the conduct in the classroom, and the five-year sentence stemmed from the convictions relating to the conduct in the gymnasium. Hofland filed this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 10] Hofland enumerates twenty-five issues in the introductory section of his brief, then addresses ten in the body of his argument, with little correlation between the two. Most of Hofland's arguments center on a theory that numerous state actors, including this Court, conspired to convict him in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. See18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1961–1968 (LexisNexis 2010). These issues are without merit and will not be discussed. We will address the following issues: Whether (A) Hofland was denied his right to a speedy trial, (B) Hofland was denied his right to self-representation, (C) the court erred in denying his request for an instruction on the Second Amendment right to bear arms, (D) the court erred by not dismissing the kidnapping charge because the term “substantial period” was unconstitutionally vague, (E) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Hofland held the children for a “substantial period of time,” and (F) the court properly imposed consecutive sentences. All other issues raised by Hofland are without merit and will not be discussed.

A. Whether Hofland Was Denied His Right to a Speedy Trial

[¶ 11] “We review for abuse of discretion a court's judgment on a motion to dismiss a charge for failure to provide a speedy trial.” State v. Teachout, 2011 ME 37, ¶ 4, 16 A.3d 155. “A speedy trial analysis requires application of a delicate balancing test that takes into account all of the circumstances of the case at hand.” State v. Drewry, 2008 ME 76, ¶ 12, 946 A.2d 981 (quotation marks omitted). The balancing test focuses on four factors announcedby the United States Supreme Court: “Length of delay, the reason for delay, the defendant's assertion of his right [to a speedy trial], and prejudice to the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). An analysis of the four Barker factors is only necessary if a presumption of prejudice is created by a lengthy delay. State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d 623, 627 (Me.1985).

[¶ 12] In denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court determined that the length of delay was sufficient to create a presumption of prejudice, and therefore analyzed the case using the four Barker factors. The court found that although Hofland asserted his rights early in the process, Hofland was the primary reason for the delay, and that he failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the delay. Thus, the court properly analyzed Hofland's claim of violation of his right to a speedy trial and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–32, 92 S.Ct. 2182;Murphy, 496 A.2d at 628–29.

B. Whether Hofland Was Denied His Right to Self–Representation

[¶ 13] Hofland argues that his right to self-representation was violated because the court refused to allow hybrid representation whereby he would proceed in a self-represented capacity and with court-appointed counsel. Although the court allowed Hofland to proceed as lead counsel with Attorney Toothaker as standby counsel, Hofland contends that this arrangement fell short of what is constitutionally required. Under Hofland's theory of hybrid counsel, both he and his court-appointed counsel would have an opportunity to present opening statements, question witnesses, and engage in closing arguments.

[¶ 14] Article I, section VI of the Maine Constitution states in relevant part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by the accused and counsel to the accused, or either, at the election of the accused.” “The protection afforded by [this provision] is commensurate with that of the [S]ixth [A]mendment to the [F]ederal [C]onstitution.” State v. Gallant, 595 A.2d 413, 416 (Me.1991). The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution confers not only a right to representation, but a right to self-representation if the defendant so elects. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Any decision to proceed with self-representation must be made knowingly and intelligently, with specific knowledge of the dangers associated with such a decision. Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Even if a defendant knowingly and voluntarily decides to proceed without counsel, the court may still appoint counsel to serve in a standby capacity. Id. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525.

[¶ 15] In McKaskle v. Wiggins, the Supreme Court clarified the appropriate roles of the pro se defendant and standby counsel. 465 U.S. 168, 170, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). As to the defendant, the Court stated:

A defendant's right to self-representation...