State v. Hoggatt

• Decision Date: 13 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2 CA-SA-00-0139.,2 CA-SA-00-0139.
• Citation: 199 Ariz. 440,18 P.3d 1239
• Parties: The STATE of Arizona, ex rel. Arizona Department of Health Services, Petitioner, v. Hon. Wallace R. HOGGATT, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Cochise, Respondent, and John Edwin Woods; George Flick; and Larry Dever, Sheriff of Cochise County, Real Parties in Interest.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

18 P.3d 1239

199 Ariz. 440

The STATE of Arizona, ex rel. Arizona Department of Health Services, Petitioner, v. Hon. Wallace R. HOGGATT, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Cochise, Respondent, and John Edwin Woods; George Flick; and Larry Dever, Sheriff of Cochise County, Real Parties in Interest.

No. 2 CA-SA-00-0139.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2, Department B.

February 13, 2001.

Janet Napolitano, Arizona Attorney General, by Dante M. Alegre and Kevin D. Ray, Phoenix, Attorneys for Petitioner.

Mark A. Suagee, Cochise County Public Defender, by Donna M. Bechman, Bisbee, Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest John Edwin Woods and George Flick.

Chris M. Roll, Cochise County Attorney, by Vincent J. Festa, Bisbee, Attorneys for Real Party in Interest Larry Dever.

HOWARD, Presiding Judge.

¶ 1 Petitioner Arizona Department of Health Services (DHS) seeks special action relief from the respondent judge's orders, entered pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-3717, requiring DHS to transport real parties in interest John Edwin Woods and George Flick from the Arizona Community Protection and Treatment Center (ACPTC) at the Arizona State Hospital in Phoenix to Cochise County Superior Court to attend a Frye¹ hearing. Woods and Flick are the subjects of petitions filed by the Cochise County Attorney's Office pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-3704, alleging that they are sexually violent persons (SVP). If a court or jury so finds beyond a reasonable doubt, A.R.S. § 36-3707(A), they must be committed to the custody of DHS and placed in a "licensed facility," or conditionally released to a "less restrictive alternative." § 36-3707(B); see also A.R.S. §§ 36-3710 and 36-3711.

¶ 2 DHS asserts and we agree that it has no equally plain, speedy, or adequate means by appeal of obtaining review of the respondent judge's interlocutory orders. Ariz. R.P. Special Actions 1(a), 17B A.R.S. And, the issue raised in this special action is of statewide importance. See Jones v. Buchanan, 177 Ariz. 410, 411, 868 P.2d 993, 994 (App.1993). But, for the reasons stated below, we cannot say the respondent judge abused his discretion in entering the order and therefore deny relief. Ariz. R.P. Special Actions 3.

¶ 3 In September 2000, the respondent judge ordered DHS to transport Woods to Bisbee for the commitment trial, which had been set for November. DHS filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that real party in interest Larry Dever, Cochise County Sheriff, should transport Woods. Gene Messer, the director of ACPTC, who had participated in drafting and had attended meetings and hearings concerning the proposal and passage of § 36-3717, testified at the subsequent hearing on the motion. The respondent denied DHS's motion for reconsideration, confirming its prior order requiring DHS to transport Woods to trial. DHS asked the respondent to permit the trial to be conducted at the Arizona State Hospital or telephonically or by an interactive audiovisual conferencing system, pursuant to § 36-3717(C). After another hearing, the respondent denied that request. Respondent then continued the trial date but set a three-day Frye hearing, commencing on January 3, 2001, consolidating Woods's case with Flick's for purposes of that hearing. Consistent with his previous order, the respondent ordered DHS to transport Woods and Flick to Bisbee for the Frye hearing. DHS filed motions to vacate the orders to transport for the Frye hearing, which the respondent denied. Subsequently, respondent ordered DHS to transport Woods and Flick to Bisbee for a hearing on February 6, 2001, and a continuation of the Frye hearing on March 13, 2001. DHS requested a stay of the transportation orders, which respondent denied.

¶ 4 In its petition challenging the transportation order, DHS contends (1) Woods's and Flick's attendance at the Frye hearing is not authorized by § 36-3717(A), which sets forth the kinds of legal proceedings to which persons detained or committed as SVPs may be transported; (2) the statute does not require DHS to transport such persons for non-medical purposes; (3) county sheriffs should transport such persons for legal proceedings specified in § 36-3717(A); and, (4) DHS does not have the vehicles, personnel, or other resources to safely transport detainees to and from such proceedings. Even though we must ultimately decide whether the respondent abused his discretion by ordering DHS to transport Woods and Flick to the Frye hearing, we review de novo issues that involve the interpretation of the SVP statutes. See Open Primary Elections Now v. Bayless, 193 Ariz. 43, ¶ 9, 969 P.2d 649, ¶ 9 (1998); Libra Group, Inc. v. State, 167 Ariz. 176, 179, 805 P.2d 409, 412 (App.1991).

¶ 5 DHS first contends that because a Frye hearing is not specified in § 36-3717(A), a detained or committed person may not be transported to it. The statute provides:

A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, a person who is detained or civilly committed pursuant to this article shall not be transported from a licensed facility under the supervision of the superintendent of the [A]rizona state hospital, except that a person may be transported to court for any of the following reasons:

1. A probable cause hearing pursuant to § 36-3705.

2. A trial pursuant to § 36-3706.

3. A hearing on a petition for conditional release to a less restrictive alternative pursuant to § 36-3709.

4. A hearing on a petition for discharge pursuant to § 36-3714.

5. Any evidentiary hearing in which the presence of a person who is detained or civilly committed pursuant to this article is necessary.

6. Any court proceeding not otherwise specified in this article where the presence of the detainee or committed person is required.

¶ 6 That a Frye hearing is not specified in § 36-3737(A) does not mean a detained or committed person is not entitled to attend it. The outcome of that hearing may well determine the outcome of the trial at which the subject's liberty is at stake. The rules of procedure do not establish a Frye hearing as a separate procedure from the trial, although it is generally held prior to the remainder of the trial for practical reasons. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 581, 858 P.2d 1152, 1184 (1993); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 104(c), 17A A.R.S. (contemplating hearing regarding admissibility of evidence to be held outside presence of jury). For purposes of § 36-3717(A), a Frye hearing is part of the trial held pursuant to § 36-3706. Thus, the respondent judge did not abuse his discretion by ordering that Woods and Flick be transported to Bisbee for the Frye hearing.

¶ 7 We now turn to the question whether the respondent judge abused his discretion by ordering DHS to provide that transportation. To answer this question, we look again to § 36-3717. In addition to specifying in subsection (A) the kinds of legal proceedings to which a detained or committed person may be transported, § 36-3717 further provides:

B. Subsection A of this section does not apply to any person whom the court has determined is subject to conditional release pursuant to § 36-3710 or to any necessary medical transports.

....

D. The department of health services is responsible for the transportation to and from a medical facility of a person who is detained or committed pursuant to this article. The department of health services shall determine the appropriate mode of transportation and level of security and restraint for the transportation needs of the person. In determining the appropriate mode of transportation and level of security and restraint, the department shall consider the safety of the public, the transporting personnel and the detained or committed person.

E. The department of health services and any county sheriff are immune from liability for any good faith acts under this section.

¶ 8 Basic principles of statutory interpretation require that we first "seek to discern the intent of the legislature." State v. Reynolds, 170 Ariz. 233, 234, 823 P.2d 681, 682 (1992). To do so, we are mindful that "[t]he language of a statute is the most reliable evidence of its intent." Walker v. City of Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 209, 786 P.2d 1057, 1060 (App.1989). If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we will give the words their ordinary meaning and will not resort to other forms of statutory interpretation. See State ex rel. Udall v. Superior Court, 183 Ariz. 462, 464, 904 P.2d 1286, 1288 (App.1995); see also A.R.S. § 1-213. We will give an undefined word or phrase "its ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended." Sierra Tucson, Inc. v. Pima County, 178 Ariz. 215, 219, 871 P.2d 762, 766 (App.1994). "Legislative intent ... can [also] be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute." Carrow Co. v. Lusby, 167 Ariz. 18, 20, 804 P.2d 747, 749 (1990); see also State v. Takacs, 169 Ariz. 392, 395, 819 P.2d 978, 981 (App.1991). We also consider the context of the statute, its language, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose. Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672 (1994).

¶ 9 With these principles in mind, we conclude and DHS concedes that § 36-3717(D) requires DHS to transport SVPs for medical purposes. Woods and Flick contend, however, that the clear language of § 36-3717, without resort to principles of statutory construction, requires DHS to provide transportation to court proceedings set forth in subsection (A) as well. They reach that conclusion based on their reasoning that § 36-3717(D) requires DHS to provide those detained or committed with "transportation to and from a medical facility" and that a "medical facility" includes a "licensed facility" such as ACPTC. Thus, they reason, even if the transportation is from a licensed facility to any court proceeding, DHS must provide it. The trial court accepted this reasoning.

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