State v. Hokanson

Decision Date03 October 2012
Docket NumberA11–2227.,Nos. A11–0359,s. A11–0359
Citation821 N.W.2d 340
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Tylar James HOKANSON, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court

1. The district court properly applied the Paradee in-camera-review process.

2. The district court did not err in excluding reverse- Spreigl evidence.

3. The State presented sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction for first-degree murder.

4. The district court's jury instruction on the requirements of a past pattern of child abuse fairly and accurately stated the applicable law.

5. Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel.

6. The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for an evidentiary hearing.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Heather D. Pipenhagen, Assistant Dakota County Attorney, Cheri A. Townsend, Special Staff Assistant Dakota County Attorney, Hastings, MN, for respondent.

David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice.

Appellant Tylar James Hokanson was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder while committing malicious punishment of a child with a past pattern of child abuse for the death of his stepson, 17–month–old Nicholas Arthur Miller. In this consolidated appeal, appellant argues that he is entitled to relief because: (1) his right to present an alternative perpetrator defense was violated when the district court denied defense counsel unfettered access to documents protected by the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act or other legislation; (2) his right to present an alternative perpetrator defense was violated when the district court ruled that potential reverse- Spreigl evidence was inadmissible; (3) the circumstantial evidence against him was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that he engaged in a “past pattern of child abuse”; (4) the jury instructions given relieved the State of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had engaged in a “past pattern of child abuse”; and (5) his defense counsel engaged in ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the erroneous jury instructions. Because we conclude that his claims lack merit, we affirm appellant's conviction.

At 5:29 p.m. on Tuesday, June 23, 2009, the Pierce County, Wisconsin, sheriff's department received a 911 call from appellant requesting an ambulance because his stepson, Nicholas Arthur Miller, was having difficulty breathing. Appellant further reported that CPR was being performed on Nicholas. Paramedics arrived at the rural farmhouse in Maiden Rock, Wisconsin, where appellant was staying with Nicholas, his wife and Nicholas's mother M.H., his stepdaughter M.M., and his infant son N.H., while visiting several other family members. The paramedics who placed Nicholas into the ambulance detected no heartbeat and were unable to resuscitate him. After transporting him to a hospital in Durand, Wisconsin, Nicholas was pronounced dead.

The Pierce County Medical Examiner ordered an autopsy that was performed by a forensic pathologist in Ramsey County. The preliminary autopsy report listed Nicholas's cause of death as a result of multiple blunt-force injuries and classified the death as a homicide. The autopsy report documented multiple injuries occurring over a period of time, including: bruising and abrasion on Nicholas's left eye; a contusion on the forehead; bruising on the right eyelid, right cheek, and left side of the jaw consistent with fingertips; bruising on the chest and shoulders; bruising on the back of the neck; and bruising in the center of the back. The autopsy also documented lacerations to the mouth and tongue, multiple rib fractures, and a fracture of a thoracic vertebra in the child's back. Based on iron studies of the contusions, the pathologist testified that the contusions likely occurred within a spectrum of days leading up to Nicholas's death. The examination also documented a subdural hematoma with approximately 20 cubic centimeters of blood pooled in the brain, which the pathologist testified was likely from an injury sustained 2 to 5 days before Nicholas's death.

Because police believed that, based on the autopsy, the injuries that caused Nicholas's death were inflicted a few days before he died, the investigation was transferred to Dakota County, where Nicholas had resided in a rural farmhouse with several family members. In the days following Nicholas's death, Dakota County law enforcement officers met and interviewed several people, including appellant, who lived with Nicholas and was Nicholas's stepfather; M.H., Nicholas's mother and appellant's wife; and several other family members, including B.M., Nicholas's biological father and an initial suspect in the homicide.

During the police interview with appellant, appellant admitted that he had shaken Nicholas in the days leading up to his death. Appellant said that he had shaken Nicholas back and forth “no less than 10, no less than 15” times, and rated the level of force used at a 5 or 6 out of 10. When asked whether it was possible that he had shaken Nicholas harder than that, appellant responded “possibly.” Appellant also admitted to covering Nicholas's mouth with his hand to stop him from screaming and to holding Nicholas's face down while Nicholas called for his mother. Appellant further stated that he believed that his actions contributed to Nicholas's health problems in the days leading up to his death, and acknowledged that he thought the shaking could have caused the bleeding on Nicholas's brain.

A grand jury subsequently indicted appellant with six counts of murder: (1) first-degree murder while committing child abuse (assault in the third degree), under Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(5) (2010), and Minn.Stat. § 609.223, subd. 3 (2010); (2) first-degree murder while committing child abuse (malicious punishment of a child) with a past pattern of child abuse, under Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(5) and Minn.Stat. § 609.377, subds. 1, 4 (2010); (3) first-degree murder while committing child abuse (neglect of a child), under Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(5) and Minn.Stat. § 609.378, subd. 1(a)(1) (2010); (4) second-degree murder while committing a felony (assault in the third degree), under Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2010) and Minn.Stat. § 609.223, subd. 3; and (5) second-degree murder while committing a felony (malicious punishment of a child), under Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) and Minn.Stat. § 609.377, subds. 1, 4; and (6) second-degree murder while committing a (felony-neglect of a child), under Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) and Minn.Stat. § 609.378, subd. 1(a)(1).

Before trial, appellant filed a notice of motion and motion seeking an order granting him access to the entire child protection file relating to investigations of M.H. and B.M. by social services. Appellant argued that other family members, including both of Nicholas's biological parents, had at least as much access to Nicholas leading up to his death and that appellant should be allowed to use evidence of social services' investigations into parenting by M.H. and B.M. as part of his defense. The State responded that the information requested was privileged under the child protection statutes and the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, and that disclosure was not appropriate without an in camera review and a court order pursuant to State v. Paradee, 403 N.W.2d 640 (Minn.1987). The district court then ordered an in camera review of the social services files in question to determine which portions would be given to appellant. The district court then released documents under seal to appellant that it determined to be “potentially relevant.”

At appellant's omnibus hearing, appellant requested that additional social services and child protection files be released and questioned the child protection worker who was in charge of the investigations relating to Nicholas after his death. As a result of this request, the district court reviewed notes and files related to the child protection worker's participation in the case and released additional documents to the defense. The district court also released additional social services documents on multiple occasions in the months leading up to trial.

Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence, including testimony that B.M. had previously shaken M.M., Nicholas's older sister and B.M.'s daughter; evidence regarding the parenting skills of M.H. and B.M., Nicholas's biological parents; evidence about custody arrangements or child protection proceedings for M.H.'s and B.M.'s other children; and evidence that M.H.'s father had physically disciplined M.H. while M.H. was a teenager, as irrelevant and inadmissible character evidence. After a hearing, the district court issued an order ruling inadmissible: (1) evidence or testimony related to the parenting skills of any party; and (2) any reference to the Children in Need of Protection (CHIPS) file or custody arrangements for the other children unless approved by the court. The district court also ruled that evidence that M.H.'s father had previously disciplined her as a teenager was irrelevant and inadmissible, and that appellant had not sufficiently articulated the specific acts committed by M.H. that were relevant and thus admissible as alternative perpetrator evidence.

Appellant submitted a motion to reconsider and argued that evidence of M.H.'s father's disciplinary history was proper alternative perpetrator evidence that established the father as an alternate abuser of Nicholas. Appellant also argued that a specific incident that occurred on August 11, 2009, in which M.M. burned her arm while M.H. and M.M. were making pancakes, was properly admissible as alternative perpetrator evidence because it...

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128 cases
  • State v. Harris
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • May 24, 2017
    ...evidence as "evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist." State v. Hokanson , 821 N.W.2d 340, 354 n.3 (Minn. 2012) (quoting 1 Barbara E. Bergman & Nancy Hollander, Whartons Criminal Evidence § 1:8 (15th ed. 1997) ). In contrast, direct......
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    • July 13, 2022
    ...accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. Cox , 884 N.W.2d at 411 ; see also State v. Hokanson , 821 N.W.2d 340, 354–55 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that the State's obligation is to exclude all reasonable inferences other than guilt).Here, the circumstan......
  • State v. Khalil, A19-1281
    • United States
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    • July 27, 2020
    ...him of a fair trial."Criminal defendants have a broad right to discovery in order to prepare and present a defense." State v. Hokanson , 821 N.W.2d 340, 349 (Minn. 2012). A district court may order disclosure of material that is not subject to disclosure without a court order upon a showing......
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    ...evidentiary hearing is to develop the record when a claim depends on a fact outside the trial record. See, e.g., State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 357–58 (Minn.2012); Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 541 (Minn.2007) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing regarding discussions between counsel......
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