State v. Holcombe
| Decision Date | 22 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. PD-1297-04.,PD-1297-04. |
| Citation | 187 S.W.3d 496 |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas v. Stephen John HOLCOMBE, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Wm. Reagan Wynn, Fort Worth, for Appellant.
Tanya S. Dohoney, Asst. Criminal District Atty., Fort Worth, Matthew Paul, State's Atty., Austin, for State.
KELLER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which PRICE, WOMACK, KEASLER, HOLCOMB and COCHRAN JJ., joined.
The question in this case is whether a city ordinance that prohibits playing music "in such a manner as to ... unreasonably disturb or interfere with the peace, comfort and repose of neighboring persons of ordinary sensibilities" is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to put the citizenry on notice of what is prohibited, fails to contain objective standards, and gives the police unfettered discretion to determine what conduct amounts to a violation. The answer to this question is "no." Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
On May 19, 2002, at approximately 2:30 a.m., two Bedford police officers, Joseph Riley and William Mack, responded for the second time that night to complaints about a loud-noise disturbance created by a house party. The officers issued a citation for violating Bedford's noise ordinance.
While returning to his patrol car, Officer Riley heard, from approximately seventy-five yards away, loud music playing from appellee's white Mercedes. The officer testified that appellee's music was louder than the noise at the party for which he had just written a citation. He further testified that the Bedford noise ordinance is a general noise ordinance that is not specific to residences. Officer Mack testified that the music was "extremely" loud from one hundred twenty and one hundred fifty feet away. Because the officers were called to the neighborhood in response to a loud noise disturbance call, and Officer Riley believed appellee was violating the Bedford noise ordinance, they pulled him over and asked him to turn down his music. While speaking to appellee through the sunroof of the car, Officer Riley smelled alcohol and noticed that appellee's speech was slurred and his eyes appeared to be bloodshot. It appeared to the officer that appellee was under the influence of alcohol, so he intended to keep speaking to him, but appellee apologized and drove off. Officer Riley then radioed Officer Mack, who was about seventy-five yards down the street, and asked him to stop appellee. Appellee subsequently was arrested for driving while intoxicated.
Appellee was charged by a misdemeanor information with driving while intoxicated. He filed a motion to suppress evidence, in which he alleged that he was illegally arrested without a warrant, and thus he requested that all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal arrest be suppressed. Following a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted appellee's motion. The court ruled that the Bedford noise ordinance is unconstitutional because it is overbroad and vague for its failure to place the public on sufficient notice. The State appealed, and the Second Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally overbroad1 or vague because it "describes the prohibited conduct and does not permit arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement."2 Appellee's motion for rehearing was overruled.
Appellee filed a petition for discretionary review, arguing, among other things, that the Bedford noise ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide notice of the prohibited conduct, fails to contain objective standards, and gives the police unfettered discretion to determine what conduct violates the ordinance. We granted review and now turn to that issue.
The Bedford ordinance provides:
The following sounds are hereby determined to be specific noises which can constitute a noise disturbance, and violations of this article are hereby defined. A noise does not have to exceed the specifications for environmental sound levels contained in section 12-533 in order to constitute a violation of this section.
. . .
(2) Radios, television sets, musical instruments and similar devices. Operating or permitting to be operated any radio receiving set, musical instrument, television, phonograph, drum or other machine or device for the production or reproduction of sound in such a manner as to violate the sound levels of this article or to unreasonably disturb or interfere with the peace, comfort and repose of neighboring persons of ordinary sensibilities, unless a permit of variance is first obtained.
BEDFORD, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 54, art. II, § 36 (2002).
It is a basic principle of due process that a statute is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.4 The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.5 Although a statute is not impermissibly vague because it fails to define words or phrases,6 it is invalid if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited.7 Moreover, where, as here, a statute does not substantially implicate constitutionally protected conduct or speech, it is valid unless it is impermissibly vague in all applications.8
Appellee argues that the Bedford noise ordinance is impermissibly vague because it does not give reasonable notice of the conduct the ordinance prohibits, nor provide an objective standard for determining when the ordinance is violated, such as a specific decibel level or a specific distance from which the noise is audible. He claims that the lack of notice or objective criteria in the ordinance gives police officers unlimited discretion to determine if the noise is sufficiently loud to constitute a violation.
The State argues that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague because it is couched in terms of objective reasonableness. Because the ordinance employs the word, "unreasonably," it provides an objective standard of evaluation. By grounding a noise ordinance in terms of reasonableness, the ordinance is not rendered unconstitutionally vague.
We agree with the State that the Bedford noise ordinance contains objective criteria for determining what conduct is prohibited and therefore does not permit arbitrary enforcement. The ordinance clearly establishes an objective reasonable-person standard by referring to "neighboring persons of ordinary sensibilities" and banning noise that "unreasonably disturb[s] or interfere[s] with the peace, comfort and repose" of such persons.9 These words describe noise of the type or volume that a reasonable person would not tolerate under the circumstances.10
Because we are limited to the use of words, we cannot demand mathematical certainty from our language.11 Although the Bedford noise ordinance does not define "noise" or "unreasonably disturb or interfere," words not defined are to be given their plain meaning.12 In determining the plain meaning of a word, we initially look to dictionary definitions.13 "Noise" commonly means a loud, confused, or senseless outcry; or a sound noticeably loud, harsh, or discordant.14 "Unreasonable" is an objective, reasonable-man standard.15 The noise ordinance thus creates an objective standard that ensures that persons of ordinary intelligence know when a particular noise is too loud. Such objectivity prevents broad discriminatory or subjective enforcement by the police. Although the noise ordinance does allow a degree of police judgment, that judgment is confined to the judgment of a reasonable person.
Here, the ordinance gave appellee adequate notice that blaring music from his car stereo at 2:30 a.m. was prohibited. His conduct falls within the conduct proscribed by the Bedford noise ordinance. His claim of lack of notice fails.
Because the noise ordinance provides sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct,16 it is unnecessary, for constitutional purposes, for the ordinance to include explicit prohibitions of noise above a certain decibel level or noise that can be heard at a certain distance.17 The words of the Bedford noise ordinance are "marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity," and the conduct that is prohibited is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process.18
We hold that the Bedford noise ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague, and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
MEYERS, J., not participating.
The trial court granted appellee's motion to suppress based on its decision that the City of Bedford noise ordinance is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals also addressed that issue. The constitutionality of the ordinance is, therefore, properly before this Court.1
The police were in a residential neighborhood at 2:30 a.m. in response to complaints about a loud party at a house where the police issued a citation for violating the City of Bedford noise ordinance. See State v. Holcombe, 145 S.W.3d 246, 248-49 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004). Appellee was driving through the neighborhood with his car stereo playing music louder than the noise at the house. See id. A police officer flagged appellee down and asked him to turn down the volume of his car stereo. See id. The officer immediately noticed that appellee was probably intoxicated. See id. Appellee turned down the volume of his car stereo and drove off. See id. Suspicious that appellee was intoxicated, the police stopped appellee's car again and eventually arrested him for DWI. See id.
Evidently believing that the police...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ex Parte Ellis
... ... Penal Code Ann. § 34.02 (West Supp.2008)) (money laundering); 1 Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 253.094 (prohibited contributions). The indictments state that six named corporations gave unlawful contributions totaling $155,000 to TRMPAC, that Ellis and Colyandro delivered these corporate contributions ... State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex.Crim. App.2006) ("In determining the plain meaning of a word, we initially look to dictionary definitions.") Our review of ... ...
-
Anthony v. State
... ... Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 108 F.3d 358, 362 (D.C.Cir.1997); see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162, 92 S.Ct. 839; State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). Although the regulation must give fair warning—in light of common understanding and practices—of the prohibited conduct, the regulation is not required to be mathematically precise. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294; Ex parte Anderson, 902 ... ...
-
Ex parte Poe
...it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited. See State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). We will not invalidate a statute for overbreadth “merely because it is possible to imagine some unconstitutional ap......
-
State v. Stubbs, 14-15-00510-CR
...fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited. See State v. Holcombe , 187 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). Statutes are not unconstitutionally vague merely because the words or terms employed in the statute are not defined. ......
-
Pretrial Motions
...words or terms used are not specifically defined. Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); see also State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Wagner v. State, 539 S.W.3d at 314. Rather, the words or phrase must be read in the context in which they are......
-
Rules of Statutory and Legal Interpretation
...constitutionally protected conduct or speech, it is valid unless it is impermissibly vague in all applications. State v. Holcombe , 187 S.W.3d 496 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); Watson v. State, 369 S.W.3d 865, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Due process requires that a criminal statute give fair notice ......
-
Rules of statutory and legal interpretation
...constitutionally protected conduct or speech, it is valid unless it is impermissibly vague in all applications. State v. Holcombe , 187 S.W.3d 496 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); Watson v. State, 369 S.W.3d 865, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Due process requires that a criminal statute give fair notice ......
-
Rules of Statutory and Legal Interpretation
...constitutionally protected conduct or speech, it is valid unless it is impermissibly vague in all applications. State v. Holcombe , 187 S.W.3d 496 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); Watson v. State, 369 S.W.3d 865, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Due process requires that a criminal statute give fair notice ......