State v. Holder

• Decision Date: 04 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. 26644.,26644.
• Citation: 676 S.E.2d 690,382 S.C. 278
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Brandi L. HOLDER, Appellant.

676 S.E.2d 690

382 S.C. 278

The STATE, Respondent, v. Brandi L. HOLDER, Appellant.

No. 26644.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard March 18, 2009.

Decided May 4, 2009.

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender for Capital Appeals Robert M. Dudek, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, of Columbia; and Solicitor Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.

Justice BEATTY.

Brandi L. Holder was convicted of homicide by child abuse for the death of her son, Bobby (Bo) Holder, and was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Holder appeals, arguing the trial court committed reversible error (1) in allowing a police investigator to testify regarding statements made by a codefendant during interrogation, (2) in admitting testimony from a coworker regarding her behavior, (3) in admitting autopsy photographs, and (4) in admitting photographs taken of her son one month before his death that suggested prior abuse. We affirm.

I. FACTS

Holder's son, Bo, was born on January 3, 2000. Holder started working at a hair salon in January 2002, and she thereafter met Mark Martucci, who worked at a carpet store next door. Holder and her son moved in with Martucci sometime in early 2002. Martucci was not Bo's biological father.

Between 12:00 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. on Wednesday, July 17, 2002, Bo, who was two-and-a-half years old, was brought unconscious to the emergency room at Allen-Bennett Hospital in Greenville, South Carolina by Martucci and another man, identified as John Parker.¹ Bo was not breathing and had no heartbeat. Martucci told hospital personnel that Bo had fallen off an All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV) earlier that week and had injured himself. When Holder later arrived at the hospital, she also told hospital personnel that Bo had been involved in an ATV accident.

Extensive efforts were made to resuscitate Bo, but they were unsuccessful and he was pronounced dead. Dr. Michael Eugene Ward, a pathologist who conducted the autopsy of Bo, testified that Bo's injuries were not caused by an accident. Bo had bruising in the pattern of knuckle marks on his face, and the inside of his lip had been split. Bruising was present around his mouth and face. Bo also had numerous bruises all over his body that were in various stages of healing. Dr. Ward concluded Bo died as a result of blunt force trauma to the abdomen. Specifically, Bo sustained trauma to the visceral organs of his abdomen with a tear in the small intestine, trauma to his pancreas, and bleeding into the abdominal cavity that caused his body to shut down.

Holder gave a statement to the police initially denying any knowledge of abuse. When she was told by investigators that they had discovered there had been no ATV accident, Holder indicated that she wanted to tell what had happened and she gave a second statement in which she admitted having knowledge of repeated incidents of Martucci's abuse of Bo.²

At a joint trial, Holder and Martucci were convicted of homicide by child abuse in the death of Bo. Holder was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Martucci did not appear for trial, so his sentence was sealed. Martucci subsequently appeared to receive his sentence and was ordered to serve life in prison. See State v. Martucci, 380 S.C. 232, 669 S.E.2d 598 (Ct.App.2008).

II. LAW/ANALYSIS

"A person is guilty of homicide by child abuse if the person ... causes the death of a child under the age of eleven while committing child abuse or neglect, and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life." S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-85(A)(1) (2003).

"Child abuse or neglect" is defined for purposes of the statute as "an act or omission by any person which causes harm to the child's physical health or welfare." Id. § 16-3-85(B)(1). "Harm to the child's physical health or welfare" occurs when someone "inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical injury, including injuries sustained as a result of excessive corporal punishment." Id. § 16-3-85(B)(2)(a).

(A) Statements by Codefendant

Holder asserts the trial court erred in allowing Doug Kelly, an investigator with the Greenville County Sheriff's Office, to relate what codefendant Martucci told him during interrogation. Martucci's redacted oral statement was allowed in to the effect that he had noticed some bruises on Bo, and "he felt like she had been inflicting them." Holder contends her Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses was denied, citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), because Martucci did not testify at trial. Holder alleges the redaction of Martucci's statement was insufficient in this case.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which was extended to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of a criminal defendant to confront witnesses against him, and this includes the right to cross-examine witnesses. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987).

In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that, in a joint trial, admission of a non-testifying codefendant's statement that expressly inculpates the defendant violates the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause, as the use of only a limiting instruction is insufficient to remove any prejudice to the defendant. 391 U.S. at 136-37, 88 S.Ct. 1620.

In Richardson, the Supreme Court remarked that the rule announced in Bruton is a "narrow" one that applies only when the statement implicates the defendant "on its face"; the rule does not apply where the statement becomes incriminating only when linked to other evidence introduced at trial, such as the defendant's own testimony. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207-08, 107 S.Ct. 1702. The Supreme Court also noted Bruton can be complied with by the use of redaction:

Even more significantly, evidence requiring linkage differs from evidence incriminating on its face in the practical effects which application of the Bruton exception would produce. If limited to facially incriminating confessions, Bruton can be complied with by redaction—a possibility suggested in that opinion itself. Id., at 134, n. 10, 88 S.Ct., at 1626, n. 10. If extended to confessions incriminating by connection, not only is that not possible, but it is not even possible to predict the admissibility of a confession in advance of trial.

Id. at 208-09, 107 S.Ct. 1702.

In Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998), a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court considered Bruton's application when the redaction consists of replacement of the defendant's name with an obvious blank space, a symbol, or a word such as "deleted." The Court noted the Richardson decision had limited the scope of Bruton to instances where the reference to the defendant was on the face of the statement. However, the majority in Gray held that a statement that "substituted blanks and the word `delete' for the petitioner's proper name[] falls within the class of statements to which Bruton's protections apply." Id. at 197, 118 S.Ct. 1151.

The majority reasoned that one must look at the kind of inferences that are necessary to make a connection to the defendant, not the simple fact that there are inferences, to determine the applicability of Bruton. Id. at 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151. Richardson involved statements that did not directly refer to the defendant, but which became incriminating only when linked to other evidence developed at trial. Id. at 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151. However, the Gray Court stated "[t]he inferences at issue here [in Gray] involve statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer directly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even [if the statement was] the very first item introduced at trial." Id. Thus, the statements are protected under Bruton because in such instances the defendant is implicated almost as if there was a direct reference, and the connection does not depend on other evidence introduced at trial. Id. at 196-97, 118 S.Ct. 1151.

Violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to a harmless error analysis. State v. Murphy, 270 S.C. 642, 644, 244 S.E.2d 36, 36-37 (1978) (observing where a wealth of evidence exists against the appellant, it eliminates any error in the admission of a codefendant's statement). "A [C]onfrontation [C]lause error is harmless if the evidence is overwhelming and the violation so insignificant by comparison that we are persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the violation did not affect the verdict." State v. Vincent, 131 Wash.App. 147, 120 P.3d 120, 124 (2005). "Considerations include the importance of the witness's testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case."³ Id.

In the current appeal, Holder argues the substitution of her name with the pronoun "she" was insufficient to obscure her identity because the jury could readily determine that the statement referred to her as she was the only female defendant. We find the redaction in this case is analogous to that discussed in Gray because, despite the redaction, it was apparent that Martucci was referring to Holder, and this inference was one that could be readily made even without reliance on the other testimony developed at trial. Thus, we find the admission of the redacted statement violated Holder's rights under the Confrontation Clause as Martucci did not testify and was not subject to cross-examination.

However, even though the redacted statement was...