State v. Holley

• Decision Date: 01 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. 1207,1207
• Citation: 82 Md.App. 381,571 A.2d 892
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Parren Augustus HOLLEY. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 381

82 Md.App. 381

571 A.2d 892

STATE of Maryland v. Parren Augustus HOLLEY.

No. 1207, Sept. Term, 1989.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 3, 1990.

Kreg Greer, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Alexander Williams, Jr., State's Atty. for Prince George's County, Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellant.

Mark Colvin, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before GILBERT, C.J., and MOYLAN and ROSALYN B. BELL, JJ.

ROSALYN B. BELL, J.

This case involves an appeal by the State from an order dismissing an indictment against Parren Augustus Holley on the ground that his trial was not commenced within 180 days after Holley filed a request for disposition of the charges pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. ¹ The question presented is whether the 180-day speedy trial provision of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers continues in effect after the defendant's term of imprisonment in another state ends.

We have not had the occasion to address this particular issue under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (I.A.D.). We have, however, answered this question in the negative in construing the Intrastate Detainers Act. ² Accordingly we hold that the I.A.D. does not apply under the circumstances presented here. Our holding is further supported by the statute's purpose, its plain language and case law from our sister jurisdictions.

Before we explain, and for ease of reference, we note the chronology of events the State contends are essential for a determination of the issue presented.

November 30, 1984 Felony arrest warrant issued charging Holley with robbery with a deadly weapon.

December 7, 1984 Written detainer sent to the District of Columbia where Holley was incarcerated.

October 29, 1985 Prison officials in the District of Columbia sent a letter to the Prince George's County Sheriff's Department, advising Maryland authorities that the District of Columbia was returning the warrants issued for Holley's arrest because he had been transferred to the prison in Petersburg, Virginia, on August 30, 1985.

December 6, 1988 The Prince George's County Sheriff's Department requested the return of Holley's arrest warrant and other documents from the District of Columbia as it had learned that Holley was incarcerated at the penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.

December 6, 1988 The Prince George's County Sheriff's Department sent a letter to the penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, advising officials there that Holley had been charged with robbery with a deadly weapon and requesting that a detainer be lodged against Holley.

December 12, 1988 Officials from the penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, sent a detainer action letter to the Prince George's County Sheriff's Department advising it that a detainer had been filed against Holley with regard to the robbery with a deadly weapon charge. The letter further advised that Holley's release date was tentatively scheduled for February 5, 1989.

December 20, 1988 Holley's request for a final disposition of the robbery with a deadly weapon charge, dated December 13, 1988, was filed pursuant to the I.A.D. and received in the State's Attorney's Office.

January 11, 1989 Officials at the penitentiary at Lewisburg sent the Prince George's County Sheriff's Department a letter advising the department that Holley would be made available to them. Prince George's County replied that it would assume custody of Holley.

February 3, 1989 The Prince George's County Sheriff's Department assumed custody of Holley--two days prior to his scheduled release date.

On February 28, 1989, an indictment (CT 890512X) was filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County charging Holley with one count of robbery with a deadly weapon and one count of use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. On August 7, 1989, Holley's attorney filed a motion to dismiss these charges, as well as other charges not relevant to the present appeal, alleging, inter alia, a violation of the 180-day speedy trial provision of the I.A.D. A hearing was held on August 8, 1989 and the motion's judge granted Holley's motion to dismiss, ruling that there was a violation of the I.A.D. From this ruling, the State appeals.

INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS

The I.A.D. provides cooperative procedures among the member states for the transfer of prisoners imprisoned in one state to the temporary custody of a second state where criminal charges are pending. Beachem v. State, 71 Md. App. 39, 43, 523 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 310 Md. 490, 530 A.2d 272 (1987). Initially, officials of the "receiving" state direct a detainer to prison officials in the "sending" state ³ which informs them that there are charges pending in another jurisdiction against one of their prisoners based on an untried indictment, information or complaint. Beachem, 71 Md.App. at 43, 523 A.2d 1033. The officials having custody of the prisoner must inform him or her of the contents of the detainer and of his or her right to request final disposition of the charges on which the detainer is based. § 616D(c).

The prisoner initiates final disposition of the charges by sending written notice to the official having custody of him or her and that official is required to forward the notice to the appropriate prosecuting official in the receiving state, § 616D(d), who must bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days from the date the request is received. § 616D(a). If the prosecuting official fails to try the prisoner within the 180 days prescribed, then the court having jurisdiction over the charges in the detainer shall enter an order dismissing the charges with prejudice. § 616F(c).

Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the State failed to bring him to trial within 180 days of December 20, 1988 and the motion's judge granted his motion.

The State argues, however, that, once an individual completes his or her term of incarceration in the "sending" state and is turned over to the custody of the "receiving" state, the prisoner loses the benefit of the 180-day speedy trial provision under § 616D(a), regardless of whether the prisoner is delivered to the receiving state before or after the incarceration is completed. Thus, the State contends that the motions' judge erred in dismissing the indictment since appellee was released from prison in the sending state in February, well before the 180 days expired. Upon an examination of the I.A.D. and its purpose, we agree with the State. We explain.

The dispute in the instant case arises from the parties' interpretation of § 616D(a), which provides in pertinent part:

"Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint: provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance."

Appellee contends that § 616D(a) should be strictly interpreted. He submits that the language of the statute is unqualified in that whenever "a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state" and "during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner," the person must be brought to trial within 180 days after the prosecuting officer of the "receiving" state receives the person's request for a final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint. Under a strict interpretation, appellee contends, dismissal of his indictment was proper since he was brought to trial more than 180 days after the State's Attorney received his request for final disposition of the indictment.

In response, the State argues that the language of § 616D(a) contemplates that the benefits of the I.A.D. are to be enjoyed only by persons under a "term of imprisonment." Once a prisoner has been released from incarceration, the State contends, the I.A.D. ceases to apply.

The determination of whether the I.A.D. applies to the instant case is largely a question of statutory construction. In Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 516, 525 A.2d 628 (1987), the Court of Appeals said that, when we pursue the context of statutory language,

"legislative purpose is critical, that purpose must be discerned in light of context, and that 'statutes are to be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose to be accomplished....' The purpose, in short, determined in light of the statute's context, is the key. And that purpose becomes the context within which we apply the plain-meaning rule." (Citations omitted.)

Under the subject statutory scheme, the legislative purpose is set out in the Act itself. ⁴ In State v. Oxendine, 58 Md.App. 591, 598, 473 A.2d 1311 (1984), quoting State v. Dunlap, 57 N.C.App. 175, 290 S.E.2d 744, 745, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 388, 294 S.E.2d 213 (1982), ⁵ this Court said " '[T]he purpose of the agreement on detainers is to obviate difficulties in securing speedy trials of persons incarcerated in other jurisdictions and to minimize the time during which there is an inherent danger that a prisoner may forego preferred treatment or...