State ' v. (*Holt
| Decision Date | 06 December 1890 |
| Citation | 34 W.Va. 352 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | State ' v. Ralphsnyder.(*Holt, J., absent.) |
A proceeding against an attorney as an officer of the court for contempt is a proceeding for a criminal offence, and the same principles of evidence apply as in other criminal trials, and the guilt of the respondent must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
A case in which the charges stated in the rule were not sufficiently proven to authorize a judgment for a fine against the respondent.
J. Brannon for plaintiff' in error, cited:
34 W. Va. 607; 16 \Y Ya. 864; 25 W. Ya. 279; 32 W. Ya. 640; Acts 1882, c. 128; Code, c. 147, s. 27; Code, c. 160, s. 4; 2 Bish. Crim. Law § 252; Whart. Crim. Law § 3426; 3 Am. & En. Ency. L. 782; 4 Bl. Comm. 287.
Attorney-General Alfred Caldwell for the State, cited: Code, c. 119, s. 3; 22 W. Ya. 387; 7 Wall. 373; 19 Wall.
512; 64 Me. 140; 11 Bush 95; 95 Pa. St. 220; 4 Wall.
578; 10 S. E. Rep. 407; 64 111. 195; 3 Greene (la.) 550;
This was a proceeding in the Circuit Court of Preston county against I. C. Ralphsnyder, a practicing attorney in said Circuit Court, for an alleged contempt of said court; and on the 19th day of August, 1889, a rule was awarded against said attorney, in which it is stated that said court is informed that said I. C. Ralphsnyder is a practicing attorney in said court and as such an officer of the court, and that, when on the 15th day of said month the case of the State of West Virginia against John Gridley and Brooks Duvall, who stood jointly indicted in that court for defacing a house, was called for trial, the said I. C. Ralphsnyder appeared for the defendant Duvall and demanded that the defendants be tried separately. He further stated that he was not ready to proceed with the trial, because he had just been employed that day to defend Buvall and was not familiar with the case; that his brother had appeared for Buvall on the trial before the justice. The Court ruled that the parties must go to trial, on that day. On the next day, the 16th day of August, 1889, the attorney for the State elected to try Duvall first. Thereupon said I. C. Ralphsnyder said he did not want them tried severally, and, the Court being reminded that he had so elected the day before, he denied that he had made such election, but the Court decided that he had made the election. The case against Duvall proceeded to trial; the said I. C. Ralphsnyder appearing for the defendant, and conducting the defence for him. He spread out before him notes of the evidence of each witness for the State, as he claimed, who had testified at the trial before the justice. When a witness for the State was being examined, he was asked by Neil J. Fortney, the prosecuting attorney, who appeared for the defendants before the justice, and he answered that I. C. Ralphsnyder had appeared before the justice for the defendant. Thereupon the said prosecuting attorney called the attention of the Court to the statement made by said Ralphsnyder on the previous day that he had on that day been employed for the defendant; and said Ralphsnyder remarked to him: "What are yon going to do about it?" That before the case was through he tendered as evidence in the case said written statement, signed, as he claimed, by the witnesses for the State, which writing, he stated to the Court, he had prepared at the time. Therefore, for the reasons aforesaid, it was ordered that a rule be awarded against the said I. C. Ralphsnyder, and that the sheriff" of Preston county, in the name of the state of West Virginia, was commanded to summon the said I. C. Ralphsnyder to appear before the Court on Thursday morning next, at 9 o'clock a. m., to show cause, if any, why he should not be attached for his said contempt of that court, for misbehavior as an officer of said Court in his official character, as set out in the information aforesaid.
On the 22nd day of August, 1889, said Ralphsnyder filed his answer to the rule issued in this case, and the State replied generally thereto, and said defendant moved to have said answer spread upon the records of the Court, which motion was overruled. In this answer the defendant, under oath, sought to purge himself of any contempt of the court, and to either deny or satisfactorily explain every material allegation contained in said information on which said rule was predicated. He is charged in said information with having on the 15th day of August, 1889, demanded that the defendants Gridley and Duvall who stood jointly indicted, should be tried separately, and that on the next day he denied having made such demand. In his answer he denies this statement emphatically under his oath, and says that it was stated that the parties, or one of them, would elect to be tried separately; and his recollecton is that that statement was made by the prosecuting attorney; and defendant then asked who had for his client so elected, and it was then stated by said prosecuting attorney that W. G. Brown, who was an attorney at law for Gridley, had so elected. And he further says that neither at the time stated, nor at any other time, did he demand that said defendants be tried separately; but in fact, then acting for said Duvall, he resisted the proposition that said indicted parties be allowed to sever in the trial. As to the allegation that he claimed, on the day the cases were called, to have just heen employed by Duvall, he states in his answer that George M. Ralphsnyder, a brother of his, represented said Duvall before the justice; that he waived an examination before said justice, and that, said George M. Ralphsnyder being absent, he was requested to appear for said Duvall in the event his said brother did not return; and, as his brother did fail to return in time for the trial, the friends of the said Duvall on that morning requested him to appear, and a fee was then agreed upon between him and said Duvall. Another matter with which the defendant was charged was that he stated that he was not ready to proceed with the case; and on the next day, when the trial commenced, he spread out before him notes of the evidence of each witness for the state, as he claimed, who had testified at the trial before the justice; and a witness being asked by the prosecuting attorney, who appeared for the defendants before the justice, answered I. C. Ralphsnyder had appeared before the justice for the defendant, when he remarked to the prosecuting attorney: "What are you going to do about it?" Respondent says in his answer that he of course knew at the time that the statement of the witness was incorrect, but that he regarded it as immaterial, but that, if he had had any conception of the intent of the prosecuting attorney, he would have shown otherwise than as stated by the witness that he appeared for Duvall before the justice; that, on the trial before the justice, Gridley alone was examined, Duvall waiving an examination, and the notes of evidence were taken during the examination of Gridley. And he denied any intentional misstatement, prevarication o falsehood in regard to any matters stated on said trial, and prayed that the rule might be discharged.
The evidence in the case being presented to the court as well for the State as for the defendant the judgment of the court was that said I. C. Ralphsnyder was guilty of contempt of the court as charged in said rule; and the court ordered an attachment to issue against him for said contempt; and, said defendant waiving the issuing of said attachment, it was considered by the Court that the State recover of said Ralphsnyder fifty dollars and the costs therein; and thereupon the said Ralphsnyder applied for and obtained this writ of error.
The judge who presided at the time this alleged contempt was committed has filed an able and extended opinion in support of the conclusion he arrived at in rendering said judgment, and in the course of said opinion has, as I think, taken a step in the proper direction in seeking to exalt the standard of legal and moral ethics among the legal fraternity in this State; and his remarks, if properly considered, may have a much-needed and salutary influence in calling the attention of attorneys to the honorable and responsible position they occupy, and the necessity of honesty and fair dealing on their part towards the court before which they practice.
The question, however, which is submitted to us for consideration is: Was said court correct in reaching the conclusion it arrived at, under the circumstances of this particular case? It has been held by this Court in the case of 'State v. Cunningham, 33 W. Va. 607 (11 S. E. Rep. 76) that a contempt of court is a criminal offence, and the imposition of a fine for contempt is a judgment in a criminal case; therefore the same principles of evidence apply as in other criminal trials, and the guilt of the respondent must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. He starts out, then, with the presumption of innocence in his favor, and this presumption must be overthrown by competent evidence.
Directing our attention, then, to the material charges against the respondent, we find it alleged, that, when the case of the State of West Virginia against John Gridley and Brooks Duvall, who stood jointly indicted for defacing a house, was called for trial, respondent appeared for defendant Duvall, and demanded that the defendant be tried separately; and that on the next day, when the attorney for the State elected to try Duvall first, respondent said he did not want them tried severally; and, the court being reminded that he had so elected on the day before, he denied that he had made such election, but...
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