State v. Holtan

• Decision Date: 24 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-393,83-393
• Citation: 216 Neb. 594,344 N.W.2d 661
• Parties: STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Richard D. HOLTAN, Appellant.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 661

344 N.W.2d 661

216 Neb. 594

STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Richard D. HOLTAN, Appellant.

No. 83-393.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Feb. 24, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Criminal Law: Pleas. It would not be proper as a matter of right for a trial judge to permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made unless such withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.

2. Criminal Law: Pleas. In an action to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the burden is on the defendant to establish the manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence.

3. Criminal Law: Pleas. Withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is necessary to correct a manifest injustice whenever the defendant proves that (1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by constitution, statute, or rule; (2) the plea was not entered or ratified by the defendant or a person authorized to so act in his behalf; (3) the plea was involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of the charge or that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed; or (4) he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement, and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not to oppose those concessions as promised in the plea agreement.

4. Criminal Law: Pleas. In the absence of a showing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted by the court. Before sentence, the court in its discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.

J. William Gallup, Omaha, for appellant.

Paul L. Douglas, Atty. Gen., and J. Kirk Brown, Lincoln, for appellee.

KRIVOSHA, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, HASTINGS, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, and GRANT, JJ.

KRIVOSHA, Chief Justice.

In embarking upon our review of this case, we note at the outset that this appeal presents to the court the very narrow question of whether the action of the district judge in denying to the appellant, Richard D. Holtan, the right to withdraw his previously entered plea of nolo contendere constituted an abuse of discretion. We believe that the district court's action did not constitute an abuse of discretion, and we affirm the action of the district court in denying the request.

This is the third appearance of this case before this court. In the first case, State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977) (Holtan I ), we affirmed the judgment of the district court which found Holtan guilty of first degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery and of shooting with intent to kill, wound, or maim. Holtan had entered a plea of nolo contendere to both counts and was sentenced to death on the first count and to serve 15 to 45 years on the second count. The specific facts of the case are set out in detail in Holtan I and need not be repeated here.

In the second case, State v. Holtan, 205 Neb. 314, 287 N.W.2d 671 (1980) (Holtan II ), we affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion seeking post conviction relief under the provisions of the Post Conviction Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 29-3001 et seq. (Reissue 1979). Holtan then filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, Urbom, Chief Judge, denied Holtan's request for federal habeas corpus in an unreported memorandum decision (CV 81-L-07, October 10, 1981). Holtan appealed that denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Because the court of appeals vacated the judgment of the U.S. District Court and remanded the matter for further proceedings, we are now presented with this appeal. See Holtan v. Parratt, 683 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir.1982) (Holtan III ).

In his action to the U.S. District Court and the subsequent appeal to the court of appeals in Holtan III, Holtan alleged a number of errors. The single issue considered by the court of appeals was whether Holtan was denied effective assistance of counsel when his court-appointed attorney did not request permission of the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska, to withdraw his previously entered plea of nolo contendere. More specifically, however, the court of appeals stated that it could not determine with certainty whether the district court for Douglas County would have favorably entertained Holtan's motion to withdraw his previously entered plea, and for that reason vacated the judgment of the U.S. District Court so as to afford the district court for Douglas County an opportunity to consider an appropriate motion by Holtan to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere. That motion was subsequently made by Holtan, considered by the district court for Douglas County, and denied. It is from that denial that this appeal was taken.

The right to withdraw a plea previously entered is not absolute, and in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion exercised by the trial judge, will not be disturbed on appeal. See State v. Miller, 202 Neb. 443, 275 N.W.2d 614 (1979). It would not be proper as a matter of right for a trial judge to permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made unless such withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. See, State v. Evans, 194 Neb. 559, 234 N.W.2d 199 (1975); State v. Johnson, 187 Neb. 26, 187 N.W.2d 99 (1971). The burden is on the defendant to establish the manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence. See, State v. Krug, 187 Neb. 551, 192 N.W.2d 163 (1971); State v. Miller, supra.

What is "manifest injustice" has been determined previously by this court. In State v. Evans, supra, we adopted a portion of the ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft 1968), including the definition of "manifest injustice." In adopting that portion (§ 2.1) of the ABA Standards, we said in State v. Evans, 194 Neb. at 562, 234 N.W.2d at 201: " '(ii) Withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice whenever the defendant proves that:

" '(1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by constitution, statute, or rule;

" '(2) the plea was not entered or ratified by the defendant or a person authorized to so act in his behalf;

" '(3) the plea was involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of the charge or that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed; or

" '(4) he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not to oppose those concessions as promised in the plea agreement....' " The record in this case is clear beyond any question that items (2), (3), and (4) do not exist. Therefore, only item (1), ineffective assistance of counsel, need be considered. We review that item in two aspects: before the entry of the plea and before the imposition of the sentence. We do this because it appears to us that if Holtan had effective assistance of counsel when initially entering his plea, all of the requirements of the ABA Standards defining "manifest injustice" would be met and Holtan's right to withdraw his plea would be a matter of discretion with the court instead of a matter of right in Holtan.

An examination of the entire record, of our previous decisions, and of the decision by the court of appeals makes it clear beyond question that Holtan was not denied effective assistance of counsel prior to the time he entered his plea of nolo contendere. The federal District Court found, in connection with its resolution of this question, that Holtan's nolo contendere plea was not entered into as a result of any ineffective assistance of counsel, but, rather, because Holtan insisted on entering the plea as a result of a mistaken impression on his part that by entering the plea he could avoid confronting a certain prosecution witness and, thus, hopefully avoid the death penalty. There is no evidence that anyone told him anything that would lead him to that conclusion, but only that he mistakenly believed that to be so. And, indeed, the court of appeals observed in Holtan III at 1170 that "when Holtan entered his plea, the trial court entered into an extensive colloquy with the defendant, covering forty pages of transcript, and did a commendable job both of informing Holtan of the consequences of the plea and of satisfying itself that Holtan understood these consequences.

....

"This court nevertheless observes that although the plea was entered into under a mistaken impression on Holtan's part, and although the trial court did not uncover this mistake at the time the plea was entered, the mistake was not the result of ineffective assistance on the part of counsel, or of any misconduct on the part of the prosecution, and the trial court's investigation of the voluntariness of the plea was clearly adequate. In these circumstances, we are unable to state that Holtan was entitled to withdraw his plea as a matter of right."

We wholly concur in the observation made by the court of appeals. On the basis of the record made in this case, we are able to say as a matter of law that there was no evidence of a manifest injustice as contemplated by our holding in State v. Evans, supra, and Holtan was not entitled to withdraw his previous plea of nolo contendere made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

Therefore, if he has any right to withdraw the plea it must be because of the second part of the ABA Standards adopted by us in State v. Evans, 194 Neb at 563, 234 N.W.2d at 201. The second portion provides: " '(b) In the absence of a showing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo...