State v. Hooks

Decision Date05 October 1988
Docket NumberNo. 86-2056,86-2056
Citation39 Ohio St.3d 67,529 N.E.2d 429
PartiesThe STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HOOKS, Appellant.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Ronald C. Carey, Pros.Atty., and William F. McKee, for appellee.

J. Robert Radabaugh and Lynn M. Kelley Dayton, for appellant.

PER CURIAM.

I

In his first proposition of law, appellant contends that the determination of the jury that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating circumstances in the death of Donald Danes is logically incongruent with its further determination that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors in the deaths of Karen and Rodney Danes. R.C. 2929.04 sets forth the aggravating circumstances to be considered in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. It provides in relevant part:

"(A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code and proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

" * * *

"(3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.

" * * *

"(5) Prior to the offense at bar, the offender was convicted of an offense an essential element of which was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.

" * * *

"(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary, and either the offender was the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and design.

"(8) The victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense who was purposely killed to prevent his testimony in any criminal proceeding and the aggravated murder was not committed during the commission, attempted commission, or flight immediately after the commission or attempted commission of the offense to which the victim was a witness, or the victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense and was purposely killed in retaliation for his testimony in any criminal proceeding. * * * "

Applying the foregoing subdivision to the facts of this case, we cannot agree with appellant's assertion that the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors of each murder are indistinguishable. The state correctly observes that there exist important distinctions between the murders. While the murder of Donald Danes was committed in association with his robbery, the later murders of his wife and son represent a cold, calculated attempt to avoid apprehension. Moreover, the degrees of initiative displayed by appellant with respect to the particular incidents vary considerably. While, for the most part, Terry Coffman orchestrated the events culminating in the death of Donald Danes, the deaths of Karen and Rodney Danes were largely under the direction of appellant. It was appellant who announced the robbery. It was appellant who instructed Coffman to "take the boy." Moreover, it was appellant who recognized the necessity to separate the victims to prevent their escape.

It is therefore evident that significant differences exist as to the presence of aggravating circumstances with respect to each murder. The jury could have reasonably concluded that, with respect to the murders of Karen and Rodney, that (1) appellant was attempting to escape detection (R.C. 2929.04[A] ); (2) the murders were part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons (R.C. 2929.04[A] ); (3) the murders were committed during the commission of a robbery and appellant was the principal offender (R.C. 2929.04[A] ); or (4) that the later victims were witnesses to the prior murder of Donald Danes (R.C. 2929.04[A] ).

In contrast, the mitigating factors remained constant as to each murder.

R.C. 2929.04(B) sets forth the following mitigating factors to be considered in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed:

"(1) Whether the victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;

"(2) Whether it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation;

"(3) Whether, at the time of committing the offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law;

"(4) The youth of the offender;

"(5) The offender's lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions and delinquency adjudications;

"(6) If the offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal offender, the degree of the offender's participation in the offense and the degree of the offender's participation in the acts that led to the death of the victim;

"(7) Any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender should be sentenced to death."

One mitigating factor common to each crime is the low IQ of appellant. At trial a clinical psychologist who examined appellant testified that he possesses an IQ of seventy-four--placing him in the bottom three to five percent of the population in terms of intelligence. This low intelligence, it was stated, makes persons with such disabilities susceptible to suggestion. They tend to be followers rather than leaders. Likewise, such limited mental capacity tends to lead to impulsiveness and an inability to appreciate the consequences of one's actions. This testimony...

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24 cases
  • State v. Smith
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • January 5, 2000
    ...to the R.C. 2929.04(A)(8) specification. See, e.g., State v. Lawson (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 595 N.E.2d 902; State v. Hooks (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 67, 529 N.E.2d 429. Based on all of the foregoing, we affirm appellant's conviction and death Judgment accordingly. MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. ......
  • State v. Jalowiec
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • April 4, 2001
    ...in addition to the (A)(8) specification. See State v. Lawson (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 595 N.E.2d 902; State v. Hooks (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 67, 529 N.E.2d 429. For these reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is hereby Judgment affirmed. MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENE......
  • State v. Carter
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • July 26, 1995
    ...of the existence of coercion. See State v. Powell, supra, 49 Ohio St.3d at 263, 552 N.E.2d at 200; State v. Hooks (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 67, 69-70, 529 N.E.2d 429, 432. However, we find that Carter has not demonstrated that Hill exerted a level of "coercive" influence sufficient to justify u......
  • State v. David A. Sneed
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • May 22, 1989
    ...241; State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d, 56, 63; State v. Stumpf (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 103; Beuke, 38 Ohio St.3d, at 38-39; Hooks, 39 Ohio St.3d, at 70; Bedford, Ohio St.3d, at 132; VanHook, 39 Ohio St.3d, at 264-65; State v. Sowell (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 322, 336; Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d......
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