State v. Horrocks, 990411-CA.

• Decision Date: 05 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 990411-CA.,990411-CA.
• Citation: 17 P.3d 1145,2001 UT App 4
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Blaine HORROCKS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

17 P.3d 1145

2001 UT App 4

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Blaine HORROCKS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 990411-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

January 5, 2001.

Shelden R. Carter, Harris & Carter, Provo, for Appellant.

Jan Graham, Attorney General, and Joanne C. Slotnik, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before GREENWOOD, P.J., and DAVIS and THORNE, JJ.

OPINION

GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Single Criminal Episode Act bar the State's reprosecution of charges against him. Defendant claims the Payson Justice Court previously received his pleas, sentenced him, and issued a final order, barring any further State action against him for charges arising out of the July 21, 1996 auto accident. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On July 21, 1996, defendant was involved in a traffic accident in Utah County. At the time of the accident, police issued a traffic citation for only the misdemeanor offenses of no insurance, driving on a suspended license, and failure to yield. Because the citation was for class B or C misdemeanors, the local justice court had jurisdiction to hear these charges. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-104(1) (Supp.2000). The citation directed defendant to appear for court no earlier than five days, but no later than fourteen days after it was issued. Accordingly, defendant appeared at the Payson Justice Court on July 29, 1996 — eight days after receiving the citation.

¶ 3 When defendant appeared in court, the court clerk was unable to locate the court's copy of the misdemeanor traffic citation. In order to accommodate defendant, the clerk made a copy of the citation defendant brought with him and entered it into the computer. A copy of the citation was given to the judge who used it to conduct the hearing. Defendant then pleaded no contest to the driving on a suspended license charge and guilty to the failure to yield and no insurance charges. After defendant pleaded to the charges, the court orally sentenced defendant with fines and jail time. The court suspended part of the fine and all of the jail time upon completion of court ordered probation.

¶ 4 After the court accepted defendant's pleas and orally imposed sentence, the court apparently realized a mistake had been made when it found its original copy of the misdemeanor citation. The original citation had "voided" written on it and a new citation was attached to it. As the clerk later testified, none of the information about the plea and sentence was entered into the court's computer system and no final judgment was ever created or signed.

¶ 5 About a week after the July 29th hearing, the Payson City attorney moved the justice court to dismiss the case without prejudice. Despite defendant's objection, the justice court granted the motion to dismiss. Because defendant wished to appeal the grant of the motion to dismiss, he asked the justice court to produce a computer entry record of the July 29th hearing. Defendant then appealed the justice court's grant of the motion to dismiss to the Fourth District Court.

¶ 6 The district court held a de novo hearing addressing defendant's claim. Judge John C. Backlund issued his Findings of Fact and Order on March 17, 1997, dismissing defendant's appeal. Judge Backlund signed another order dismissing the appeal on May 8, 1997.¹ Defendant appealed Judge Backlund's orders to this court, and we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 7 On January 23, 1997, the county attorney filed an information charging defendant with six criminal counts arising from the July 21, 1996 auto accident. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that this action could not proceed because the State was barred under both the Single Criminal Episode Act and the Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court, Judge Anthony Schofield presiding, held a hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss. During this hearing, the State produced as the sole witness, Marley Lazenby, the Payson Justice Court clerk. Ms. Lazenby testified about the events that took place during the July 29th hearing and subsequent computer document generated on September 11th. The clerk testified that under normal circumstances she would enter the information from the hearing into the computer in order to produce a final judgment. This final judgment would reflect the charges, plea, and sentence, and would subsequently be signed by the judge and mailed to the parties. On cross-examination, the clerk testified that the court always prepares these final judgments and the judge always signs them. After Ms. Lazenby's testimony, defense counsel requested additional time to present rebuttal evidence to show that the justice court routinely fails to produce, sign, and mail final judgments to the parties. The court allowed defense counsel an additional ten days to submit further evidence to the court. The State subsequently brought a motion to strike the evidentiary hearing based partially on defendant's failure to provide the court with any rebuttal evidence. The district court granted the State's motion, and noted that defendant had failed to provide any further evidence.

¶ 8 Judge Schofield later issued an order concluding that the current proceeding did not constitute double jeopardy. Specifically, Judge Schofield determined that Judge Backlund had already held that the justice court had not entered a final judgment and therefore no jeopardy had attached.

¶ 9 Defendant then entered conditional guilty pleas to use or possession of psilocybin and use or possession of marijuana. Defendant now appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 Because we are limited to reviewing Judge Schofield's order, we address only defendant's claim that this action constitutes double jeopardy.² Thus, the issue before us is whether double jeopardy precludes the reprosecution of defendant in this action. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss presents a question of law, which we review for correctness. See State v. Amoroso, 1999 UT App 060, ¶ 6, 975 P.2d 505,

cert. denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).

ANALYSIS

¶ 11 To the extent that defendant seeks to reverse the justice court's dismissal of the misdemeanor charges, we lack jurisdiction to consider that argument. As we previously ruled when defendant sought to appeal Judge Backlund's decision, section 78-5-120 governs appeals from a justice court, providing: "Any person not satisfied with a judgment rendered in a justice court . . . is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court . . . . The judgment after trial de novo may not be appealed unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (Supp. 2000). Defendant therefore exhausted his right to appeal the justice court's dismissal of the charges when he appealed to Judge Backlund. See Dean v. Henriod, 1999 UT App 050, ¶ 9, 975 P.2d 946

(holding the right of appeal in criminal matters is satisfied by right to de novo trial in district court); City of Monticello v. Christensen, 769 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (per curiam) (holding appeal of district court de novo review of justice court judgment is not allowed unless it involves the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance), aff'd, 788 P.2d 513, 519 (Utah 1990).

¶ 12 Although we do not address whether the justice court erred in dismissing the charges, we can examine Judge Schofield's ruling that this case does not constitute double jeopardy because there was no final order and therefore jeopardy did not attach to the prior proceeding in the justice court. In his order, Judge Schofield stated that Judge Backlund "has previously addressed the issue of double jeopardy," and "[t]he court declines to review Judge Backlund's ruling on the issue of double jeopardy." Our review of Judge Backlund's orders, however, indicates that Judge Backlund never addressed nor even mentioned the issue of whether jeopardy had attached. Instead, Judge Backlund merely found that the justice court had never entered a final signed order, and thus the charges could be dismissed.³

¶ 13 Consequently, it is clear that Judge Backlund never issued any ruling concerning defendant's double jeopardy claim, and it is likely that jeopardy was not even raised as an issue in the appeal to Judge Backlund. Because Judge Schofield relied on Judge Backlund's legal conclusion, both district court orders focused on whether the justice court issued a final signed order. Judge Schofield was not required by the doctrine of res judicata or other legal principles to rule in conformity with Judge Backlund on the issue of when and if jeopardy attached, since Judge Backlund did not address the issue. As a parallel consequence, we are able to review Judge Schofield's order, which held, for the first time, that double jeopardy did not preclude the charges against defendant in this case.

¶ 14 The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const.amend. V. A double jeopardy claim presents two questions. "The first is whether jeopardy in fact `attached' when the trial court accepted [defendant's] first plea. The second is whether, if jeopardy did attach, a reprosecution of the case is permitted." State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Utah Ct.App.1996). The Utah Supreme Court has observed that it is well settled "that jeopardy attaches when a court accepts a guilty plea and that the entry of the plea, rather than the actual imposition of the sentence, is the critical moment for determining jeopardy." State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1302 (Utah 1986) (internal citations omitted); see also Moss, 921 P.2d at 1024

. Thus, under the facts of this case, the trial court's ruling is at odds with the accepted rule that,...