City of Monticello v. Christensen, 890163

• Decision Date: 02 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. 890163,890163
• Citation: 788 P.2d 513
• Parties: CITY OF MONTICELLO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Lee CHRISTENSEN, Defendant and Petitioner.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 513

788 P.2d 513

CITY OF MONTICELLO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Lee CHRISTENSEN, Defendant and Petitioner.

No. 890163.

Supreme Court of Utah.

March 2, 1990.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 1990.

Lyle Anderson, Monticello, for plaintiff and respondent.

Lee Christensen, Evanston, Wyo., pro se.

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:

Defendant Lee Christensen, convicted in circuit court of operating a motor vehicle in Utah while his privilege to drive was suspended, claims error in the dismissal of his appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. He argues, inter alia, that the court violated his constitutional right to an appeal, as guaranteed by article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, when it dismissed his appeal and that even if the court did not violate his constitutional rights, it nonetheless erred in dismissing his appeal because he properly preserved a constitutional issue, as required by section 77-35-26(13)(a) of the Code. We affirm.

Christensen, a Wyoming resident and a holder of a Wyoming driver's license, was involved in an automobile accident while driving in Utah in October of 1986. In February of 1987, the state of Utah suspended for one year Christensen's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19 (1981) (amended 1987, 1988, & 1989; now codified at § 41-2-128 (Supp.1989)). The state took this action because Christensen failed to provide security for the damages he caused in the 1986 accident.

In September of 1987, Christensen was stopped by the police while driving within the city limits of Monticello, Utah. He was arrested and charged with two violations: (i) driving during suspension, and (ii) driving without insurance. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-28 (1981) (amended 1987 & 1989; now codified at § 41-2-136 (Supp.1989)); ¹ Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302 (Supp.1986) (amended 1987). Christensen posted bond, and the matter was scheduled for a hearing before a justice of the peace, pursuant to section 78-5-4 of the Code. Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-4 (1987) (repealed 1989; now codified at § 78-5-114 (Supp.1989)). ²

In January of 1988, Christensen appeared before a justice of the peace and unsuccessfully argued that the "driving under suspension" charge against him should be dismissed. He was convicted of that charge, sentenced to thirty days in the county jail, and required to pay a $200 fine. The sentence was stayed, and Christensen appealed to the circuit court under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26. That rule provides in part:

(13) An appeal may be taken to the circuit court from a judgment rendered in the justice court in accordance with the provision of this rule, except:

(a) the case shall be tried anew in the circuit court and the decision of the circuit court is final except where the validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court.

Utah R. Crim.P. 26(13)(a) (1987) (amended 1989; codified at § 77-35-26(13)(a) (Supp.1989) (code provision, but not rule, repealed effective July 1, 1990)). ³ A trial de novo was held in the circuit court in March of 1988. Christensen was again convicted of driving under suspension and again fined $200 and sentenced to thirty days in jail.

Christensen next appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal, reasoning that under rule 26(13)(a), it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter because "the validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance [had not been] raised in the justice court." Utah R. Crim. P. 26(13)(a); City of Monticello v. Christensen, 769 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah Ct.App.1989). The court of appeals reached this conclusion after reviewing the documentary records from the justice court and from the circuit court. Neither of these evidenced a raising of a challenge to a statute's validity or constitutionality, although the court of appeals acknowledged that it could not determine with certainty what had occurred in these two courts because no transcript is kept in a justice court and Christensen had not provided a tape or transcript of the circuit court hearing although one was kept. 769 P.2d at 855.

Following the court of appeals' denial of his petition for a rehearing, Christensen sought certiorari from this Court. We granted the writ in order to consider the question of whether the appeal procedure prescribed in rule 26(13)(a) comports with the appeal guarantee of article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution.

Article I, section 12 provides in part:

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.

Utah Const. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added).

Christensen claims that his right "to an appeal" was violated when the court of appeals refused to give his appeal the plenary consideration usually afforded any other appeal from the circuit or district court. Specifically, he argues that the guarantee of "an appeal" in article I, section 12 connotes an on-the-record review of the trial court's action, something that by definition cannot be provided via a trial de novo in the circuit court. Therefore, the only vehicle for vindication of his rights to an appeal is full review of the circuit court action by the court of appeals, and the limitation on the scope of the court of appeals' review imposed by rule 26(13)(a) is unconstitutional.

In considering Christensen's claim that rule 26(13)(a) is unconstitutional, we follow the settled rule that "legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity and will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no reasonable basis upon which they can be construed as conforming to constitutional requirements." In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct., 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988); see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989); City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1988). And we accord a lower court's statement of the law, statutory interpretation, or legal conclusion no particular deference, but review it for correctness. See, e.g., State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990); State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1123 (Utah 1989); Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co., 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989).

Article I, section 12 provides, "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to appeal in all cases." Utah Const. art. I, § 12. Rule 26(13)(a) labels an "appeal" a trial de novo in the circuit court, with only limited review of that decision by the court of appeals. The determination of whether rule 26(13)(a) is constitutional depends on what is meant by the word "appeal" in article I, section 12. We conclude that in Utah, at least, it is settled that the right to an "appeal" from a court not of record is satisfied by provision for a trial de novo in a court of record. The reasons for this conclusion are largely historical.

The guarantee in article I, section 12 providing a right of appeal has been in the constitution since statehood. From 1896 until 1984, it coexisted with a version of article VIII, section 9 of the Utah Constitution which provided in part:

Appeals shall also lie from the final judgment of justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to District Courts on both questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions as shall be provided by law; and the decision of the District Courts on such appeals shall be final, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute.

Utah Const. art. VIII, § 9 (repealed 1984) (emphasis added). The right of appeal from a justice of the peace to the district court referred to in article VIII, section 9 was a trial de novo because justice courts have never been courts of record.

Statutes with language substantially similar to article VIII, section 9 have existed since statehood. For example, chapter 109, section 18 of the 1901 Laws of Utah provided in part:

From all final judgments of a city court ... an appeal may be taken by either party in a civil case, or by the defendant in a criminal case, to the district court of the county in the manner and with like effect as is now, or may be provided by law for appeals from justices' courts in similar cases, and from all final judgments in the district courts rendered upon such appeals, an appeal may be taken to the supreme court in like manner as if said actions were originally commenced in the district court ... and provided further, that in all cases involving the validity or constitutionality of the statute, there shall be a right of appeal to the supreme court.

1901 Utah Laws ch. 109, § 18 (emphasis added). ⁴

In decisions from statehood until 1983, this Court repeatedly held that a person dissatisfied with a justice court decision could appeal that decision to a district court and that the district court decision was final unless the validity or constitutionality of a statute was at issue, not on appeal, but in the lower court. See, e.g., State v. Van Gervan, 657 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1983); State v. Munger, 642 P.2d 721 (Utah 1982); Vernal City v. Critton, 565 P.2d 408 (Utah 1977); State v. Lyte, 75 Utah 283, 284 P. 1006 (1930); Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 53, 48 P. 41 (1897), aff'd, 173 U.S. 32, 19 S.Ct. 317, 43 L.Ed. 603 (1899); see also State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983). In State v. Lyte, 75 Utah at 287, 284 P. at 1007, this Court explicitly rejected a challenge based on article I, section 12 to a statute worded very similarly to rule 26(13)(a). That statute restricted Supreme Court...