State v. Horton, 2007 Ohio 4309 (Ohio App. 8/23/2007)

• Decision Date: 23 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06AP-311.,06AP-311.
• Parties: State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, (Cross-Appellant), v. Richard H. Horton, Defendant-Appellant, (Cross-Appellee).
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 1

2007 Ohio 4309

State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, (Cross-Appellant), v. Richard H. Horton, Defendant-Appellant, (Cross-Appellee).

No. 06AP-311.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Rendered on August 23, 2007.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, C.P.C. No. 05CR-01-146.

Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven Taylor, for appellee.

Carol A. Wright, for appellant.

OPINION

PETREE, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Richard H. Horton, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that convicted him of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and having a weapon under disability. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

{¶2} According to the evidence of plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio ("the state"), on October 8, 2004, Richard McClanahan cashed a paycheck. After cashing his paycheck, McClanahan went to a store to buy beer and stopped by a public telephone to place a call. Observing that McClanahan had a pocketful of money, defendant asked McClanahan if he could borrow $20. McClanahan refused defendant's request. McClanahan also refused defendant's request to use the public telephone ahead of McClanahan.

{¶3} The next morning, defendant, who had a gun with him, forcibly entered Richard McClanahan and Rhonda Curry's home in Columbus, and demanded money. Upon forcibly entering the home, defendant shot McClanahan in the leg, and struck McClanahan in the head with the gun. In addition, defendant threatened McClanahan and Curry and prevented them from leaving the house. Defendant also kicked McClanahan, dragged McClanahan around the house, and later robbed McClanahan of $40.

{¶4} After defendant fled the house, Curry and her sister, who was in another room at the time of the robbery, brought McClanahan to McClanahan's sister's house so that emergency medical personnel and police officers could be summoned. Because McClanahan and Curry did not have a telephone in their house, Curry and her sister were unable to place an emergency call from their home. McClanahan later underwent several surgeries to repair damage to his leg.

{¶5} By indictment filed on January 7, 2005, defendant was charged with one count of aggravated burglary with firearm specifications; two counts of aggravated robbery with firearm specifications; four counts of robbery with firearm specifications; two counts of kidnapping with firearm specifications; one count of felonious assault with firearm specifications; and one count of having a weapon while under disability. Defendant pled not guilty to these charges.

{¶6} Claiming that a pre-trial identification was secured by unnecessarily suggestive means thereby depriving him of due process rights under the United States and Ohio Constitutions, defendant moved to suppress identification evidence by the state's witnesses. The trial court denied this motion.

{¶7} Waiving his right to a jury trial as to the charge of having a weapon under disability, defendant chose to have this charge tried by the court. However, as to the remaining charges, defendant elected to have these charges tried by a jury. During the trial, four counts of robbery were dismissed.

{¶8} After deliberating, a jury returned verdicts of guilty as to all charges before it. The trial court also found defendant guilty of having a weapon under disability. Finding that defendant's conduct as to the aggravated robbery charges and the kidnapping charges were allied offenses of similar import, the trial court entered no convictions as to the kidnapping charges when the trial court imposed a 23-year prison sentence.

{¶9} From the trial court's amended judgment, which we construe as a nunc pro tunc judgment, defendant appeals, and the state cross-appeals. See, generally, Crim.R. 36 (providing that clerical mistakes in judgments arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time); see, also, State v. Brown (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 816, 819-820 (discussing function of nunc pro tunc entry).

{¶10} Since the state filed notice of a cross-appeal, in its responsive brief, the state stated a wish to withdraw its cross-appeal. Although the state has not formally moved to withdraw its cross-appeal, we construe the state's statement seeking withdrawal of its cross-appeal as a motion seeking dismissal of the cross-appeal.

{¶11} Defendant assigns seven errors for our consideration:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I:

THE REPRESENTATION PROVIDED TO RICHARD HORTON FELL FAR BELOW THE PREVAILING NORMS FOR COUNSEL IN A CRIMINAL CASE, WAS UNREASONABLE, AND AFFECTED THE OUTCOME IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AS WELL AS ART. I, § 2, 9, 10, AND 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II:

THE ADMISSION OF DETECTIVE WALKER'S TESTIMONY REGARDING THE PHOTO ARRAY EVIDENCE PROCEDURE AND THE VICTIM'S STATEMENTS IN REGARDS TO THE PHOTO ARRAY PROCEDURE VIOLATED RICHARD HORTON'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIAL, AND THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, §§2, 10 & 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. ITS ADMISSION ALSO VIOLATED THE OHIO EVIDENCE RULES. EVIDENCE RULES. [sic.]

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE PHOTO ARRAY EVIDENCE BECAUSE IT WAS AN IMPERMISSIBLY SUGGESTIVE IDENTIFICATION THAT LACKED SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF RELIABILITY THEREBY VIOLATING RICHARD HORTON'S RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, §2, 10, AND 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IV:

A TRIAL COURT MAY NOT SENTENCE A DEFENDANT TO NON-MINIMUM AND CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WITHOUT VIOLATING A DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, §10 AND 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO IN STATE V. FOSTER (2006), 109 OHIO ST.3D 1, IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONTROLLING PRECEDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND MUST BE REJECTED.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. V:

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED HORTON'S RIGHTS UNDER THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION BY SENTENCING APPELLANT TO A TERM OF INCARCERATION WHICH EXCEEDED THE MAXIMUM PENALTY AVAILABLE UNDER THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE. THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO IN STATE V. FOSTER (2006), 109 OHIO ST.3D 1, WHICH PURPORTS TO AUTHORIZE THE SENTENCE RENDERED AGAINST RICHARD HORTON, IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONTROLLING PRECEDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND MUST BE REJECTED.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. VI:

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION BY SENTENCING APPELLANT PURSUANT TO THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO IN STATE V. FOSTER (2006), 109 OHIO ST.3D 1, BECAUSE THE HOLDING OF FOSTER IS INVALID UNDER ROGERS V. TENNESSEE (2001), 532 U.S. 451.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. VII:

THE RULE OF LENITY REQUIRES THE IMPOSITION OF MINIMUM AND CONCURRENT SENTENCES, AND THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT TO THE CONTRARY MUST BE REVERSED.

{¶12} We shall begin our analysis by first addressing defendant's third assignment of error.

{¶13} By his third assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court erred under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions by failing to suppress a photo array that was used to identify defendant because this array was impermissibly suggestive and lacked sufficient indicia of reliability.

{¶14} "Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶8; see, also, State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, at ¶100, reconsideration denied, 111 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2006-Ohio-5083; State v. Carrocce, Franklin App. No. 06AP-101, 2006-Ohio-6376, at ¶26 (Brown, J., dissenting). "When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses." Burnside, at ¶8, citing State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, rehearing denied, 63 Ohio St.3d 1406, certiorari denied, 505 U.S. 1227, 112 S.Ct. 3048; see, also, Roberts, at ¶100; Carrocce, at ¶26. As a consequence, "an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence," Burnside, at ¶8, citing State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, and "an appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard." Burnside, at ¶8, citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706; see, also, Roberts, at ¶100; Carrocce, at ¶26.

{¶15} "The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit the admission of unreliable identification testimony derived from suggestive identifications procedures." State v. Brust (May 28, 2000), Franklin App. No. 99AP-509 (Tyack, J., dissenting in part), dismissed, appeal not allowed, 89 Ohio St.3d 1465, citing Stovall v. Denno (1967), 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967. See, also, Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 422-423, citing Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton (1941), 138 Ohio St. 540, 544 (stating that the "[t]he `due course of law' provision [in Section 16, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution] is the equivalent of the `due process of law' provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution"); Peebles v. Clement (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 314, 317.

{¶16} "Before identification testimony is suppressed, the trial court must find that the procedure employed was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise...