State v. Houck

• Decision Date: 07 March 1949
• Docket Number: 30662.
• Citation: 203 P.2d 693,32 Wn.2d 681
• Parties: STATE v. HOUCK.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

203 P.2d 693

32 Wn.2d 681

STATE v. HOUCK.

No. 30662.

Supreme Court of Washington.

March 7, 1949

Department 2.

John A Houck was charged by information with practicing medicine without a certificate. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the information and from entry of judgment of dismissal, the State of Washington appeals.

Case reversed with instructions to vacate judgment of dismissal and to overrule demurrer.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; James B. Kinne, judge.

Lloyd Shorett and Max R. Nicolai, both of Seattle, for appellant.

John J Kennett, of Seattle, for respondent.

SIMPSON Justice.

The state of Washington appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer to an information and the entry of a judgment of dismissal. The information was worded as follows:

'He, the said John A. Houck, in the County of King, State of Washington, on or about the 26th day of September, 1947, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully practice or attempt to practice medicine and surgery in this, that he, the said John A. Houck, acting as physician and obstetrician, delivered a child born to Mrs. Elizabeth Hardin and performed services at such time, including the administration of ether and the cutting of the umbilical cord, without having at the time of so doing a valid, unrevoked certificate to practice medicine within the State of Washington and having at said time only a license from the State of Washington as a 'drugless healer' permitted to practice 'full sanipractic'; * * *

'He, the said John A. Houck, as a part of the act or transaction alleged in Count I or a connected act or transaction, in the County of King, State of Washington, on or about the 26th day of September, 1947, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully practice or attempt to practice medicine and surgery in this, that he, the said John A. Houck, administered a drug, the exact nature of which is unknown to the prosecuting attorney at this time, by hypodermic injection into the body of Mrs. Elizabeth Hardin, without having at the time of so doing a valid, unrevoked certificate to practice medicine within the State of Washington, and having at said time only a license from the State of Washington as a 'drugless healer' permitted to practice 'full sanipractic'; * * *'

Assignment of error is 'in sustaining respondent's demurrer and entering judgment of dismissal.'

The charge was based upon Rem.Rev.Stat. § 10018, which reads:

'Any person who shall practice or attempt to practice, or hold himself out as practicing medicine and surgery in this state, without having, at the time of so doing, a valid, unrevoked certificate as provided in this act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. * * *'

Our state constitution, Art. XX, § 2, provides:

'The legislature shall enact laws to regulate the practice of medicine and surgery, and the sale of drugs and medicines.'

In order to implement the constitutional provisions, the legislature has enacted several laws now contained in Rem.Rev.Stat. Title 68.

Respondent takes the position that the court was correct in sustaining the demurrer because the information failed to charge that an emergency did not exist at the time and place mentioned in the information. He bases his contention upon the provisions of Rem.Rev.Stat. § 10024, which states in part: 'Nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit service in the case of emergency * * *.' This question has been presented to this court on various occasions. Our holding may be restated in the following language: exceptions need not be negatived unless they are in the enacting clause of the law--that is to say, if the act defining a crime does not in itself define a defense or exception, it is not necessary to negative the exceptions or defense in charging the crime. State v. Davis, 43 Wash. 116, 86 P. 201; State v. Seifert, 65 Wash. 596, 118 P. 746; State v. Bartow, 95 Wash. 480, 164 P. 227; State v. Young, 195 Wash. 515, 81 P.2d 799; United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168, 84 U.S. 168, 21 L.Ed. 538.

An examination of Rem.Rev.Stat. § 10018, does not reveal any exception in favor of a drugless healer acting in an emergency. That exception, as we have stated, is contained in Rem.Rev.Stat. § 10024. It follows that the exception set out in another statute need not be mentioned in the information, but advantage must be taken of it as a matter of defense.

Was it the intention of the legislature to make the practice of obstetrics outside the scope of practice given to drugless healers?

In construing a statute and ascertaining the legislative intent, certain rules are observed by the courts. The legislative intent must be gleaned from a consideration of the whole act by giving effect to the entire statute and every part thereof. Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609, 196 P. 13; State ex rel. Baisden v. Preston, 151 Wash. 175, 275 P. 81; Pease v. Stephens, 173 Wash. 12, 21 P.2d 294; Arden Farms Co. v. Seattle, 2 Wash.2d 640, 99 P.2d 415; State ex rel. Wilson v. King County, 7 Wash.2d 104, 109 P.2d 291.

Where the language of a statute is plain, free from ambiguity, and devoid of uncertainty, there is no room for construction because the meaning will be discovered from the wording of the statute itself. Shelton Hotel Co., Inc. v. Bates, 4 Wash.2d 498, 104 P.2d 478.

Where an act has a doubtful or ambiguous meaning, it is the duty of the court to adopt a construction that is reasonably liberal in furtherance of the obvious or manifest purpose of the legislature. Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or. 101, 248 P. 146; Gallagher v. Campodonico, 121 Cal.App.Supp. 765, 5 P.2d 486.

Statutes in pari materia must be construed together. Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same person or thing, or the same class of persons or things; and in construing a statute, or statutes, all acts relating to the same subject matter or having the same purpose, should be read in connection therewith as together constituting one law. The object of the rule is to ascertain and carry into effect the intent of the legislature, and it proceeds upon the supposition that the several statutes having to do with related subject matters were governed by one spirit or policy, and were intended to be consistent and harmonious in their several parts and provisions. State ex rel. American Piano Co. v. Superior Court, 105 Wash. 676, 178 P. 827; Paltro v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 119 Wash. 101, 204 P. 1044.

The words and phrases used in statutes are interpreted in accordance with their common meaning, and this regardless of the policy of enacting it, or the seeming confusion that may follow its enforcement. State v. Miller, 72 Wash. 154, 129 P. 1100.

From these general rules it follows that our attention should first be directed to the determination of whether the drugless healing act, Laws of 1919, chapter 36, Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 10112-10125, gave respondent the right to practice obstetrics. It must, of necessity, be assumed that, if the statute gave an individual complying with its provisions the right to practice obstetrics, the individual had the right to follow all medical procedure and use all proper medical methods leading up to and following delivery. In our opinion, that conclusion cannot be drawn from the provisions of the statute.

Section 4 of the act of 1919, to which we have just referred, provides for the issuance of five different certificates, named as follows:

'First. A certificate authorizing the holder thereof to practice mechanotherapy;

'Second. A certificate authorizing the holder thereof to practice suggestive therapeutics;

'Third. A certificate authorizing the holder thereof to practice food science;

'Fourth. A certificate authorizing the holder thereof to practice physcultopathy;

'Fifth. A certificate for any other separate and co-ordinate system of drugless practice * * *. Practitioners hereunder shall confine their practice to the subjects and system or systems represented by their certificate or certificates granted * * *.'

Section 7 of the act provides:

'All persons granted licenses or certificates under this act [Laws of 1919, ch. 36], shall be subject to the state and municipal regulations, relating to the control of contagious diseases, the reporting and certifying of births and deaths, and all matters pertaining to public health; and all such reports shall be accepted as legal.'

It is argued that the provision requiring an examination concerning obstetics, coupled with the direction that persons receiving the benefits of the act must certify births, indicates the intention of the legislature to allow holders of certificates under the act to practice obstetrics. The provisions of the indefinitely worded statute do not indicate the extent of the practice of drugless healers.

It is necessary, then, to examine all of the pertinent acts passed in 1917 and 1919 to ascertain the powers conferred by legislative enactment.

The medicine and surgery practice act, Laws of 1919, chapter 134, included in Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 10008-10024, passed the House February 17, 1919, the Senate, March 10, 1919, and was signed by the Governor March 15, 1919. The amendment of 1947, Laws of 1947, chapter 168, Rem.Supp.1947, § 10008, did not change the act in any way material to the issues here involved.

The osteopathy act, Laws of 1919, Chapter 4, Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 10056-10073, was passed by the House February 24, 1917, by the Senate March 5, 1917, vetoed by the Governor March 17, 1917, and passed over his veto, January 21, 1919.

The chiropractic act, Laws of 1919, chapter 5, Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 10098-10111, passed the House February 24, 1917, and the Senate March 5, 1917. It was vetoed by the Governor March 17, 1917, and passed over his veto January 21, 1919.

The...