State v. Houpt, CR
| Decision Date | 30 April 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
| Citation | 302 Ark. 188,788 S.W.2d 239 |
| Parties | STATE of Arkansas, Appellant, v. David Wayne HOUPT, Appellee. 89-239. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Clint Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellant.
Larry Honeycutt, Hot Springs, for appellee.
In accordance with A.R.Cr.P.Rule 36.10(a), the state brings this interlocutory appeal contending the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion to suppress. At a pretrial hearing on appellee's motion, appellee argued and presented proof that the police officers, without probable cause and in violation of the fourth amendment, stopped the car appellee was driving and found controlled substances as a result of a pretextual search of the car. The state countered with its own argument and proof that the search was permissible. After the trial court granted appellee's motion, the state appeals, raising a new theory and argument that the trial court erred because appellee was driving his girlfriend's car when he was stopped, and as a consequence, he lacked standing to contest the officers' search of the car. The state asserts that it should be permitted to raise appellee's lack of standing for the first time on appeal because appellee's standing is a jurisdictional, or a "quasi-jurisdictional," requirement. We reject the state's argument and therefore affirm.
The state's argument is two-fold. Initially, it cites Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), for the proposition that a defendant who moves to suppress allegedly illegally seized evidence has the burden to prove he has standing to do so. 1 Here, the state claims appellee failed in meeting his burden because he never showed that he had his girlfriend's permission to drive her car. Next, the state suggests, this failure is "jurisdictional in nature," and, as such, is an issue the state could raise for the first time on appeal. To summarize, while the state acknowledges it did not contest appellee's standing below, it asserts it should be permitted to do so on appeal because the appellee's standing is a jurisdictional, or a "quasi-jurisdictional" requirement.
In support of its contentions that a defendant's lack of standing to seek suppression of evidence may be raised by the government for the first time on appeal, the state cites cases from a number of other jurisdictions. See United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir.1981); State v. Strayer, 242 Kan. 618, 750 P.2d 390 (1988). There are a number of holdings in other jurisdictions that run contrary to the state's contention. See United States v. Sanchez, 689 F.2d 508 (5th Cir.1982); Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); People v. Brown, 88 Ill.App.3d 514, 43 Ill.Dec. 505, 410 N.E.2d 505 (1980); State v. Grundy, 25 Wash.App. 411, 607 P.2d 1235 (1980); see also 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.7(d) at 524 (1987). Federal courts, of course, adhere to the plain error rule, under which plain errors affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. To the contrary, we have reiterated our fundamental rule that an argument for reversal will not be considered in the absence of an appropriate objection in the trial court. Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980). Even a constitutional question must be raised in the trial court to be reversible on appeal. Griggs v. State, 280 Ark. 339, 658 S.W.2d 371 (1983).
As noted previously, the state concedes that it failed to raise the standing theory below, but it points to our recognized rule that an appellant still may question the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. While the state concedes the court in the present case had subject matter jurisdiction, it additionally contends that we should give the term jurisdiction a broader definition than that which encompasses mere subject matter jurisdiction. In other words, the state requests this court to coin a new definition of jurisdiction which would include a criminal defendant's standing. Thus, assuming standing is jurisdictional as urged by the state, the state urges the appellant never met his burden to show his girlfriend permitted him to drive her car and as a...
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Chubb Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Miller County Circuit Court, Third Div.
...we are unaware of any authority in this Court holding that lack of standing deprives a court of jurisdiction. See also State v. Houpt, 302 Ark. 188, 788 S.W.2d 239 (1990). If the issue were one of jurisdiction of the subject matter, we would address it despite the fact that it was not raise......
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Cook v. State
...appropriate objection in the trial court. This rule is applicable to the State, as well as to criminal defendants. See State v. Houpt, 302 Ark. 188, 788 S.W.2d 239 (1990). The issue of whether the statement's exclusion was erroneous was not properly preserved and therefore, the State may no......
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Camp v. McNair
...to preserve an issue on appeal challenging a party's standing, the appellant must have raised the issue below. See State v. Houpt, 302 Ark. 188, 788 S.W.2d 239 (1990). Our court has stated many times that it will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and even constitut......
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Ramage v. State, CA
...at trial. Furthermore, our supreme court addressed the State's argument that standing is a jurisdictional issue in State v. Houpt, 302 Ark. 188, 788 S.W.2d 239 (1990). In Houpt, an interlocutory appeal by the State from a trial court's order of suppression, the supreme court, in framing the......