State v. House
Citation | 698 P.2d 951,299 Or. 78 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review, v. Scott Wayne HOUSE, Respondent on Review. TC 82-0265; CA A25766; SC S30562. |
Decision Date | 23 April 1985 |
Court | Supreme Court of Oregon |
Stephen F. Peifer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the petition was Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and James E. Mountain, Jr., Solicitor General, Salem.
Rex Armstrong, of Kell, Alterman & Runstein, Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the response to the petition for review was Stuart J. Cutler, Chief Public Defender, Hillsboro.
Defendant was charged with engaging in sexual conduct in a live public show, a violation of ORS 167.062(1). ORS 167.062 reads in pertinent part:
(a) 'Live public show' means a public show in which human beings, animals, or both appear bodily before spectators or customers.
Defendant filed a demurrer to the indictment, challenging ORS 167.062(1) and 167.060(10) as unconstitutional under Article I, Section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, and the federal First Amendment. The trial court overruled the demurrer, and defendant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to pay a fine.
On defendant's appeal, the Court of Appeals held that ORS 167.062(1), read with ORS 167.060(10), restrains expression protected by Article I, Section 8, and is overbroad. State v. House, 66 Or.App. 953, 676 P.2d 892, aff'd as modified 68 Or.App. 360, 681 P.2d 173 (1984). This court allowed review to consider whether ORS 167.062(1) contravenes Article I, Section 8. The statute in question may well be an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of expression, but after reviewing the entire case we are of the opinion that we do not need to reach the constitutional question because as a factual matter the defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. 1 It is a fundamental rule that courts will not decide a case upon constitutional grounds unless absolutely necessary to determination of the issue before it. We discussed this basic procedural principle as early as 1892 in Elliott v. Oliver, 22 Or. 44, 48, 29 P. 1 (1892), where we quoted with approval from the earlier work, Cooley's Constitutional Limitation * 163 at 196 (5th ed 1883):
" * * * [W]here a constitutional question is raised, though it may be legitimately presented by the record, yet if the record also presents some other and clear ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, and thereby render the constitutional question immaterial to the case, that course will be adopted and the question of constitutional power will be left for consideration until a case arises which cannot be disposed of without considering it, and when consequently a decision upon such question will be unavoidable."
See also Burt v. Blumenauer, 299 Or. 55, 73, 699 P.2d 168 (1985) (decided this date); Planned Parenthood Assn v. Dept. of Human Resources, 297 Or. 562, 564, 687 P.2d 785 (1984); State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 343, 667 P.2d 996 (1983); Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or. 75, 83, 619 P.2d 632 (1980); State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 845, 849, 618 P.2d 423 (1980); State v. Franzone, 243 Or. 597, 601, 415 P.2d 16 (1966); Fed. Cartridge Corp. v. Helstrom, 202 Or. 557, 564, 276 P.2d 720 (1954); Oregon Cry. Mfrs. Ass'n. v. White, 159 Or. 99, 78 P.2d 572 (1938); Winslow v. Fleischner, 112 Or. 23, 228 P. 101 (1924); McKinney v. Watson, 74 Or. 220, 145 P. 266 (1915); State ex rel. v. Malheur County Court, 46 Or. 519, 81 P. 368 (1905). 2
The clause of ORS 167.060(10) with which we are concerned in this case prohibits "any touching * * * in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification." Where, as here, the indictment charges a defendant with engaging in this behavior, the state must not only prove that the defendant knowingly engaged in the described touching, but also must prove that the defendant knowingly participated in the touching in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification. The reference to an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification refers to sexual stimulation or gratification of the actor in the live public show, and was an essential element of the state's case against the defendant.
The brief transcript of the trial demonstrates that the state did not present one scintilla of evidence that the defendant ever engaged in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification. To the contrary, the sole witness produced by the state, an OLCC investigative officer, only testified that the women customers touched the defendant. There was no evidence that defendant was...
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State v. Henry
...in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification." In State v. House, 66 Or.App. 953, 957, 676 P.2d 892 (1984), aff'd 299 Or. 78, 698 P.2d 951 (1985), we construed the language "in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" to mean "any touching of the described areas ......
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City of National City v. Wiener, S020887
...Village of Greenhills (1966) 5 Ohio St.2d 207, 215 N.E.2d 403, 407; Schwartz v. Diehl (Okla.1977) 568 P.2d 280, 283; State v. House (1985) 299 Or. 78, 698 P.2d 951, 952; Ballou v. State Ethics Commission (1981) 496 Pa. 127, 436 A.2d 186, 187 & fn. 2; Town of Barrington v. Blake (R.I.1987) 5......
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...553 (1982), and State v. House, 66 Or.App. 953, 676 P.2d 892, mod. 68 Or.App. 360, 681 P.2d 173 (1984), aff'd on other grounds 299 Or. 78, 698 P.2d 951 (1985), in which, he maintains, we held that ORS 167.065(1)(a) was unconstitutionally overbroad. The state responds that our decision in Fr......
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