State v. House
| Decision Date | 25 June 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,CA-CR,2 |
| Citation | 169 Ariz. 572,821 P.2d 233 |
| Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Appellant, v. Carl Richard HOUSE, Appellee. 90-0701. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellee pled guilty to molestation of a child, a class 2 felony. At the sentencing hearing on June 20, 1990, it appeared that the trial court did not have before it a psychologist's report referred to in the presentence report. Defense counsel suggested that sentencing should be continued but the court nevertheless went on with the hearing and sentenced appellee to a presumptive term of 17 years' imprisonment. Appellee filed a motion to modify the sentence under Rule 24.3, Ariz.R.Crim.P., 17 A.R.S., based on the fact that the trial court did not have before it certain documents relevant to sentencing. The motion was granted and the sentence was set aside, the trial court finding that such documents might have resulted in the imposition of a different sentence.
The trial court further elucidated its reasons for granting the motion at resentencing, stating that it had neither a psychological report nor certain letters that were referred to at the time of the sentencing. The court concluded that
the original sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner due to the fact that that information presented to the Probation Officer, which is an agency of the Court, was not--was not given to the Court. I didn't know about it at the time of sentencing. Although some of it was discussed during the sentencing hearing.
When the motion was received, I read it and decided to--that the--I should have had it at the time of sentencing, and that the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner.
The court then stated that it had also read letters apparently sent to the probation officer after the initial sentencing and that he considered them a "duplication" of what he had already received. The court found the same aggravating and mitigating factors but gave "substantially more weight to these mitigating factors" than before, imposing a mitigated term of 12 years' imprisonment.
On appeal the state contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence which was both lawful and imposed in a lawful manner. We agree.
Rule 24.3, Ariz.R.Crim.P., 17 A.R.S., provides as follows:
The court may correct any unlawful sentence or one imposed in an unlawful manner within 60 days of the entry of judgment and sentence but before the defendant's appeal, if any, is filed.
An unlawful sentence is one that is outside the statutory range. State v. Suniga, 145 Ariz. 389, 701 P.2d 1197 (App.1985); State v. Thomas, 142 Ariz. 201, 688 P.2d 1093 (App.1984). The sentence initially imposed was not unlawful. The trial court is also without the inherent power to alter a lawfully imposed sentence. State v. Falkner, 112 Ariz. 372, 542 P.2d 404 (1975). "A sentence imposed in an unlawful manner is one imposed without due regard to the procedures required by statute or Rule 26 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure." State v. Glasscock, 168 Ariz. 265, 267, 812 P.2d 1083, 1085 (App.1991), citing the comment to Rule 24.3, Ariz.R.Crim.P., 17 A.R.S.; see also State v. Suniga, supra. In Glasscock, Division One of this court found that where the trial court had initially imposed a sentence that it mistakenly believed was the presumptive term but which in actuality was a mitigated term, the court was required to articulate the mitigating factors under A.R.S. § 13-702(C), and its resentencing of the defendant to comply with that provision was proper. Under those circumstances, because the trial court had failed to comply with § 13-702(C), the sentence could be characterized as imposed in an unlawful manner. Compare State v. Suniga, supra ().
Here the court intended to and did impose a presumptive sentence, noting the aggravating and mitigating factors and that they balanced one another. While the fact that the trial court imposed...
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...The State concedes that the fifteen-year sentence is unlawful because it falls outside the statutory range. See State v. House, 169 Ariz. 572, 573, 821 P.2d 233, 234 (App.1991). We remand Hargrave's burglary conviction for resentencing within the statutory range.B. Aggravation Phase Suffici......
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State v. Speer, 2 CA-CR 2011-0077
...393, ¶11, 142 P.3d 701, 705 (App. 2006). "An unlawful sentence is one that is outside the statutory range." State v. House, 169 Ariz. 572, 573, 821 P.2d 233, 234 (App. 1991). ¶27 Section 13-3405(D) provides that[i]n addition to any other penalty prescribed by this title, the court shall ord......
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State v. Provenzino
...227, 230, ¶ 10, 16 P.3d 788, 791 (App.2000). "An unlawful sentence is one that is outside the statutory range." State v. House, 169 Ariz. 572, 573, 821 P.2d 233, 234 (App.1991). ¶ 19 To use a prior conviction to aggravate Defendant's sentence, the State was required to prove that Defendant ......
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State v. Vasquez
...sentence exceeded the statutory maximum of fifteen years and was therefore unlawful. See A.R.S. § 13-704(A); State v. House, 169 Ariz. 572, 573, 821 P.2d 233, 234 (App. 1991) ("An unlawful sentence is one that is outside the statutory range."). Accordingly, we vacate Vasquez's sentences on ......