State v. Houston
Decision Date | 03 March 2010 |
Docket Number | No. E2009-00352-CCA-R9-CD.,No Application for Permission to Appeal Filed.,E2009-00352-CCA-R9-CD.,Application for Permission to Appeal Filed. |
Citation | 328 S.W.3d 867 |
Parties | STATE of Tennessee v. Rocky Joe HOUSTON. |
Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
Randy G. Rogers, Athens, Tennessee, for the appellant, Rocky Joe Houston.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; John H. Bledsoe, Assistant Attorney General; G. Robert Radford, District Attorney General Pro Tempore; Kenneth Irvine, District Attorney General Pro Tempore; and Jason Demastus, Assistant District Attorney General Pro Tempore, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The issue presented in this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure is whether the manner of discharge of the jury prior to the jury's reaching a verdict on all counts and the jury's unorthodox consideration of the charged and lesser included offenses prohibit a retrial of the defendant, Rocky Joe Houston, on the charged offenses under the state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy. Because the record establishes that the jury reached a verdict of not guilty on the charge of the first degree premeditated murder of Gerald Michael Brown and several lesser included offenses before it was discharged, the defendant stands acquitted of those charges, and his retrial on those offenses is barred by the state and federal constitutions. Regarding the remainder of the charges, the record establishes that the trial court improperly dismissed the jury without declaring a mistrial, without the defendant's consent, and without finding a manifest necessity to terminate the proceedings. Because the improper discharge of the jury operates as an acquittal, the principles of double jeopardy bar the defendant's retrial for any offense in the indictment. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court permitting retrial of the defendant is reversed, and the charges are dismissed.
On October 15, 2007, the Roane County grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging the defendant, Rocky Joe Houston, and his brother, Clifford Leon Houston, with the May 11, 2006 first degree premeditated murder of William Birl Jones, the first degree premeditated murder of Gerald Michael Brown, and the first degree felony murder of Gerald Michael Brown perpetrated during the first degree premeditated murder of William Birl Jones. Following the designation of a district attorney general pro tempore and a special judge to hear the case,1 the defendant'sseparate trial commenced in December 2008.2
On December 19, 2008, the jury sent a note to the trial judge indicating that it had been unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Upon the jury's return to the court room, the jury foreman reported, "[W]e as a jury panel have ... not been able to reach a unanimous verdict." 3 The following exchange then occurred:
Thereafter, Mr. Rogers, the defendant's counsel, inquired of each juror whether he or she agreed that the jury had been unable to reach a verdict on any of the charged offenses or any lesser included offenses of count one. Each agreed. Similar colloquies regarding the remaining two counts established that the jury had been unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the charged offenses or the lesser included offenses.
At that point, the following exchange occurred:
The judge observed that the purpose of Rule 31 was to provide "an orderly process" for finding out "what [the jury] is trying to tell us" and stated that he sent the jury back with the verdict form in hopes that the form "would be more in keeping in the orderly process as it relates to Rule 31." The court stated, "I thought that they didn't go further as it relates to those other crimes because I thought they had found that they could not reach a verdict as to count one, two, and three." Finally, the court added,
The jury then returned to the court room, and the following exchange took place:
Thereafter, the trial court held a bench conference during which it showed the verdict form to the attorneys. The State noted that it "continue[d] to object to the procedure employ[ed]." Mr. Rogers observedthat the jury had apparently misunderstood the court's instructions and that "they thought that they had to have a requirement of a unanimous verdict they thought that was across the board unanimous." Acknowledging the irregularities in the verdict as reported, Mr. Rogers stated his belief that the defendant was "entitled" to the verdict. The court then polled the jury regarding the verdict forms, and each juror agreed that the verdict was his or her own.
The jury reached the following verdicts:
COUNT | CHARGE | VERDICT |
1 | Premeditated first degree murder of William Birl Jones | Unable to reach a verdict |
1 | Second degree murder | Unable to reach a verdict |
1 | Facilitation of first degree premeditated murder | Unable to reach a verdict |
1 | Facilitation of second degree murder | Unable to reach a verdict |
1 | Voluntary Manslaughter | Unable to reach a verdict |
1 | Facilitation of voluntary manslaughter | Not guilty |
1 | Reckless homicide | Unable to reach a verdict |
1 | Criminally negligent homicide | Unable to reach a verdict |
2 | First degree premeditated murder of Gerald Michael Brown | Not guilty |
2 | Second degree murder | Unable to reach a verdict |
2 | Facilitation of first degree premeditated murder | Not guilty |
2 | Facilitation of second degree murder | Not guilty |
2 | Voluntary manslaughter | Unable to reach a verdict |
2 | Facilitation of voluntary manslaughter | Not guilty |
2 | Reckless homicide | Unable to reach a verdict |
2 | Criminally negligent homicide | Unable to reach a verdict |
3 | First degree felony murder of Gerald Michael Brown | Unable to reach a verdict |
3 | Second degree murder | Unable to reach a verdict |
3 | Facilitation of first degree felony murder | Not guilty |
3 | Facilitation of second degree murder | Not guilty |
3 | Voluntary manslaughter | Unable to reach a verdict |
3 | Facilitation of voluntary manslaughter | Not guilty |
3 | Reckless homicide | Unable to reach a verdict |
3 | Criminally negligent homicide | Unable to reach a verdict |
Following the court's polling of the jury, the court asked the parties if they wished to poll the jury further, and the defense declined while the State elected to "stand on its earlier...
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