State v. Howard

Decision Date26 August 1991
Docket NumberNo. 460,460
Citation600 N.E.2d 809,75 Ohio App.3d 760
PartiesThe STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. HOWARD, Appellee.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Robert N. Rosenberger, Pros. Atty. and Paul W. Cox, Asst. Pros. Atty., Waverly, for appellant.

David Sief and Ed Rhoads, Waverly, for appellee.

PETER B. ABELE, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Pike County Common Pleas Court granting appellee's motion to suppress evidence. James Mitchell Howard, defendant below and appellee herein, was indicted by the Pike County Grand Jury for obstructing justice in violation of R.C. 2921.32(A)(1), a felony of the fourth degree. After the court below granted appellee's motion to suppress evidence, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal in compliance with Crim.R. 12(J).

Appellant assigns the following errors: 1

First assignment of error:

"The trial court erred by finding the police were required to have a search warrant to enter the residence of a third party, since the warrant requirement does not prevent police from entering the residence of a third party when the police see inside the residence a fugitive with an outstanding felony warrant; therefore, the third party who prevented entrance to his residence by the police obstructed justice as defined in Section 2921.32(A)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code."

Second assignment of error:

"The trial court erred by finding that there were no exigent circumstances when police have a felony warrant for the arrest of a fugitive who is visible inside a third party's residence to police standing outside the residence, there are exigent circumstances sufficient to give police the right to gain entry to the residence for the purpose of executing the arrest warrant."

On March 12, 1990, the grand jury returned an indictment alleging appellee engaged in conduct constituting obstruction of justice in violation of R.C. 2921.32(A)(1), a felony of the fourth degree. Appellee pleaded not guilty and the court scheduled a jury trial for August 27, 1990.

On the day scheduled for jury trial, the parties advised the court of their agreement to submit a pre-trial defense motion to the court for immediate determination. The court proceeded to hear the motion. Although appellee called the motion a motion to dismiss, the court treated the motion as a motion to suppress evidence. The parties submitted the following stipulated facts:

" * * * JUDGE: Okay. Now, have the parties agreed upon a statement of facts for the Court to consider, then, with respect to this motion?

"MR. ROSENBERGER: Yes, Your Honor, we have tried to come up with a stipulation of facts that probably is the State's version of the facts that are in this case, and if under those circumstances, the Court feels that we do not have a claim or an action, at that point we assume that the Court will grant that motion.

"Your Honor, it's my understanding our stipulated facts would be that, I believe, on January 29th, the Pike County Common Pleas Court issued a warrant for one Steve Hamilton based upon an indictment returned of a breaking and entering and two theft offenses. Then on or about February 19, 1990, the Pike County Sheriff's Department received a tip that the defendant, Steve Hamilton, was located at the residence of defendant located within Pike County. The Officers went to that residence based upon that tip and observed the felon for which they had a warrant of Steve Hamilton inside the trailer of the defendant, Mr. Howard. They then approached the door, called upon Mr. Howard to allow them to enter to execute their warrant upon the defendant, Steve Hamilton.... excuse me.... upon the felon Steve Hamilton. They do not have an arrest warrant in hand. This defendant, Mr. Howard, made a demand upon them to see a warrant, whether that is an arrest warrant or a search warrant or both. The Officers again indicated that the .. they had an arrest warrant but did not have it in hand, and the defendant, James Mitchell Howard, refused them access to the fugitive or to the felon, Steve Hamilton. Steve Hamilton then made his escape from the trailer of Mr. Howard. I think that's basically our stipulated facts. Is that accurate?

"DEPUTY BLANTON: That's accurate.

"MR. RHOADS: Yes, that's ... for the record, Your Honor, I would like to mention so my client will know that it is on the record. * * * "

The trial court judge accepted the stipulated facts. After considering the stipulated facts and the arguments of counsel, the court below granted appellee's motion to suppress evidence. The court made the following comments in the record:

" * * * JUDGE: Okay. Well, the indictment in this case charges the offense of obstructing justice which is ... it reads that 'James Mitchell Howard did, with purpose to hinder the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for crime or to assist another to benefit from the commission of a crime, harbor or conceal such other person, and the crime committed by the person aided is a felony in violation of Section 2921.32(A)(1) of the Revised .. Ohio Revised Code.' That's the obstructing justice statute.

"Okay, now let's see how I want to say this. It's the ... first of all, based upon the statement of facts, it's the Court's impression that the Officers were required to obtain a search warrant before entering this defendant's home to arrest Mr. Hamilton. There was no consent given to search and I have not heard anything that would amount to .. what I consider to be exigent circumstances that would obviate the need for a search warrant. So that's the first finding I'll make. Number two: It's the Court's opinion that the fact that the defendant demanded to see a warrant ... did he demand a specific type of warrant, or hust [sic ] say a warrant?

"MR. ROSENBERGER: It's my ... our understanding is that he demanded to see a warrant. Uh ...

"JUDGE: Okay. Well, so that's ...

"MR. HOWARD: No, he told me he had a search warrant.

"MR. RHOADS: Okay.

"MR. HOWARD: And I asked him to see it.

"MR. RHOADS: Okay. Apparently ... as near ... there's some conflicting testimony or statements, but ...

"JUDGE: Okay. Well, let's stay with the stipulation then ...

"MR. RHOADS: Okay.

"JUDGE: (Continuing) ... and limit it to that since there's some conflict about that. It's this Court's opinion that the fact that this defendant demanded a warrant or to see a warrant, cannot be used as evidence of his purpose to hinder the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for crime, cause I think he does have a ... that he does have the right to demand a warrant for admitting Law Officers into his home. So, I don't believe that that ... can be used as evidence against him for purposes of this particular charge. Now, it is my understanding that since that is the case, the State feels that it would be ... its case would be jeopardized and couldn't proceed on that basis. Is that right. Mr. Prosecutor?

"MR. ROSENBERGER: That's correct, Your Honor.

"JUDGE: So, based upon that statement, I want to be ... I'm gonna be certain how this matter's handled, the Court would conclude that the indictment then, or the facts as stated, would not constitute the offense without more, and the appropriate order should be issued accordingly. I don't ... if it's called a dismissal, it's called a dismissal. It may be a motion to suppress or a limitation on evidence. Whatever it is, it is. I don't want to call it something it isn't. But my understanding from the Prosecutor was that if that's the Court's ruling about that particular issue, that the State would not be prepared to go forward with its case. Is that correct, Mr. ...

"MR. ROSENBERGER: Yes, Your Honor. We intended to ask the Court for an instruction at the end of the State's case in regards to the necessity of a warrant under these circumstances, and the Court's ruled. By ruling on this, I think it's making that ruling.

"JUDGE: Okay. But the ... it's my understand [sic] that ruling impacts the Prosecutor's case sufficiently to ... that you couldn't go forward today then, or would not be prepared to go forward with the charge today.

"MR. ROSENBERGER: That's correct, Your Honor.

"JUDGE: Okay, the Court will issue an appropriate order to that effect in writing and the intention, I believe, and the understanding is, that the Prosecutor would have a right to appeal that ruling to get some clarification if you deem it advisable to do so.

"MR. RHOADS: That's correct, Your Honor. * * * "

On August 31, 1990, the court below filed an entry granting appellee's motion to suppress evidence. The court wrote in pertinent part:

" * * * For purposes of the motion, the parties stipulated certain facts which were read into the record by the prosecutor. To summarize, Pike County Sheriff's deputies went to the home of defendant to arrest Steven Hamilton pursuant to an arrest warrant for B & E. The deputies did not take the arrest warrant with them. Upon arrival, the deputies observed Hamilton inside defendants [sic ] home. Defendant refused to allow the deputies to enter his home to arrest Hamilton without 'a warrant'.

"First, it is the Court's opinion that the deputies were required to have a search warrant to enter defendants [sic ] home to arrest Hamilton. There was no consent or exigent circumstances obviating the search warrant requirement. Steagald v. U.S. (1981), 451 U.S. 204 [101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38].

"Second, it is the Courts [sic ] opinion that defendants [sic ] demand that the officers produce a warrant before permitting them to enter his home, a right granted him by the Constitution, cannot be used as evidence that he committed the crime of obstructing justice. cf. State v. Pembaur (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 136 [9 OBR 385, 459 N.E.2d 217].

"Upon announcement of the opinion, the Prosecuting Attorney represented to the Court that the State could not proceed to trial.

"It is...

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