State v. Howell
| Decision Date | 16 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. C–170158,C–170158 |
| Citation | 106 N.E.3d 337,2018 Ohio 591 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Lakisha HOWELL, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alex Scott Havlin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff–Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Carrie Wood, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant–Appellant.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Lakisha Howell has appealed from the trial court's entry convicting her upon a no-contest plea to operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a).
{¶ 2} In two assignments of error, Howell argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress based on both the alleged unlawful stop of her automobile and the alleged unlawful administration of field-sobriety tests. Because the stop of Howell's vehicle was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to grant her motion to suppress.
{¶ 3} On August 6, 2014, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Aaron Shade conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Howell. Following the stop, Howell was cited for failure to dim headlights in violation of R.C. 4513.15 and placed under arrest for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and 4511.19(A)(1)(d).
{¶ 4} Howell filed a motion to suppress challenging the traffic stop, the administration of field-sobriety tests, and her arrest. At a hearing on the motion, Trooper Shade testified that he had been patrolling westbound on Interstate 275 at approximately 2:30 a.m., when Howell's vehicle approached him from behind. Howell had her high beams on as she approached, but dimmed them when she got close to the trooper's vehicle. Trooper Shade observed Howell "bouncing" a little back and forth in her lane while she was behind him. He testified that she had not committed a lane violation and had not been driving erratically. He explained that the bouncing did not constitute a marked-lanes violation, but it had raised his suspicion because it was "abnormal." Trooper Shade slowed down to allow Howell to pass him, but she continued to stay behind his vehicle. As Howell exited from the interstate, Trooper Shade moved behind her and followed her for a short distance. She did not commit any traffic violations during this time. Trooper Shade testified that the sole reason he stopped Howell was because she had committed a traffic violation by failing to dim her headlights on the interstate.
{¶ 5} Upon approaching Howell's vehicle, Trooper Shade detected an odor of alcohol coming from within the vehicle, and he asked Howell if she had had anything to drink. Howell stated that she had drunk one margarita. Trooper Shade removed her from the vehicle and administered three field-sobriety tests. Based on Howell's performance on the field-sobriety tests, the odor of alcohol that he had detected from within Howell's vehicle, Howell's failure to dim her headlights, and the bouncing within her lane on the interstate, Trooper Shade placed Howell under arrest.
{¶ 6} The trial court denied Howell's motion to suppress, finding that the initial traffic stop had been legal and based upon probable cause. It further found that the field-sobriety tests had been properly administered. As relevant to the traffic stop of Howell's vehicle, the trial court found as a fact that Howell had operated her motor vehicle behind Trooper Shade on Interstate 275 with her high beams illuminated, and that Trooper Shade had stopped Howell's vehicle based on her failure to dim her headlights. The court specifically found that the stop had been a noninvestigatory stop. The trial court denied Howell's motion to suppress upon its conclusion that Trooper Shade had probable cause to conduct a noninvestigatory stop of Howell's vehicle based on her failure to dim her headlights.
{¶ 7} Howell subsequently pled no contest to a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and was found guilty. She appealed, but her appeal was dismissed by this court because the trial court had not imposed a sentence, and therefore, the order appealed from was not final and appealable.
{¶ 8} After her appeal was dismissed, the trial court sentenced Howell. She now appeals from the trial court's final entry finding her guilty and imposing sentence. In two assignments of error, she challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress.
{¶ 9} Our review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. We must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent and credible evidence, but we review de novo the trial court's application of the relevant law to those facts. Id.
{¶ 10} In her first assignment of error, Howell argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the stop of her automobile and all evidence gathered following the unlawful stop.
{¶ 11} Because a traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the traffic stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. State v. Slaughter , 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C–170110, C–170111 and C-170112, 2018-Ohio-105, 2018 WL 387268, ¶ 10, citing Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 809–810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). When an officer witnesses a specific violation of the traffic code, a stop of the vehicle in which the violation is committed is supported by probable cause. State v. Johnson , 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C–010621 and C–010622, 2002-Ohio-2884, 2002 WL 1300263, ¶ 7.
{¶ 12} In addition, even in the absence of probable cause, an officer may initiate a traffic stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime has been, or is being, committed. State v. Foster , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160424, 2017-Ohio-4036, 90 N.E.3d 1282, ¶ 16, citing State v. Mays , 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 7.
An investigatory traffic stop is permitted in such a situation in order for the officer to confirm or refute her or his suspicion. Johnson at ¶ 6. The totality of the circumstances must be examined to determine whether an officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Slaughter at ¶ 12.
{¶ 13} Here, the officer testified, and the court found, that his stop was based on probable cause for the failure to dim, and not an investigatory stop for another violation such as driving under the influence. Trooper Shade testified that he had stopped Howell because she had committed a violation of R.C. 4513.15(A)(1) by failing to dim her headlights as she approached him from behind on the interstate. R.C. 4513.15(A)(1) provides that:
{¶ 14} Howell argues that she could not have violated R.C. 4513.15(A)(1), because she had been driving in the same direction as Trooper Shade and had not projected her high beams into the eyes of an oncoming driver. She is correct. The plain language of the statute provides that a driver must use a distribution of light that does not project glaring rays when she or he "approaches an oncoming vehicle." In this context, the term "oncoming" unambiguously refers to a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. Trooper Shade testified that he had been traveling in the same direction as Howell. And the record is devoid of evidence that there was any oncoming traffic at the time that Howell was using her high beams. Consequently, Trooper Shade was mistaken in his determination that Howell had committed a violation of R.C. 4513.15.
{¶ 15} But State v. Cronin , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C–100266, 2011-Ohio-1479, 2011 WL 1195818, ¶ 11. Given the plain language of the statute regulating the distribution of light to be used when "the driver of a vehicle approaches an oncoming vehicle," we cannot find that an objectively reasonable police officer would have...
To continue reading
Request your trial