State v. Hreha

• Decision Date: 15 May 2014
• Citation: 89 A.3d 1223,217 N.J. 368
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Carl HREHA, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

217 N.J. 368

89 A.3d 1223

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Carl HREHA, Defendant–Respondent.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Oct. 21, 2013.

Reargued Jan. 6, 2014.

Decided May 15, 2014.

Brian J. Uzdavinis, Deputy Attorney General, and Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

David W. Fassett argued the cause for respondent (Arseneault, Whipple, Fassett & Azzarello, attorneys).

Joshua C. Gillette argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Gibbons, attorneys; Mr. Gillette, Lawrence S. Lustberg, Mary Frances Palisano, and Jillian Stein, Newark, on the brief).

Justice FERNANDEZ–VINA delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves an appeal from defendant Carl Hreha's convictions for second-degree computer theft, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20–25(b), and fourth-degree bias intimidation, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:16–1. Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly refused to suppress a confession that he had supplied involuntarily during a custodial interrogation. He argues that interrogating officers elicited his confession with promises of leniency and other beneficial treatment. The trial court, however, found that the officers had extended defendant no such promises, and it concluded that defendant had voluntarily waived his Miranda¹ rights. That factual finding and conclusion were later challenged on appeal.

In a split decision, a majority of the Appellate Division panel held that the trial court's factual finding that the officers had not made offers of leniency was not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. On that basis, the majority concluded that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The Appellate Division thus reversed both of defendant's convictions. One member of the panel dissented, instead concluding that the totality of the circumstances supported the trial court's conclusion that defendant had voluntarily confessed.

The State appealed as of right to this Court. R. 2:2–1(a)(2). We are now asked to determine whether defendant voluntarily offered his confession. That inquiry requires us to first consider the propriety of affording deference to the trial court's factual finding that the interrogating officers did not promise defendant leniency or other beneficial treatment. A review of the record makes clear that the trial court possessed a mistaken understanding of the evidence provided at the Miranda hearing, particularly the testimony elicited from Sergeant David Dias, one of the interrogating officers. Although the officer testified that he could not remember whether any offers of leniency had been extended to defendant, the court determined that the officer had denied making any such promises. Because of that misunderstanding, we conclude that the record lacks sufficient credible evidence to support the trial court's finding that defendant was not offered leniency in exchange for his statement. Therefore, we reverse the Appellate Division's holding that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and remand to the trial court for a new Miranda hearing on defendant's motion to suppress his confession.

I.

The incident underlying defendant's convictions occurred in the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) at the Hughes Justice Complex in Trenton, where defendant worked from 2003 through 2006 as a technician in the information technology (IT) department. Just after noon on September 11, 2006, all of the OAG's network printers began to repeatedly print a document depicting a confederate flag and a threatening, racist message. A second, similar printing incident occurred a few hours later. Kiran Patel, an OAG IT security manager and one of defendant's supervisors, attempted to stop the printing and determine the source of the problem. Patel testified that, at first, defendant had not assisted with the IT staff's collection of the printed documents; instead, defendant and another member of the IT staff had been “kind of giggling” and acting “giddy.”

The IT staff eventually stopped the printing of the document and later determined that two print orders had caused the two incidents of continuous printing. Those print orders had originated at a computer on one of the four floors of the Hughes Justice Complex on which OAG employees worked. After reviewing the OAG network logs, Patel and a consultant determined that a single internet protocol (IP) address ² within the OAG network had been the source of the print orders. That IP address was a valid address within the OAG network, but Patel determined that it had not been assigned to any specific OAG device. Patel's review of the network logs also disclosed the media access control (MAC) address ³ assigned to the device that had sent the print orders. Patel later determined that the address was “phony”; it had been altered and did not belong to any OAG device.

The IT department reported the incident to the State Police and sent the hard drives from two OAG computers to the State Police laboratory. On September 18, Patel informed State Police Sergeant David Dias about his discovery of the IP address and phony MAC address. Patel also named two employees as suspects—defendant and the other IT staff member with whom defendant had been “giggling” on the date of the incident.

On Friday, October 13, 2006, following an IT meeting in an OAG conference room, Patel informed defendant that a representative from the State Police wanted to speak with him. Defendant remained in the conference room, and Dias entered and told defendant that he desired to ask him some questions. The questioning that followed was not electronically recorded, despite the availability of resources for such recording at the OAG. For five to ten minutes, Dias and defendant discussed defendant's typical duties at work. According to Dias's later testimony, he then read aloud the warnings on a Miranda card and asked defendant to read and sign it. Defendant testified that Dias had not read the card to him and that defendant had only read it quickly before signing it. The card did not contain a written Miranda waiver provision.

Dias asked whether defendant knew why he was there, to which defendant responded, “not yet.” Defendant then stated that he believed the questioning was related to an employment discrimination complaint that he had filed against one of his supervisors, Maria Cardiellos. Dias replied that the discrimination complaint was not the topic he wished to discuss. Dias then asked defendant a series of questions about the printing incident. At some point during the questioning, defendant and Dias were joined by Detectives Stanley Field, Charles Allen, and Kevin Zebro.⁴ Defendant testified that the four officers took turns asking him questions.

At first, defendant denied playing any role in the creation of the racist document or its transmission to the printers. Instead, he explained that he thought the incident had been designed to make the IT department look bad and that he was pleased if the incident had reflected poorly on Cardiellos.

Defendant later testified that he “felt cornered” during the questioning, and characterized the officers' demeanor as becoming increasingly accusatory. He testified that the officers clearly wanted him to confess and “started to pressure [him] into giving them more information about something [he] felt [he] didn't know.” The officers continued their questioning, and defendant eventually admitted that he had composed the document and sent it to the printers from his OAG computer.

Defendant later alleged that his confession had been induced by the officers' promises of leniency, including an offer that defendant could participate in a pretrial intervention (PTI) program instead of facing traditional criminal prosecution. Defendant has further asserted that the officers told him that he would be arrested and held for two or three days, including the weekend, if he did not provide a statement. Moreover, if he confessed, they agreed to allow him to exit the building without handcuffs and suggested that he would not lose his job with the OAG.

Defendant was arrested at approximately 3:00 p.m. He was escorted to Dias's patrol car, where he was handcuffed, and Dias then drove him to a nearby State Police unit. Upon arrival, defendant was fingerprinted and photographed. Defendant then agreed to provide an audio-recorded statement. That recording began at 3:27 p.m. and lasted for eight minutes. At the start of the recording, Field informed defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant stated that he understood those rights and, when asked if he had been “coerced or threatened or intimidated at any point [that day] at all,” defendant replied in the negative.

The questioning continued, and Field prompted defendant to explain what had happened on September 11, 2006. Defendantagain admitted that he had been responsible for the printing of offensive documents at the OAG on that date. Field requested specifics about the incident, and defendant described how he had sent the document to multiple OAG printers using a program that masked the MAC address and prevented anyone from tracing his IP address. Moreover, he stated that his intention had been to “create some grief” for his supervisor, Cardiellos. At first, defendant stated that he had been given the document, but he later denied having conspired with any other person to accomplish the printing.

After the questioning was completed, defendant signed another Miranda card and again responded in the negative when asked whether he had been “threatened or coerced into ... speaking to [the officers] in providing th [e] taped statement.”

Dias drove defendant back to the Hughes Justice...