State v. Hubbard
| Decision Date | 24 June 2015 |
| Citation | 118 A.3d 314,222 N.J. 249 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. TerrellL. HUBBARD, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Wayne Powell argued the cause for appellant.
David M. Galemba, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Webb–McRae, Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney).
Sara M. Fedorczyk, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney).
On October 20, 2008, police responded to a 9–1–1 call requesting assistance for an injured child. The child was defendant Terrell Hubbard's five-month-old daughter, Lanaya. When police arrived, the infant was in an ambulance about to be transported to the hospital. Medical technicians informed the responding police officers that the child was in critical condition.
Defendant told a detective that he found his daughter lying on the bed and noticed that she was not breathing. He placed a 9–1–1 call and performed CPR while waiting for assistance. Defendant acceded to the detective's request to come to the police station to provide information that might be helpful to medical professionals treating his daughter. Defendant was in the police station for a total of three hours, which included three breaks, ranging from a few minutes to two hours in duration. After the interview was concluded, the detective drove defendant home. The detective never administered Miranda2 warnings to defendant. Defendant's daughter was declared dead three days later.
A grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with second-degree manslaughter, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11–4(b)(1), and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24–4(a). The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress his October 20, 2008 statement. The court concluded that defendant was in custody at the time of the interview and that police had failed to advise defendant of his Miranda rights. The Appellate Division granted the State's motion for leave to appeal and reversed. The panel determined that this Court's recent ruling in State v. Diaz–Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 34 A. 3d 748 (2012), permitted it to conduct a de novo review of the trial record, without deferring to the findings of fact and credibility assessments of the trial court, because it concluded that the trial court had based its findings of fact solely on the videotape of the October 20 interview. The appellate panel found that defendant had not been subject to a custodial interrogation; therefore, the failure to administer Miranda warnings to defendant at the beginning of the interview did not require suppression of the statement. We granted defendant's motion for leave to appeal.
In Diaz–Bridges, the Court emphasized that de novo review of a video record is confined to the rare case in which the videotaped statement is the only evidence before the trial court or the trial court clearly and unequivocally relies on no evidence other than the videotaped statement to resolve the motion to suppress. Id. at 565–66, 34 A. 3d 748. In this matter, we have not been asked to examine the standard of review set forth in Diaz–Bridges. There is no need to do so for in this matter the traditional rules governing appellate review of trial court findings control and should have been applied by the Appellate Division. The trial court relied on evidence other than the videotaped statement, including testimony presented to it when making its findings.
We further determine that the interview conducted by the detective at the police station was a custodial interrogation and the failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to the interview requires suppression of that recorded statement.
On October 20, 2008, defendant Terrell Hubbard was alone with Lanaya, his five-month-old daughter, at the home he shared in Vineland with the child's mother and her father. The child's mother left Lanaya in defendant's care to go to the dentist before reporting to work. At approximately 3:30 p.m., defendant placed a 9–1–1 call to report that his daughter was not breathing. The operator instructed defendant how to administer CPR as he awaited the arrival of emergency medical assistance. Emergency medical personnel arrived at defendant's home before the police. After restoring the child's heartbeat, medical personnel placed her in an ambulance for transport to a hospital. Police arrived just before the ambulance departed. A medic informed Detective Jeff Travaline that the child was in critical condition.
After speaking to the medic, the detective went to the porch of the house, where defendant stood with another police officer. The detective asked defendant what had happened to the baby. Defendant stated that the child was lying on the bed and had been crying. He picked her up, realized she was not breathing, and placed the call for assistance. When a police sergeant informed Travaline that he wanted to secure the house as a crime scene, Travaline and the sergeant conducted a “walk-through” to confirm that no one else was in the house. Defendant remained on the porch with a police officer.
After locking the front door, Travaline asked defendant to accompany him to the police station. Defendant assented and Travaline drove him to the police station.
The parties disputed the circumstances surrounding defendant's trip to the police station. Travaline maintains that he offered to drive defendant because defendant's vehicle was being used by his girlfriend. Defendant, however, insists that he had ready access to a vehicle but was given no option other than to ride in Travaline's car. The trial court found that the detective offered defendant no option, directing him to the backseat of his unmarked police vehicle. Defendant and Travaline did not converse during the drive to the station. Defendant sat in the backseat of the vehicle.
Defendant was not handcuffed or patted down at any time that day. According to Travaline, defendant was not a suspect at that time; he was simply being interviewed to provide a fuller understanding of what transpired so that additional information could be relayed to the medical professionals treating defendant's daughter.
At approximately 4:17 p.m., defendant entered an interview room at the station. He sat alone for almost three minutes before being joined by Travaline. After providing defendant with water, Travaline asked him to move to a different seat in the corner of the room. The move permitted defendant to face the video camera. Travaline sat across from defendant, between him and the door. Defendant was in the interview room for almost three hours. During that period, Travaline asked defendant questions for about forty minutes. Defendant was never advised of his Miranda rights that day.
Defendant told Travaline that, earlier in the day, his girlfriend informed him that the baby was cranky. Defendant tried to calm the baby over several hours. Eventually, he placed her on the bed and went to the kitchen to prepare something to eat. On his return to the bedroom, he noticed that the baby “was flimsy and ... wasn't breathing,” so he called 9–1–1. Travaline then asked defendant to “back up a little bit” and clarify a few things. The detective's questions focused on defendant's movements and his interaction with his daughter. Defendant provided additional detail, explaining that Lanaya had been uncharacteristically fussy the night before and that her mother had given the child Tylenol
earlier that day.
At one point during the interview, Travaline left the room and returned about eight minutes later, informing defendant that the
Returning to the interview, Travaline asked defendant if Lanaya had fallen or been accidentally dropped, or if defendant may have been distracted at any point while watching her. Defendant answered each of these questions in the negative. Travaline asked defendant about his relationship with his girlfriend, whether her pregnancy was a surprise, and how the birth of the baby had altered his life. Travaline also asked if he was ever advised or counselled to treat the infant gently, whether he ever got frustrated with the baby, if he loved her, and if he ever resented her.
The exchange proceeded as follows:
At 5:12 p.m., after about an hour in the interview room, Travaline told defendant that he was going to check the baby's status and that he would return in a few minutes. After an absence of...
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