State v. Hubbard
| Decision Date | 04 August 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 3730-II,3730-II |
| Citation | 615 P.2d 1325,27 Wn.App. 61 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Val Wayne HUBBARD, Appellant. |
Kathryn Guykema, Tacoma, for appellant.
Joseph D. Mladinov, Deputy Pros. Atty., Tacoma, for respondent.
Defendant Val Wayne Hubbard appeals his conviction for delivery of a controlled substance by assigning error to the trial court's limitation of impeachment examination and admission of evidence of other crimes not charged or proven. We reverse.
Defendant's version of the facts, if believed, portrays an unsavory picture of police entrapment. An acquaintance of defendant, James Glace had, in the past, allegedly borrowed $50 from defendant for unknown reasons. Unbeknownst to defendant. Glace was a police informant working with the narcotics division of the local police department. Glace would arrange drug purchases between dealers and undercover police, earning a commission in the event of a drug buy or arrest.
In the morning of February 7, 1978, Glace met with defendant to discuss repayment of the $50 loan. Although Glace apparently had no cash on hand, he did have a small packet of white powder which he insisted defendant take as collateral. 1 Although reluctant, defendant accepted the packet and the two parted company. Later that afternoon, Glace again contacted defendant and asked him to come to a parking lot in a Puyallup shopping center where the alleged loan would be repaid. At the meeting Glace introduced defendant to an undercover agent posing as a buyer. The buyer requested to "see the dope" and defendant volunteered the small packet of white substance. The buyer examined the packet and then handed defendant $40. Glace assured defendant that he (Glace) still owed defendant $10. The parties left the scene and defendant was arrested some months later.
At defendant's trial, defendant called Glace as an adverse witness and sought to establish a defense of entrapment. Testimony indicated that Glace himself was a drug user of many years and that he had an interest in setting up defendant solely for the commission he would receive. Upon direct examination defendant sought to expose the details of Glace's habit including the type of drugs used and the daily cost of his habit. Following the prosecution's objection, however, the trial court would not allow defendant to explore this area beyond establishing the existence of Glace's drug habit and the receipt of a commission for successful drug buys. The trial court rather abruptly refused to permit defense counsel to make an offer of proof. Defendant assigns error to the rulings, arguing that he was not allowed to fully establish Glace's motives to set up defendant and thereby bolster his defense of entrapment.
In State v. Smith, 93 Wash.2d 329, 350, 610 P.2d 869 (1980), our State Supreme Court recently indicated that in proving the defense of entrapment
police conduct (is) secondary unless the conduct serves to entrap an unwary defendant into committing a crime he had no intention of committing. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973); State v. Gray, 69 Wash.2d 432, 418 P.2d 725 (1966); State v. Emerson, 10 Wash.App. 235, 517 P.2d 245 (1973).
See RCW 9A.16.070(1)(b). At trial defendant staunchly maintained that he never intended to make a drug sale and that his only concern was repayment of the $50 he had loaned to Glace. Recognizing that this is not a case alleging entrapment as a matter of law, as urged in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976), or United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973), we find it was error to preclude defendant from exploring the extent of Glace's drug involvement in establishing his defense of entrapment.
Beyond defendant's denial of a predisposition to commit the crime, it was critical to his defense that defendant cast doubt upon Glace's version of the facts. A costly and extensive drug habit could show not only Glace's motives and potential bias against defendant, but also...
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State v. Tishchenko, No. 38471-0-II (Wash. App. 4/13/2010)
...was admissible to rebut Tishchenko's claim that the police officers arrested the "wrong guy." 3-A RP at 91; see State v. Hubbard, 27 Wn. App. 61, 64, 615 P.2d 1325 (1980) ("[e]vidence of prior unlawful acts, similar to the one with which the defendant is charged, is admissible to rebut defe......
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State v. Kalamarski, 3349-III-0
...matters within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Gray, 64 Wash.2d 979, 984, 395 P.2d 490 (1964); State v. Hubbard, 27 Wash.App. 61, 64, 615 P.2d 1325 (1980). This was within its discretion. Although there may be circumstances in which a different decision should be made, we ......
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