State v. Huber

Citation140 P.3d 1096,2006 NMCA 087
Decision Date31 May 2006
Docket NumberNo. 24,722.,24,722.
PartiesSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert HUBER, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico

Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Inocente, P.C., Brian A. Pori, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} Defendant appeals his convictions for second degree murder, kidnapping (great bodily harm), conspiracy to kidnap, and related crimes. On appeal, Defendant claims (1) the evidence presented was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial; (3) the prosecution withheld material, exculpatory evidence; (4) his sentence violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; and (5) cumulative error requires reversal. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} This case presented the jury with numerous major and minor conflicts and discrepancies in witness testimony concerning the events surrounding the victim's beating and his physical condition after being taken from the scene. We consider these facts in detail in our discussion after analyzing them with deference to the verdict under the applicable standard of review. It is not disputed that on the evening of October 18, 2000, Defendant, Lincoln Hill, and Rudy Marquez were involved in the beating of the victim in this case, Ryan Bryant, over an unpaid debt for a consignment of hay. Bryant had previously moved from Arizona to Valencia County and had befriended Defendant. Defendant was the best man at Bryant's wedding and Bryant stayed at Defendant's house when Bryant and his wife were arguing. Bryant's wife testified that, notwithstanding their friendship, Defendant and Bryant often argued like siblings and physically fought on at least one occasion.

{3} Hill testified that three or four days before Bryant's beating, Hill was living and working at his mother's ranch when he was approached by Bryant, whom he did not know, about the availability of hay. Bryant told Hill that he had a friend with sixty roping steers that needed inexpensive feed, and that his friend would pay him on delivery. Hill agreed to sell the hay on consignment, and Bryant came back the next day for a second load, but never paid as promised. Hill determined from his caller ID that Bryant had called from Defendant's house. Hill's mother needed the money, so he proceeded to Defendant's house to collect the debt. When Hill arrived, Bryant opened his wallet, claiming to have a check, and assured Hill that he would cash the check and pay Hill when the bank opened in the morning.

{4} Bryant spent the day of October 17, 2000 with Toni Wagoner, who had rented a room at Defendant's home. Bryant agreed to pay to fix Wagoner's shattered car window in exchange for her driving him to various ranchers to collect money owed Bryant. The two dropped off the car to be fixed, spent the evening at Defendant's home, and spent the next day, October 18, 2000, driving around trying to collect the money allegedly owed to Bryant. Wagoner testified that Bryant only received money at one of the places they visited. She also stated that he briefly gambled while she submitted a job application at Isleta Casino. Bryant and Wagoner then returned to Defendant's home.

{5} During this period, Hill and his brother Marquez were looking for Bryant at local bars and made repeated calls to Defendant. Ultimately, Hill was informed by another brother that Defendant had called to say that if Hill wanted the money he should go to Defendant's house. Meanwhile, at Defendant's property, Defendant informed Bryant that he wanted to be taken to the liquor store before it closed. Bryant was sitting in the driver's seat of Wagoner's car, inside Defendant's fenced yard, when Defendant moved his own vehicle in front of the gate. Wagoner, who was sitting in the passenger's seat of her car, testified that Defendant then "came back walking to the car like he was mad and started to yell at [Bryant] and [Bryant] was sitting behind my steering wheel and he started getting on to [Bryant] about being a sorry puke and screwing his friends over."

{6} At this point, Troy Hibdon arrived, although there is conflicting testimony as to whether he parked his car outside or inside the fenced yard. The State's theory was that Defendant had blocked off all exits so that he could hold Bryant until Hill arrived. Wagoner testified that Defendant was on the phone, telling the other party to hurry up because he did not know how much longer he could hold Bryant. She described Defendant as "getting madder and madder." Hill and Marquez soon arrived, with Hill testifying that they walked up and said hello to Defendant, who introduced them to Hibdon. Hill testified that they did not physically attack Bryant then, but merely approached him and asked him for the money. Wagoner's account differed; she testified that "[Bryant] was still in my car and I was still in my car and they started yelling at him and screaming at him and telling him what a sorry person he was and not to be screwing people over like he had been doing. . . . And next thing I know they were throwing blows at [Bryant]. . . ."

{7} Regardless of when the fighting began, at some point shortly after Hill and Marquez arrived, Bryant tried to assure them that his mother would soon be sending him a check for his birthday. In response, Defendant called Bryant's mother in Arizona. She subsequently testified that Defendant sounded very angry, that she told him that she was sending her son money, but that she refused to specify the amount. Hill testified that Defendant ended the conversation and announced that Bryant's mother was not going to be sending any money, which triggered the beating. Wagoner described Defendant as "addled, mad[,] frustrated, in a rage. Just thoroughly pissed off."

{8} The actual beating of Bryant by Hill, Marquez, and Defendant, like much of this case, presented the jury with numerous inconsistencies in the testimony. Defendant testified that he did not hit Bryant, but on the contrary picked up a rubber pole from a children's batting tee because he was scared, and that he told Hill and Marquez "no more, that's enough." Wagoner, Hill, Marquez, and Hibdon each testified that Defendant was involved in the beating to varying degrees, but all agreed that at some point Defendant used a baseball bat. Marquez noted that it was an aluminum bat. The beating began with Bryant trying to fend off the blows from the backseat of the car, but he was eventually dragged from the vehicle and was described as being "on all fours" while the beating continued. When the beating ended, Hill, Marquez, and Defendant left, and Wagoner and Hibdon took Bryant back to Hibdon's house. Again, the testimony is conflicting as to Bryant's physical condition at this time, but he deteriorated on the way back to Hibdon's house and was placed on the bathroom floor, where he died during the middle of the night.

{9} Hibdon informed Defendant the next morning that Bryant was dead. Defendant went to the Hibdon residence with Hill and Marquez, where Justin Brown was also present. Defendant testified that he told the others that they should call the police, although this testimony was contradicted by testimony that Defendant paid Brown to dispose of the body. In any event, after some discussion, it was decided that they would not contact the police, but would instead dispose of the body. Hill, Marquez, and Brown then proceeded to a remote location, where they buried the body. On December 1, 2000, Bryant's wife reported him missing. Bryant's body was not discovered until April 2, 2001, when a passerby walking his dog came upon the remains.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

{10} Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the second degree murder conviction, with the specific assertion that the evidence is lacking that his actions constituted a significant, proximate cause of Bryant's death. Defendant also contends that the evidence did not support the kidnapping and conspiracy convictions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{11} A sufficiency of the evidence review involves a two-step process. Initially, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a process that prevents us from re-weighing the evidence. See State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 130-31, 753 P.2d 1314, 1318-19 (1988). Then we must "make a legal determination of whether the evidence viewed in this manner could justify a finding by any rational trier of fact that each element of the crime charged has been established beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Apodaca, 118 N.M. 762, 766, 887 P.2d 756, 760 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Sufficient evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State v. Salgado, 1999-NMSC-008, ¶ 25, 126 N.M. 691, 974 P.2d 661 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{12} As indicated, this case presented the jury with significant factual conflicts. Once the jury resolved these conflicts, it was still necessary to rely heavily on reasonable inferences that could be derived from these facts. In his recitation of the standard of review, Defendant refers us to the oft-cited passage that "[e]vidence equally consistent with two hypotheses tends to prove neither." Herron v. State, 111 N.M. 357, 362, 805 P.2d 624, 629 (1991). As we explain below, however, once we look at the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, along with the reasonable inferences that may be derived therefrom, we believe that Defendant is actually advocating the position that the evidence used to support the conviction must be devoid of any reasonable inference of innocence. This specific standard of reviewing the evidence has been disavowed by our ...

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