State v. Hudson
| Decision Date | 22 December 1924 |
| Docket Number | 5288. |
| Parties | STATE EX REL. CHAFIN, SHERIFF, ET AL. v. HUDSON, JUDGE, ET AL. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted December 9, 1924.
Syllabus by the Court.
A circuit court does not have jurisdiction of a bill in chancery filed by the state, at the relation of the Attorney General, solely for the purpose of enjoining an act or proceeding apprehended or being committed, unless the act or proceeding sought to be enjoined is being committed or will be committed in the county in which the suit is instituted or unless the act or proceeding is being committed or apprehended in an adjoining circuit the judge of which is so situated that it would be improper for him to act.
The circuit court of the county of Kanawha does not have jurisdiction of a bill by the state at the relation of the Attorney General solely for the purpose of enjoining and inhibiting the commission of illegal acts and proceedings being committed by persons in the county of Logan. The court takes judicial notice that the Kanawha circuit does not adjoin the Logan circuit.
Original mandamus by the State on the relation of Don Chafin, Sheriff of Logan County, and others, against Honorable A. P. Hudson Circuit Judge of Kanawha County, and another. Writ awarded.
E. T England, Atty. Gen., and Charles Ritchie, R. A. Blessing, and R. Dennis Steed, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondents.
Petitioners in this prohibition are the defendants in a bill in chancery filed by the state at the relation of E. T. England, its Attorney General, in the circuit court of Kanawha county over which circuit Honorable A. P. Hudson presides. Petitioners are residents of Logan county, and aver that the circuit court of Kanawha county has no jurisdiction to entertain the bill.
The bill is against the sheriff of Logan county and his numerous deputies, the judge of the circuit court of that county (although no allegation against him is therein contained), the members of the county court, the prosecuting attorney and his assistant, and numerous coal companies operating in that county. The object of the bill is to enjoin the sheriff from appointing deputies to serve as private guards at the mines of the coal companies named; and to prevent the coal companies from paying for the services of such deputy sheriffs acting as mine guards; and to restrain the coal companies from paying the sheriff large sums of money alleged to be paid him for the appointment of such deputies. It is charged in the bill that the appointment and service of these deputies as mine guards is in violation of section 11, chapter 7, of the Code, which makes it unlawful to appoint deputies for the purpose of acting in the capacity of guards or watchmen for any private individual, firm or corporation. The bill contains numerous charges of illegal and criminal acts upon the part of these deputies, by which the personal rights and safety of the inhabitants of that county are abridged and endangered, and their political rights denied; and that they are deprived of the inalienable right of the peaceful pursuit of business, happiness, and of their personal safety.
The petitioners aver that the bill does not present a case wherein the interference with the enjoyment of any right may be said to be threatened as a result of the conditions sought to be prohibited; but even if the allegations may be so construed as to charge that the enjoyment of personal rights is threatened or abridged by the acts sought to be enjoined, it is clear that such rights are not of that nature coming within the jurisdiction of a court of equity; that the law courts afford a speedy and adequate remedy; that the criminal acts complained of can be speedily controlled by the criminal courts; that the remedy for infringement upon the personal and private rights of any citizen is upon suit on the sheriff's bond; and that if the administrative and judicial officers of that county fail to discharge their duties for the preservation of such rights, impeachment proceedings should be invoked. They further assert that no infringement of the right of property is involved in the charge, which would give equity jurisdiction to enjoin a criminal act or one anticipated, citing State v. Ehrlick, 65 W.Va. 700, 64 S.E. 935, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 691; State v. Railroad Co., 78 W.Va. 526, 89 S.E. 288, L. R. A. 1916F, 1001; In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092, and many other cases, which hold, in substance, that something more than the threatened commission of a criminal offense is necessary to call into exercise the injunctive powers of a court; that there must be an interference actual or threatened of property or rights of a pecuniary nature.
On the other hand the Attorney General argues forcibly that the violations of law complained of in the state's bill involve personal rights and political liberty of the citizens of Logan county and of others who may visit that county in the pursuit of pleasure, or for the transaction of business; that the violation of personal rights of this character, continuous and threatening in its nature, is sufficient to warrant injunctive process for its prevention; that the violations are in the nature of a public nuisance; and that pecuniary rights of the citizens are thus indirectly involved and are sufficient to sustain equity jurisdiction. To sustain this contention, State v. Ehrlick, 65 W.Va. 700, 64 S.E. 935, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 691; State of Missouri ex rel. Crow v. Dennis Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S.W. 1078, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 747, 123 Am. St. Rep. 393, 13 Ann. Cas. 787; Railway Co. v. Conley & Avis, 67 W.Va. 129, 67 S.E. 613; Roosevelt et al. v. Edson, Mayor, 51 N.Y. Super. Ct. 227; People ex rel. Miller, Attorney General, v. John Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 86 P. 224, 229, 231, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 822, 117 Am. St. Rep. 198; Commonwealth of Ky. ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. McGovern et al., 116 Ky. 212, 75 S.W. 261, 66 L. R. A. 280; 1 Joyce on Injunctions, p. 540; Spelling on Injunctions, § 922; and many other decisions of like character are relied on.
In our view we have deemed it unnecessary to pass upon the question thus presented whether under the allegations of the bill a court of equity has jurisdiction by injunctive process to prevent the commission of the...
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