State v. Hudson

• Citation: 44 S.E. 968,66 S.C. 394
• Parties: STATE v. HUDSON et al.
• Decision Date: 19 June 1903
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

44 S.E. 968

66 S.C. 394

STATE v. HUDSON et al.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 19, 1903

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Oconee County; Gage Judge.

Indictment for murder against John Hudson, Henry Hudson, Money Hudson Jack Centell, Thomas Hudson, and George Hudson. The three first were convicted of manslaughter, and appeal. Reversed.

Jones & Shelor and J. P. Carey, for appellants. Asst. Atty. Gen Townsend, for the State.

GARY A. J.

John Hudson, Money Hudson, George Hudson, Thomas Hudson, and Jack Centell were all charged, in one indictment with the murder of Rachel Thomas, and were tried at the March term of court of general sessions for the county of Oconee. George Hudson and Thomas Hudson were acquitted, and the other defendants were convicted of manslaughter and sentenced. The defendants who were convicted have appealed to this court. The exceptions make the point that the trial judge erred in his charge in two respects: First, in charging the rule as to circumstantial evidence; second, in charging the law as to complicity in crime where several are on trial.

There was no positive testimony as to which of the defendants did the killing, and the case was one of circumstantial evidence. Five persons were jointly indicted for the murder, and there was no direct proof as to who fired the fatal shot; but the state relied upon the theory that all the parties charged went to the house of the deceased for an unlawful purpose, and that all of the defendants, or such of them as went there under the common design, were just as guilty as the one who fired the fatal shot.

The exceptions assign error as follows:

"(1) Because the circuit judge erred in charging the jury as follows as to circumstantial evidence: 'These circumstances surrounding the transaction would be proved to your entire satisfaction; that is to say, the different incidents--each one--must be proved to your entire satisfaction. The circumstances must be consistent with themselves, and they must all point to one thing--the guilt of the defendants; and any other reasonable theory than the theory that the defendants at the bar, charged with the crime, did do it, would tend to prove that they were not guilty.' Whereas he should have charged the jury that the circumstances must point conclusively to the guilt of the defendants, and that, if any other reasonable theory than the theory that the defendants committed the crime should appear the defendants were entitled to a verdict of not guilty.

(2) Because the circuit judge, when he undertook to charge the rule as to circumstantial evidence, erred in not charging the true rule, as follows: That the circumstances must be proved to the entire satisfaction of the jury, and, when these circumstances are so established, they must point conclusively to the guilt of the defendants, and must be inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis.

(3) Because the circuit judge erred in charging the jury that 'if the men went to Rachel Thomas' house for the purpose of, not killing her, but to do a wrongful act--to do an illegal act, and yet not to kill--and if, as a result of that illegal act, springing out of it, if, under these circumstances, Rachel Thomas was killed, then that is manslaughter.' Whereas he should have charged the jury that if the men went to the house of Rachel Thomas with a common purpose to do an illegal act, and, in the execution of this common purpose, Rachel Thomas was killed by one of the defendants, as a probable or natural consequence of the acts done in pursuance of the common design, then the persons present, participating in the unlawful common

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