State v. Hudson
| Decision Date | 21 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 3015.,3015. |
| Citation | 519 S.E.2d 577,336 S.C. 237 |
| Parties | The STATE, Appellant, v. Ui Sun HUDSON, Respondent. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, all of Columbia; and Solicitor David Price Schwacke, of North Charleston, for appellant.
John D. Elliott; and Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, both of Columbia; and D. Ashley Pennington, of Charleston, for respondent.
Amicus Curiae: Lesly Ann Bowers, of Protection & Advocacy for People with Disabilities, Inc., of Columbia.
The State appeals from that portion of a Circuit Court order which authorizes unsupervised leave from the South Carolina State Hospital by Ui Sun Hudson where the judge found Hudson in need of "continued" hospitalization pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 17-24-40. We affirm in part and vacate in part.
In a 1995 bench trial, a Circuit Court judge found Hudson not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) on four counts of assault and battery with intent to kill. The parties have stipulated to the following underlying facts:
The trial judge ordered Hudson committed to the State Hospital for a mental evaluation. The court's order mandated the evaluation be completed within one hundred twenty days so the Chief Administrative Judge could hold a hearing to determine whether Hudson required hospitalization. The mental health authorities charged with completing the evaluation and reporting its results to the court failed to timely comply.
While committed to the state hospital for her mental evaluation, Hudson participated in the Allan Project, an NGRI treatment program operated by the Department of Mental Health. The program allows an NGRI defendant to progress through a series of seven levels, each affording the defendant an increasing degree of independence while decreasing the level of supervision. A defendant who reaches level seven is deemed ready for discharge.
On April 25, 1997, the court held a hearing to review Hudson's status. At the time of the hearing, Hudson, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, had achieved a level four status and could travel unsupervised on public transportation to and from a state-sponsored work site. She also could request passes to spend unsupervised periods of time in the community while accompanied by another NGRI defendant or "buddy." Hudson was allowed to take money she earned with her during her unsupervised excursions from the hospital.
Following the hearing, the Chief Administrative Judge issued an order finding Hudson "in need of further hospitalization." The judge ruled the South Carolina State Hospital violated S.C.Code Ann. § 17-24-40 (1985) by allowing unsupervised leave by Hudson without prior notice to and approval from the Chief Administrative Judge. He concluded, however, that Hudson's participation in the Allan Project proved beneficial. The court held the state hospital could continue to release Hudson unsupervised into the community in accordance with her level four status. The judge further ordered that, prior to Hudson's advance to level five and the concomitant privileges, the state hospital must follow the statutory procedures and obtain approval from the Chief Administrative Judge. Finally, the judge instructed the state hospital to review the privileges granted to an NGRI defendant at level four "as prior court approval is required before patients are released into the community unsupervised."
The state's Attorney General, Charles M. Condon, brought a declaratory and injunctive action to prohibit the Department of Mental Health's release of NGRI defendants through "buddy" passes, work passes, and community living passes until the Chief Administrative Judge ordered the release of these defendants pursuant to the procedures of § 17-24-40. This action resulted in a consent order requiring the Department of Mental Health to obtain approval from the appropriate Chief Administrative judge prior to allowing NGRI defendants to take unsupervised leave in any form from hospital grounds. The order prohibited the Allan Project's use of "buddy passes." The consent order provided that settlement of the declaratory and injunctive action did not affect the State's appeal in the present case.
Did the trial court err in authorizing unsupervised leave from the state hospital by Hudson where the judge found Hudson in need of "continued" hospitalization?
Hudson contends the State's consent order with the Department of Mental Health renders the issue in this appeal moot. We disagree.
A close reading of the consent order in State ex rel. Condon v. South Carolina Department of Mental Health reveals the issue in the case sub judice was specifically preserved for this appeal. The language of the order is instructive and edifying:
The consent order did not, nor could it, resolve the issue on appeal in this case: whether a Circuit Court Chief Administrative Judge can authorize the unsupervised leave of an NGRI defendant the judge finds is in need of "continued" hospitalization under S.C.Code Ann. § 17-24-40 (1985). While the consent order mandates the Department of Mental Health receive prior court approval before releasing NGRI defendants on unsupervised leave, it does not determine whether the court can actually approve such leave. Even with the approval of a judge, the parties to a lawsuit cannot determine the extent of judicial power under a statute.
The State claims the trial court erred in authorizing unsupervised leave from the state hospital by Hudson where the judge found Hudson in need of "continued" hospitalization pursuant to § 17-24-40. We agree.
According to the State, the Chief Administrative Judge exceeded the powers granted him by the General Assembly under § 17-24-40, which vests the Chief Administrative Judge "with the discretion to determine whether [an NGRI] defendant is in need of hospitalization." State v. Huiett, 302 S.C. 169, 173, 394 S.E.2d 486, 488 (1990). Section 17-24-40 provides:
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