State v. Huff

• Decision Date: 09 January 1984
• Citation: 469 A.2d 1251
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. William HUFF.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1251

469 A.2d 1251

STATE of Maine v. William HUFF.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 22, 1983.

Decided Jan. 9, 1984.

James E. Tierney, Atty. Gen., Matthew F. Dyer, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Augusta, for plaintiff.

Peter B. Dublin (orally), Lewiston, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, ROBERTS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, and SCOLNIK, JJ.

SCOLNIK, Justice.

The defendant, William Huff, appeals from his conviction of attempted murder, 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 201, 152 resulting from a jury trial in Superior Court (Sagadahoc County). On appeal, he argues that the presiding justice committed error in 1) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence as to culpable state of mind, 2) denying his motion to have a court reporter present during grand jury proceedings, 3) admitting in evidence medical testimony concerning the details of treatment of the victim and in permitting the jury to view a scar on the victim's forearm, and 4) including in his charge to the jury an instruction with respect to the requisite culpable state of mind which was inappropriate for the crime of attempted murder. We find no error in the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal or in the denial of the request for the recording of the grand jury proceedings but we do conclude that the presiding justice erroneously instructed the jury concerning the required culpable state of mind, and we vacate the judgment.

On the evening of December 24, 1981, in the town of Richmond, the defendant was out driving in his car with his wife Linda. Darkness had fallen and the streets were icy. As he turned onto Southard, a narrow, residential street, he noticed several individuals along the side of the road, and one person, Billy Chapman, who was walking near the middle of the street. The defendant decreased his speed, was approached by Chapman, and an altercation ensued. There was testimony that the defendant nearly skidded into him and a hostile verbal exchange followed with Chapman inquiring whether the defendant's car had brakes. Huff allegedly replied, "Brakes on my car. I'll kill you."

The defendant thereupon used his vehicle to pin Chapman against another car. A scuffle and a chase ensued during which Chapman received stab wounds in his forearm and leg. A police officer happened upon the scene, but Huff retreated to his vehicle and drove away. He was later arrested and on January 4, 1982, an indictment was returned charging him with attempted murder.

I.

Under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 152 "A person is guilty of criminal attempt if, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of the crime, and with the intent to complete the commission of the crime, he engages in conduct which, in fact, constitutes a substantial step toward its commission" (emphasis added). 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201 states in part: "A person is guilty of murder if: A. He intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another human being ..." (emphasis added).

The presiding justice instructed the jury as follows:

Now, as to attempted murder, the law of the State of Maine as contained in our Criminal Code, Section 152, provides that a person commits a criminal attempt if, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of the crime and with the intent to complete the commission of the crime, he engages in conduct which, in fact, constitutes a substantial step towards its commission.... The law of the State of Maine in our Criminal Code, Section 201(1)(a) (sic) provides that a person commits murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another human being. The offense of murder is, therefore, comprised of the following three essential elements: ... and third and finally, that such killing was done by the other human being intentionally, that is, with the actual intent or conscious object to cause such death or knowingly, that is, with the awareness that it was practically certain that his conduct would cause such death. (emphasis added).

The defendant correctly contends that the instruction was erroneous because it is factually and legally impossible for an individual to intend knowingly to commit the crime of murder.

17-A M.R.S.A. § 201 uses "intentionally" and "knowingly" as alternative states of mind. Under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 35(1)(A), "[a] person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious object to cause such a result," and under section 35(2)(A), "[a] person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34 states "[w]hen the law provides that acting knowingly is sufficient to establish an element of the crime, that element is also established if, with respect thereto, a person acted intentionally." The Code does not state, nor would it be rational to infer, the converse.

Under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 152(1), a person is guilty of criminal attempt if he acts with the intent to complete the commission of the target offense. Where a discrepancy exists in the culpable mental states between criminal attempt and the offense attempted, the criminal attempt to commit such a crime is a "logical impossibility". State v. Howard, 405 A.2d 206, 212 (Me.1979). Thus, there is no crime of attempted manslaughter because the requisite culpable state of mind for the crime of manslaughter is "recklessly" or "with criminal negligence". State v. Howard, 405 A.2d at 212. An actor ... cannot intend to act recklessly or negligently. State v. Grant, 418 A.2d 154, 156. Nor can he intend to act "knowingly". Before a person can be convicted of attempted murder, he must act with the intent to cause the death of another human being. State v. Howard, 405 A.2d at 212.

That "knowingly" is a distinct and less purposeful state of mind than "intentionally" is clear by definition, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 35(1)(A) and (2)(A), and is implicit in the formulation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(3). While either mental state may satisfy the murder statute, this does not commend them equally for purposes of the attempt statute. We therefore hold that in a prosecution for criminal attempt, where alternative culpable mental states will satisfy the target offense, but only one is compatible with the attempt statute, the incompatible element must be...