State v. Huff
| Decision Date | 31 May 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 64438,64438 |
| Citation | 879 S.W.2d 696 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Tami HUFF, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Harold G. Johnson, St. Ann, for appellant.
Timothy A. Braun, Pros. Atty., Steven G. Kobal, Asst. Pros. Atty., St. Charles County, St. Charles, for respondent.
Tami Huff, Defendant, appeals from her conviction for driving while revoked in violation of § 302.321, RSMo 1986. We affirm.
On January 29, 1993, Defendant appeared in the St. Charles County courthouse to plead guilty in connection with a driving while intoxicated (DWI) offense. At some point during the hearing, Deputy Gary L. Files, bailiff in the associate circuit court, learned Defendant's driving privileges may have been revoked for failure to submit to a chemical test.
Following the proceedings, Defendant left the courthouse and went to her automobile. Deputy Files observed Defendant get in her car and attempt to drive away. Deputy Files then stopped Defendant and arrested her. Defendant presented her driver's license. However, a check with the Department of Revenue revealed Defendant's license had been revoked and a police demand order placed on her license. Deputy Files cited Defendant for driving while revoked.
At the trial on the charge, Defendant primarily contested her awareness of the revocation. Defendant testified she had originally received a notice of revocation when she was first charged, but that revocation had been stayed. She stated she had not received another notice of revocation.
The State introduced into evidence Defendant's driving record, including a letter dated January 25, 1993 from the Department of Revenue to Defendant at 730 Apricot in St. Charles. In that letter, the Department informed Defendant the effective date of her revocation was from August 3, 1990 to August 3, 1991. (This revocation was apparently unrelated to the DWI charge to which Defendant had pleaded guilty on January 29, 1993.) After August 3, 1991, her license could only be reinstated if she paid a $45 reinstatement fee to the office. The letter further requested Defendant surrender her driver's license with a May 1, 1994 expiration date to the Department of Revenue. Defendant's mother, who lived with Defendant at 730 Apricot, testified she brings in the mail everyday and never saw any mail from the Department of Revenue.
The trial court found Defendant guilty of driving while revoked. The court stated Defendant knew The court sentenced Defendant to one year imprisonment.
In Point I of her appeal, Defendant disputes the sufficiency of the information charging her with driving while revoked. She contends it is defective because it fails to contain an essential element of the crime, the culpable mental state. Defendant was issued a State of Missouri Uniform Complaint and Summons charging her with "Driving While Revoked--Leaving Courthouse."
In support of her contention, Defendant relies upon State v. Merritt, 833 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Mo.App.1992); and State v. Quigley, 829 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Mo.App.1992), where the Southern District held similar uniform complaints to be insufficient. However, these two opinions relied substantially upon State v. Gilmore, 650 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. banc 1983), which stated if all the elements of an offense are not alleged in the information, they cannot be supplied by intendment or implication. See, Merritt, 833 S.W.2d at 6; Quigley, 829 S.W.2d at 119. The Supreme Court overruled Gilmore in State v. Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d 31, 34-35 (Mo. banc 1992) stating:
While this Court in Gilmore acknowledged the purposes of a criminal indictment or information, it failed to analyze that information under the standard enunciated in DeLuca or under the more liberal construction of indictments or informations afforded under § 545.030 or Rule 23.11. Specifically, the Court in Gilmore did not examine the information to determine if it was sufficient to inform the defendant of the offense charged so that he would not be prejudiced by being unable to prepare a defense or unable to raise the defense of double jeopardy. In addition, the Court did not examine the information to see if it was so defective that it did not by an reasonable construction charge the defendant with the offense with which he was convicted. That case also failed to consider the effect of Rule 24.04(b) requiring a timely challenge to the charge.
See, DeLuca v. State, 465 S.W.2d 609, 612-13 (Mo.1971). The Parkhurst decision effectively eliminates reliance upon Merritt and Quigley as valid authority. See, State v. Hill, 865 S.W.2d 702, 706 n. 7 (Mo.App.1993).
Therefore, where a challenge to an information or indictment is not timely raised pursuant to Rule 24.04(b), the indictment or information will be insufficient only if:
it is so defective that (1) it does not by any reasonable construction charge the offense of which the defendant was convicted or (2) the substantial rights of the defendant to prepare a defense and plead former jeopardy in the event of acquittal are prejudiced. In either event, a defendant will not be entitled to relief based on a post-verdict claim that the information or indictment is insufficient unless the defendant demonstrates actual prejudice.
Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d at 35[7-9].
The record before us fails to show Defendant raised the issue of insufficiency of the information at any point during the trial. She clearly has not shown any motion challenging the information was timely filed pursuant to Rule 24.04(b). Further, she is not entitled to relief because she has not demonstrated, or even claimed, actual prejudice. Indeed, her entire defense at trial focused on lack of a culpable mental state. See, State v. Coates, 862 S.W.2d 418, 424 (Mo.App.1993). Point denied.
In Point II, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict her of driving while revoked. She contends there is no credible evidence to establish she knew her license was revoked or recklessly disregarded that fact.
In response, the State contends § 302.321 does not require a culpable mental state. In 1989, the Supreme Court declined to address this issue, but did note § 302.321, on its face, does not require a culpable mental state. State v. Davis, 779 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Mo. banc 1989). Defendant, however, points to several other cases in which the appellate courts, relying upon § 562.021.2, RSMo 1986 (repealed 1993), have indicated a culpable mental state of knowledge or recklessness is a requisite element of § 302.321. See, State v. Walker, 832 S.W.2d 953, 953 (Mo.App.1992); State v. Counts, 783 S.W.2d...
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State v. Collins
...alleged failure to know was a gross deviation from the care a reasonable person would exercise in his situation. See State v. Huff, 879 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Mo.App. E.D.1994) (finding previous revocation relevant to the issue of defendant's knowledge). Collins argues he was “adamant that his ‘l......
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State v. Musil, 20257
...him to plead former jeopardy. Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d at 35. See also State v. Lewellyn, 890 S.W.2d 22 (Mo.App.1994), and State v. Huff, 879 S.W.2d 696 (Mo.App.1994). Point I is Point II alleges the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of the st......