State v. Huggins
Citation | 802 So.2d 276 |
Decision Date | 22 March 2001 |
Docket Number | No. SC99-27.,SC99-27. |
Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Stanley V. HUGGINS, Respondent. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, West Palm Beach, and Daniel P. Hyndman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
Richard Jorandby, Public Defender, and Karen E. Ehrlich, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.
We have for review the decision in State v. Huggins, 744 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which certified conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in State v. White, 736 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Because the language of section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), is ambiguous, we approve the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Huggins, which held that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act is not applicable to a defendant who is convicted of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling.
Stanley Huggins (Huggins) was charged with burglary of a dwelling. Both Huggins and the State agree that the dwelling was not occupied at the time of the crime. Prior to entry of a plea of guilty to the offense, Huggins sought clarification from the trial court as to whether the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (PRR), section 775.082(8)(a)(1)(q), Florida Statutes (1997)1, applied to him. The burglary was committed within three years of his release from prison, and the PRR imposes steep mandatory minimum sentences for commission of certain crimes within three years after the reoffender's release from prison. Had Huggins been sentenced under the PRR, a mandatory fifteen-year sentence would have been imposed. Over the State's objection, the trial court ruled that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling is not one of the enumerated offenses in section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997). The trial court sentenced Huggins to fifty-five months in the Department of Corrections.
The State appealed and argued that the enumerated offense of "burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling" was intended to include burglary of any dwelling whether occupied or not because the word "occupied" modifies only the word "structure." The en banc Fourth District agreed with the trial court and concluded the word occupied modifies both structure and dwelling.2 In so holding the court certified conflict with the Second District on the same issue of law. We likewise agree with the trial court and approve the decision of the Fourth District holding the PRR inapplicable to burglary of an unoccupied structure and burglary of an unoccupied dwelling.
Both the State and Huggins argue that the language of section 775.082(8)(1)(q) is clear and unambiguous, although they advocate opposite interpretations. We do not agree because the phrase "occupied structure or dwelling" as used in the PRR is susceptible to more than one interpretation. "Ambiguity suggests that reasonable persons can find different meanings in the same language." Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452 (Fla.1992). As is evident from the arguments being presented in this case, reasonable persons can find different reasonable meanings in the phrase "occupied structure or dwelling." The ambiguity exists because it is unclear whether the word "occupied" modifies "structure" only or modifies both "structure" and "dwelling."
The State argues that the word "occupied" modifies the word "structure" only, and not both "structure" and "dwelling." If there is any doubt, the State argues, the rules of statutory interpretation require courts to apply the doctrine of nearest antecedent, i.e., that an adjective only modifies the word it is most near. If we were to accept the State's position, we would be required to find that the word "occupied" cannot reasonably be construed to modify both the words "structure" and "dwelling." Phrases constructed like the phrase at issue, however, are commonly construed to mean that the adjective modifies subsequent nouns, for example, "qualified man or woman" and "governmental fine or penalty" mean "qualified man or qualified woman" and "governmental fine or governmental penalty," respectively.
The State also argues that the language of the burglary statute supports its reading of the PRR language. The State asserts that the Legislature never intended that "burglary of a dwelling" be further distinguished by occupied or unoccupied, because in either event the offense levels are the same. The burglary statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
§ 810.02, Fla.Stat. (1997) (emphasis added). While it appears that the Legislature intended the crime of "burglary of a dwelling" not be broken down into occupied or unoccupied for purposes of the classification of the crime, we cannot say it is unreasonable to interpret the PRR, a sentencing statute, to require a different result.
The Legislature has the authority to not only define crimes but to also determine the range of punishment applicable to such crimes. See Sims v. State, 754 So.2d 657 (Fla.2000). For whatever reason, the Legislature when enacting the PRR chose to make that act applicable to a limited number of crimes including "burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling."3 The list of crimes which qualify for PRR sentencing includes life felonies, first-degree felonies, second-degree felonies, and third-degree felonies. All sexual batteries are included but not lewd and lascivious assault; carjacking is an eligible offense but not grand theft. Thus, it is clear that crimes of the same degree are not necessarily punished in the same manner or to the same extent under the PRR.
The State also argues the burglary statute, section 810.011, Florida Statutes (1997), defines "dwelling," and the definition does not make any distinction between occupied and unoccupied, so no distinction can be made.4 While this position seems reasonable at first blush, it does not explain the Legislature's distinction in section 810.02(c), Florida Statutes, wherein burglary is deemed a first-degree felony where the offender "enters an occupied or unoccupied dwelling or structure." Clearly in this section, the Legislature intended the word dwelling to be modified by the adjectives "occupied" and "unoccupied." Therefore, to say that the word "occupied" may not logically modify the word "dwelling" belies section 810.02(c). Furthermore, the definition itself, which includes the language "designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night," carries within it the connotation that while the purpose of a dwelling is occupation by people, a dwelling need not always be occupied.
The defendant argues that the PRR provision clearly applies to burglary of an occupied structure or an occupied dwelling. The defendant further suggests that if the statute is ambiguous, any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant under the rule of lenity and section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (1997). Indeed, the same criminal code which contains the PRR outlines certain rules of construction. Section 775.021(1) provides, "The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused." This provision of chapter 775 mandates the result reached by both the trial and appellate courts.
Neither the State's nor the defendant's interpretation of the language "occupied structure or dwelling" can be said to be unreasonable. Because we hold that the phrase "occupied structure or dwelling" as used in section 775.082(8)(1)(q) is susceptible to differing constructions, we are bound to construe the language most favorably to the defendant. For that reason, we approve the Fourth District's decision below.
It is so ordered.
I do not agree with the majority's reading of this statute. I find that the Legislature intended, by its deliberate use of the word "or," to have the statute apply both to a dwelling, whether occupied or not, or to an occupied structure. Under this statute, "occupied" modifies "structure," not "dwelling." Therefore, I would quash the Fourth District and approve decisions on this issue from...
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