State v. Huggins, 24993.

• Decision Date: 23 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. 24993.,24993.
• Citation: 336 S.C. 200,519 S.E.2d 574
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Titus L. HUGGINS, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

336 S.C. 200

519 S.E.2d 574

The STATE, Respondent, v. Titus L. HUGGINS, Appellant.

No. 24993.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard November 4, 1998.

Decided August 23, 1999.

Rehearing Denied September 22, 1999.

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for appellant.

Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Ralph J. Wilson, of Conway, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant was convicted of capital murder, armed robbery, and conspiracy and received concurrent sentences of five years (conspiracy), twenty-five years (armed robbery), and death (murder). The sole aggravating circumstance was that the murder was committed while in the commission of a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. This opinion consolidates appellant's direct appeal and our mandatory review pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (1985). We affirm.

Appellant was convicted of murdering and robbing Mrs. Weaver, the operator of the local grocery/liquor store, as she entered her home with the day's receipts. The evidence showed Aaron Hill suggested Mrs. Weaver as the robbery target, and that he was present at the scene. Hill maintained he hid and watched as appellant committed the robbery they had planned, and then as appellant unexpectedly shot the victim.¹ Appellant gave a statement that Hill was present and actually did the robbing and shooting. On appeal, appellant raises only sentencing issues.

Appellant first argues he was entitled to have the judge direct a life sentence because the State failed to produce any evidence of aggravation in the sentencing phase of the trial. The State instead chose to introduce only "Victim Impact" evidence, and did not formally reintroduce the guilt phase evidence. We find no reversible error.

Appellant's directed verdict motion was denied because the trial judge ruled that the guilt phase evidence "carried over" to the sentencing phase. Appellant contends this ruling was incorrect.² This issue has already been decided adversely to appellant's position.

In State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979) subsequent history omitted, this Court held:

The purpose of the bifurcated trial proceeding is to permit the introduction of evidence at the pre-sentence hearing that normally would be inadmissible at the guilt determination proceeding. The pre-sentence hearing is for the introduction of additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation or aggravation of punishment. The statute does not exclude from the consideration of the sentencing authority any evidence received at the guilt determination stage. To the contrary, the sentencing authority is required to consider all the evidence received at the guilt determination stage regarding the circumstances of the crime and the characteristics of the individual defendant together with additional evidence, if any, in extenuation, mitigation or aggravation of punishment.

Although it is customary for the State to formally reintroduce the guilt phase evidence at the beginning of the sentencing phase, this formality is not required by statute or case law. We affirm the trial judge's refusal to direct a life sentence.

Appellant next argues the court committed reversible error in refusing to allow him to introduce certain evidence in the sentencing phase. Specifically, appellant wanted to introduce the fact that he had briefly been released on bond³ after being served with notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and that he did not flee during that period. He offered this evidence in mitigation, to show his good character.

Appellant was permitted to introduce evidence that he was briefly bonded out of jail. The jail record keeper testified to the dates of appellant's release and his bail bondsman testified he had no trouble contacting appellant while he was out on bond and no trouble picking him up when bond was revoked. Appellant then sought to introduce into evidence the "notice of intent" which had been served prior to his release, and related documents in order to establish an evidentiary basis for his mitigation argument. See, e.g., State v. Cannon, 229 S.C. 614, 93 S.E.2d 889 (1956)

(counsel must confine argument to evidence and fair inferences in the record). The trial judge held that since appellant's release on bond had been predicated on an error of law, and since the bond was quickly revoked when the error was discovered, the whole issue of the bond and the notice were "too confusing", and refused to admit the documents. He also held the "fact" the State had sought the death penalty was already before the jury.

In her closing argument, appellant's attorney stated, without objection:

One fact, one series of facts, I do think, speak to [appellant] also. No question he was arrested for murder, armed robbery and conspiracy. He was given notice by the State of South Carolina "We intend to seek the death penalty.", [sic] and he knows this. He is released on bond on April 2nd. He is returned to the jail on April 8th. He is out for that period of time knowing the State wants to seek the death penalty. The bondsman had daily contact with him and had no problem picking him up and returning him to jail when he was so directed.

Assuming the trial judge erred in refusing to admit the actual notice of intent to seek the death penalty and the other documents into evidence, appellant simply cannot show prejudice since he was...