State v. Hughes
| Decision Date | 14 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | A16-1481 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Christopher Blane Hughes, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Affirmed
St. Louis County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Sharon N. Chadwick, Assistant County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Toussaint, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Christopher Blane Hughes challenges his conviction of a controlled-substance crime in the third degree, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the drug evidence. In the alternative, Hughes argues that he is entitled to be resentenced to the penalty for a controlled-substance crime in the fifth degree under the 2016 Drug Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA) and the amended sentencing guidelines grid. Because law enforcement had a reasonable suspicion that Hughes was committing a crime and was armed and dangerous, we affirm. We also conclude that Hughes is not entitled to resentencing under the DSRA-amended fifth-degree controlled-substance crime because the legislature did not intend for the DSRA's increased-weight threshold to apply to Hughes's crime, and the DSRA-amended sentencing grid does not mitigate Hughes's sentence.
Around 2:00 a.m. on July 16, 2015, Officer Chiaverini of the East Range Police Department was on patrol in his squad car in Aurora. Chiaverini activated his emergency lights and pulled over a maroon vehicle for failing to signal a turn. After stopping the vehicle, the officer approached the driver's side door.
He began speaking with M.B., the driver. With the window rolled down, Chiaverini smelled a "strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle." He could not detect from where inside the vehicle the odor was emanating. He did not initially confront the driver about the odor of marijuana because he wanted to call for backup.
Hughes, who was the passenger in the vehicle, told Chiaverini that he owned the vehicle but that he had no insurance card in the vehicle. M.B. handed the officer a driver's license with a clipped corner, which, to the officer, indicated M.B.'s license might be expired. Chiaverini returned to his squad car to run M.B.'s license and make local checks on both Hughes and M.B. He called for backup and was able to confirm on his computer that M.B.'s license was valid.
Before backup arrived, the officer approached the vehicle again. When Chiaverini asked the driver, M.B., about the odor of marijuana, M.B.'s legs and hands started shaking. M.B. was nervous, very slow to respond to questions, and avoided eye contact. M.B. eventually handed him a baggie of marijuana. Chiaverini asked M.B. if he had anything else on his person, and M.B. admitted he had knives. The officer then asked M.B. to exit the vehicle and he complied. M.B. further admitted that he had a marijuana pipe.
He then searched M.B., locating two knives on his person. He also found another small container of marijuana, a pouch with a marijuana pipe, and two baggies containing trace amounts of a white powdery substance, which later tested positive for methamphetamine. The officer handcuffed M.B. and set him on the curb when his backup, Officer Garrick, arrived. He testified that M.B. was cooperative.
After securing the evidence found on M.B., Chiaverini then turned his attention to Hughes. On approaching the vehicle, the officer could still smell an odor of marijuana from the vehicle. He asked Hughes to exit the vehicle as a safety precaution because the officer wanted to search where M.B. had been sitting. Hughes was very tense, would notmake eye contact, his hands were shaking, and his voice was shaky. Chiaverini told him to relax.
He then told Hughes to place his hands behind his back and he pat-frisked Hughes. Hughes denied he had anything of interest on his person. On pat-frisking Hughes's pants, Chiaverini noticed a "heavy[,] bulky item" in his right pocket that seemed to be a case. The officer removed the object. The object was a soft, zippered case, and Chiaverini testified he could feel hard objects within it.
He asked Hughes what was in the case, but, at first, Hughes would not answer. When asked a second time, Hughes told Chiaverini, "You already know what is in the case." When the officer said he did not know what was in the case, Hughes stated it contained methamphetamine. Officer Garrick placed Hughes in handcuffs, and then Chiaverini opened the case, finding a baggie of a substance that later tested positive for methamphetamine, a methamphetamine pipe, and some marijuana. The methamphetamine weighed 6.854 grams. Police arrested both Hughes and M.B.
On August 17, 2015, the state charged Hughes with one count of a controlled-substance crime in the third degree for possession of three or more grams of methamphetamine. In November 2015, the district court held a contested omnibus hearing where Hughes moved to suppress the drug evidence.
On December 31, 2015, the district court denied Hughes's motion. In March of 2016, Hughes stipulated to the prosecution's evidence to obtain review of the pretrial ruling, pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, and the district court found Hughesguilty of a controlled-substance crime in the third degree, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014).
On June 20, 2016, Hughes was sentenced to a stayed sentence of 21 months, and six months of local jail time. Hughes now appeals.
Appellate courts undertake a de novo review to determine whether law enforcement possessed reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify a search or seizure. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005). We independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). Usually the district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, but when the facts are undisputed, our review is entirely de novo. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d at 487.
Hughes first argues that police unlawfully expanded the scope of the traffic stop in investigating the marijuana smell. We disagree.
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect against "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. "A search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is generally unreasonable." State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). The Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement from searching an individual without a warrant, subject only to a fewspecifically established and well-delineated exceptions. State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1998).
One exception to the warrant requirement is an investigatory stop, or Terry stop, which allows law enforcement to temporarily detain a suspect if an officer has a reasonable, articulable, and particularized suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (Minn. 2011) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)); State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995). The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843, and "an actual violation is not necessary." State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). However, a stop that is the product of "mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity" is invalid. State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996).
Under the Minnesota Constitution, the principles and framework of Terry are applied when evaluating the reasonableness of searches and seizures during traffic stops, even when there is probable cause that a minor traffic law has been violated. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004). Every incremental intrusion during a traffic stop must be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop; (2) independent probable cause; or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry. Id. at 365.
Here, the officer's suspicion that Hughes may have possessed marijuana was reasonable to warrant an expansion of the scope of the stop because the officer smelled an odor of marijuana after he approached the vehicle. After the officer found marijuana on M.B., and M.B. was seized, the officer continued to smell marijuana when he approachedthe vehicle to speak with Hughes. The expansion of the stop was justified under Terry principles because the marijuana odor provided the officer with a reasonable suspicion that Hughes could be in possession of a criminal amount of marijuana.
Next, Hughes argues that the officer had no basis to search his person and that the pat-frisk was an unconstitutional expansion of the scope of the stop.
A pat-frisk of a person ordered out of a vehicle is an incremental intrusion during a traffic stop. Such an intrusion requires that an officer have either independent probable cause, or a reasonable suspicion under Terry. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365; see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12, 98 S. Ct. 330, 334 (1977) ().
Here, the district court concluded that the pat-frisk search of Hughes was justified by probable cause and was valid under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement. This exception allows police "to conduct a full search of...
To continue reading
Request your trial