State v. Human Relations Research Foundation, 5

• Decision Date: 16 April 1964
• Docket Number: No. 36901,No. 5,5,36901
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. HUMAN RELATIONS RESEARCH FOUNDATION, a Washington nonprofit corporation, Kittitas Reclamation District, Weed Districtof Kittitas County; John Richmond, Margaret Donovan, a widow; James Adams, a widower, and Kittitas County, Earl Coe, Director of Department of Conservation, State of Washington, Respondents.

Page 262

64 Wn.2d 262

391 P.2d 513

The STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. HUMAN RELATIONS RESEARCH FOUNDATION, a Washington nonprofit corporation, Kittitas Reclamation District, Weed District No. 5 of Kittitas County; John Richmond, Margaret Donovan, a widow; James Adams, a widower, and Kittitas County, Earl Coe, Director of Department of Conservation, State of Washington, Respondents.

No. 36901.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

April 16, 1964.

John J. O'Connell Atty. Gen., Edward E. Level, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for appellant.

Kern, Dano & Cone, Ellensburg, John J. O'Connell, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Roe, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondents.

Kermit Rudolf, Spokane, amicus curiae.

WEAVER, Judge.

This is an action by the state Department of Highways to condemn for highway purposes 52 acres of irrigable land within the boundaries of the Kittitas Reclamation District. The district, which contains 57,399.5 acres of irrigable land, was organized pursuant to Title 87, RCW. An order adjudicating public use was entered February 5, 1960.

Eleven acres are presently being irrigated; the remaining 41 acres are capable of being served by the facilities of the reclamation district.

Just compensation to be paid the fee owners of the property is to be determined in a separate proceeding. The crux of the instant case is to determine what, if any, compensable interest the reclamation district has in the land under existing state statutes.

This case brings into sharp focus the constitutionality and interpretation of Laws of 1959, Chapter 303 (RCW 87.03.810, 87.03.815), set forth in the margin. ¹

In short, the statute provides that when the state Department of Highways acquires land in an irrigation district, the department must pay to the district, as distinguished from the individual owners of the land, 'with funds available for such acquisition,' and as a part of the cost of acquisition, (1) a sum sufficient to pay the land's pro rata share of the district's bonded indebtedness, if any, and its pro rata share of the district's contract indebtedness, if any, to the United States, or to the state; (2) a sum sufficient to pay any deferred installments of local improvement district assessments, if any; and (3) a sum sufficient to produce, if invested, an amount equal to the annual increase in operation and maintenance costs against the lands remaining in the district resulting from the severance from the district of the lands acquired by the state Department of Highways.

The clear purpose of the statute is to maintain the economic stability of these districts and to prevent their emasculation by the loss of assessable lands within their boundaries by condemnation since such condemnation would result in increased financial burdens upon the land remaining. ²

In the instant case, the district has no bonded indebtedness; there are no deferred installments of local improvement district assessments. The pro rata share of the district's contractual indebtedness to the United States chargeable to the 52 irrigable acres is $6,034.86.

It is stipulated that there will be no reduction or increase in the total operation and maintenance costs of the district resulting from the severance of the 52 acres, but there will be an annual increase in operation and maintenance costs per acre against the remaining lands because of the loss of contribution from the severed lands.

By its judgment and decree of appropriation, dated September 18, 1962, the trial court awarded to the Kittitas Reclamation District judgment against the state pursuant to Laws of 1959, chapter 303, in the sum of $6,034.86, the pro rata share of the district's contractual indebtedness chargeable to the 52 irrigable acres being condemned, and $928.00, the sum sufficient to produce $32.47 annually, which is the increase in operation and maintenance costs chargeable against the remaining lands in the district.

The state (appellant) presents two interwoven questions (1) Does the district have a compensable interest in the lands being taken by this action of eminent domain? (2) Is chapter 303, Laws of 1959 (RCW 87.03.810-815) quoted supra (Fn. 1) constitutional?

In In re Horse Heaven Irrigation District, 11 Wash.2d 218, 227, 118 P.2d 972, 976 (1941) this court said:

'An irrigation district is a corporation which exercises no governmental functions. It owns and uses its property in a strictly proprietary capacity for the primary benefit of the owners of land included within the district. With the acquisition as owner of land in an irrigation district that owner immediately acquires an interest in all property of that district. * * *'

The rights acquired by owners of land within the district can be exercised only by the district itself, standing in fact, as a trustee, to accomplish the purpose for which the district was formed. Its right to accomplish its purpose by imposition of assessments arises both by contract and by statute. RCW 87.03.215. If a portion of the lands in the district does not discharge its duty, the remaining lands in the district are required to assume an additional pro tanto burden arising from the nonpayment. Roberts v. Richland Irrigation District, 169 Wash. 156, 13 P.2d 437 (1932).

The state urges that condemnation of the land results in nothing more than a diminution of the statutory taxing power possessed by the district; that the state does not acquire this right; hence, the district has not been deprived of a compensable interest. Of course, when the right to assess cannot be distinguished from the taxing power, the interest lost is noncompensable; but this is not the instant case.

In Adaman Mutual Water Company v. United States, 278 F.2d 842 (CA 9th; 1960), the federal government sought to condemn land within an Arizona private water district.

The court stated the question:

'* * * does the diminution of appellant's assessment base constitute the taking of a compensable interest under the Fifth Amendment?'

In giving an affirmative answer, the court said:

'We think that the duty to pay assessments in the instant case is an equitable servitude or restrictive covenant binding upon any once-cultivated segment of Project land serviced by appellant. Appellant has lost the benefit derived from this servitude, and the loss is compensable, for the Government has destroyed an intangible right directly connected with the physical substance of the land condemned.'

Further, there is a vast distinction between general taxes and levies for improvement of specific property. See In re State's Appeal, 60 Wash.2d 380, 374 P.2d 171 (1962); In re Howard Avenue North, 44 Wash. 62, 86 P. 1117 (1906). The fact that the right to levy assessments in the instant case is lodged in a semi-public body makes no difference; the statute simply lends the machinery for tax collection to enforce the inherent duty impressed upon the land by the equitable servitudes and restrictive covenants necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the district was formed. The district is being deprived by condemnation of the right to collect the pro rata share of construction, operation, and maintenance costs against the land involved. It is the deprivation of this right, rather than the accretion of any right to the state, that constitutes the taking.

We conclude, as did the trial court, that the district is being deprived of

'* * * a compensable property right for which the respondent district is entitled to compensation under the provisions of Amendment 9 of the Washington State Constitution.'

See: Columbia Irrigation District v. United States, 268 F.2d 128 (CA 9th; 1959); United States v. Florea, 68 F.Supp. 367 (DC Or.1945); United States v. Aho, 68 F.Supp. 358 (DC Or.1944).

Before discussing the second issue--the constitutionality of chapter 303, Laws of 1959--we turn briefly to the state's contention that the court erred when it admitted in evidence 16 incidents of payments by the Department of Highways for acquisition of rights of way and lands for highway purposes within the boundaries of the Columbia Basin Irrigation Districts. Generally, these lump sum payments were for the costs of plat revisions, construction and development charges usually represented by bonded or contractual indebtedness, and operation and maintenance costs chargeable against the lands, acquired.

We believe these admitted facts were relevant and material because they constitute a recognition by the Highway Department that compensable property rights were taken from the districts; these payments indicate an administration interpretation contrary to the position taken in the instant case. The weight to be given this evidence is to be determined by the trier of the facts. In view of the conclusion we have reached, however, we need not...