State v. Hunter
| Citation | 154 N.W. 1083,131 Minn. 252 |
| Decision Date | 03 December 1915 |
| Docket Number | 19,467 - (4) |
| Parties | STATE v. CHARLES H. HUNTER |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Defendant and another were indicted by the grand jury for the crime of murder in the first degree, tried in the district court for Hennepin county before Jelley, J., and a jury which rendered a verdict of guilty as charged in the indictment. From the order denying his motion for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Manslaughter -- verdict sustained by evidence.
1. In a prosecution for manslaughter, resulting from an abortion committed upon a pregnant woman, it is held that the evidence supports the verdict of guilty.
Evidence -- res gestae.
2. Declarations made by the woman during the time she was under treatment and before the final act of abortion was committed to the effect that defendant was her physician, had treated her for the purpose of bringing about a miscarriage, and was to administer to her further treatment for that purpose, held properly admitted in evidence as a part of the res gestae.
No error.
3. The record presents no reversible error.
Larrabee & Davies, Cassius M. Ferguson and Floyd B. Olson, for appellant.
Lyndon A. Smith, Attorney General, John M. Rees, County Attorney, and George W. Armstrong, Assistant County Attorney, for respondent.
Defendant was convicted of the crime of manslaughter and appealed from an order denying a new trial.
It is contended by defendant: (1) That the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict, or to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant is guilty of the crime charged; (2) that the trial court erred in its rulings on the admission and exclusion of evidence, and (3) that there was error in the denial of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
1. The contention that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict is not sustained. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the evidence in detail. It would serve no useful purpose. But the principal facts are substantially as follows: An unmarried young woman found herself in an embarrassing situation, and sought relief by means of a surgical operation. Some one performed that operation, and as a result thereof she died. Defendant was accused and on the trial found guilty. It appears without dispute that the young woman was pregnant and the purpose of the operation, which she earnestly desired, was to protect her name and to avoid the disgrace which would follow from the birth of a child out of wedlock. And in this connection we may remark, in disposing of one of defendant's contentions on this branch of the case, that the evidence is quite conclusive that the operation was not performed to save the life of the young woman or that of the unborn child, but rather, as just stated, to save the name and reputation of the pregnant woman. With this remark we pass that feature of the case. State v. Lee, 69 Conn. 186, 37 A. 75; Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 N.W. 380. The evidence tending to connect defendant with the operation is in the main circumstantial, but sufficient in our opinion to sustain the conviction. The evidence shows, without controversy, that deceased, upon learning her condition, applied to defendant for help and requested him to perform the operation, and thus relieve her. She borrowed money of a relative to whom she confided her trouble. She stated to this relative, and to one or two other persons, the condition she was in and that defendant was her physician. That defendant treated her at her request is not disputed, though it is claimed that the evidence fails wholly to show that he performed the illegal operation. Defendant did not take the stand as a witness. He was not required to do so and no inferences can be drawn against him for his failure to testify. Yet we find him at her bedside at the time of her death, rendering such aid as he was able to render at that time. He knew her condition and knew that she had been in search of some one who would perform the operation; and he must have known, when attending her for a time immediately prior and up to the moment of her death, that the operation had been performed and that she died from its effects, yet he deliberately certified to the public authorities in a death certificate that the cause of death was pneumonia. From this the jury was justified in adopting one of two conclusions; namely, that by this false certificate defendant was attempting to protect himself, or to protect the person, known to him, who in fact performed the operation. In our view of the evidence, taken as a whole, it cannot well be said that the jury improperly concluded that defendant was thus attempting to cover up the illegal operation and to shield and protect himself. The intention of deceased to have on operation performed and that she applied to defendant therefor, and had been treated by him, is shown by certain declarations of deceased, reference to which will be made later in the opinion in connection with the contention that it was improperly received. There is evidence tending to exonerate defendant and to show that the operation was performed by a person other than defendant, described by the witness who vouched for the fact as a strange man who came to the rooming house where deceased was lodging, late in the evening a day or so before she died. This strange man remained in her room for about an hour and then departed without making known his identity. The morning following this visit the bed clothes on the bed occupied by deceased were found in a bloody condition. There is also evidence that deceased had applied to others for assistance and relief, but she did not obtain it, at least so far as disclosed by the record, unless it was from the strange man just mentioned, the evidence in reference to whom was for the consideration of the jury. There is also evidence that defendant refused to perform the operation and that he advised deceased to dismiss thoughts thereof, and promised that after the birth of the child he would make an effort to secure its adoption, and thus relieve deceased from disgrace. This refusal to perform the operation, and the advice given, appear from the testimony of a maid in attendance at defendant's office. This witness testified that a day or so prior to her death, the young woman called at defendant's office in company with a young man, and that after admitting them she overheard the following conversation between defendant and deceased:
Q. "Now tell us what you heard?
A. "Well, I heard her say: 'This man of mine won't believe me when I tell him that you won't help me out, so I brought him up here to hear for himself.'
Q. "Then what?
A.
Just why deceased should consider it necessary to enact this scene, and to thus convince her friend that defendant had refused to aid her is not made clear by the evidence. The jury may have concluded that it was defensive matter prepared in advance. In any event, if such refusal was made and advice given, deceased did not acquiesce therein. She insisted upon, and obtained, immediate relief, and the operation was performed. But we need go no further upon this branch of the case. There are other items of evidence, and circumstances tending to establish defendant's guilt and in a measure to exculpate him, but all thereof were for the consideration of the jury, including the weight and credit to be given the testimony of the several witnesses. And our conclusion is that, since the verdict has received the approval of the trial judge, it must stand.
2. The state called witness Liesch, an acquaintance and friend of deceased, who was permitted, over the objection and exception of defendant, to testify to the following conversation had with deceased on Wednesday before her death:
Q. "And it was Wednesday prior to that time that you first went to the Hampshire Arms as you have testified? A. Yes.
Q. "Now then on that occasion prior to going to Hampshire Arms, did you have any talk or conversation with Miss Kummer (deceased) relative to her condition and with regard to her intention and purpose in going to the Hampshire Arms? A. I did.
Q. "Will you tell us what she said? * * *
A. "She told me that she was in trouble. I asked her what the trouble was, and she says female trouble, that she was in the family way; * * * I asked her who she was going to see and she told me.
Q. "What did she say?
A. "She said Dr. Hunter; and I asked her who sent her there and she said her cousin, Mr. Wagner."
The witness again met deceased on the following Friday when he had another conversation with her, and over defendant's objection was permitted to testify that she then stated to him, Witness Kummer, a cousin of deceased, was permitted to give similar evidence, and of conversations with deceased as late as the day before the final operation was performed, in which deceased stated that Dr. Hunter was her physician, had given her three injections, and that she was to pay the doctor $75 for his services. Another state witness gave similar testimony, all over defendant's objection as incompetent and hearsay.
It is urged that this testimony was hearsay, and that the admission thereof was reversible error. We have given this contention full and careful consideration, for it is the claim mostly relied...
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