State v. Hunter

• Decision Date: 12 November 1891
• Citation: 3 Wash. 92,27 P. 1076
• Parties: STATE EX REL. SHANNON ET AL. v. HUNTER, JUDGE.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

27 P. 1076

3 Wash. 92

STATE EX REL. SHANNON ET AL. v. HUNTER, JUDGE.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 12, 1891

Application on R. M. Shannon & Co. for a peremptory writ of mandamus to Edward F. Hunter, judge of the superior court of Lewis county, to compel him to set aside the dismissal of a cause for want of jurisdiction, and hear the same upon its merits. Writ allowed.

Reynolds & Stewart, for petitioner.

Edward F. Hunter, in pro. per.

HOYT J.

The return of the respondent to the alternative writ of mandamus issued herein shows that he had dismissed the suit in question for want of jurisdiction to hear the same, because the amount sued for was less than $100, and upon this return the questions to be decided arise. Some question is made by counsel as to whether in fact the sum sued for, as shown by the complaint, was less than $100, but as the view we take makes such question immaterial, we shall not attempt to decide the same. Two questions are presented which it is necessary for us to decide: First. Has the superior court jurisdiction where the sum sued for is less than $100? Second. Is mandamus the proper remedy where a cause is wrongfully dismissed because in the opinion of the court it has no jurisdiction therein?

As to the first question above suggested, the constitution of this state provides that the superior courts shall have jurisdiction in all cases in which some other court has not been given exclusive jurisdiction by law, and, if the legislature has not provided that justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction in suits of this kind, it follows that the superior courts must have jurisdiction. The language of the act fixing the jurisdiction of justices of the peace so far as it relates to this question, is as follows "Every justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction and cognizance of the following civil actions and proceedings;" and it seems clear that by such language simply jurisdiction is conferred, and not exclusive jurisdiction.

This is so plain from the language used that it seems entirely unnecessary to present argument in support of the proposition. If there could be any question as to the meaning of the legislature as conveyed in said language such question would clearly be resolved in favor of such construction when the language used is interpreted in the light of other legislation bearing upon the subject. For instance, the act relating to costs in superior courts provides "that the plaintiff shall in no case be entitled to costs taxed as attorneys' fees in actions within the jurisdiction of justices of the peace when commenced in superior courts," which would be an absolutely senseless provision, and of no force whatever, if, as contended for by the respondent, the superior court could have no jurisdiction in suits of this kind. It must therefore be held that the legislature has not as yet conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon justices of the peace in actions like the one at bar, and for that reason the superior court must be held to have jurisdiction. Much has been said by the respondent upon the policy of the law in this regard, and the fact that the usefulness of the superior courts will be materially interfered with if their jurisdiction is held to extend to these minor suits; but such questions of public policy and convenience are for the legislative, and not for the judicial,...