State v. Hunter
| Decision Date | 06 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 40950.,40950. |
| Citation | 328 P.3d 548,156 Idaho 568 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Mark Christopher HUNTER, Defendant–Appellant. |
Alan Trimming, Ada County Public Defender; Erik J. O'Daniel, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Erik J. O'Daniel argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Lori A. Fleming argued.
Mark Christopher Hunter appeals from the district court's intermediate appellate decision reversing the magistrate's order granting his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
The parties stipulated to the following facts. Shortly after midnight, an officer stopped Hunter for driving several blocks without headlights. The officer smelled the odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. Hunter admitted he had been drinking that night; the female passenger in the vehicle appeared to be heavily intoxicated. The officer checked Hunter's eyes and observed nystagmus.1 He then requested the assistance of a Safety Traffic Enforcement Program (STEP) officer2 to help in the investigation. Officer Robert Gibson arrived to administer field sobriety tests and had Hunter exit the vehicle. Hunter told the officer he was coming from a bar and had earlier watched MMA fights at an arena. He also admitted to drinking three vodka tonics between 7:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. Officer Gibson smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Hunter and observed that Hunter's eyes were glassy and bloodshot.
Officer Gibson had Hunter perform several sobriety tests on the sidewalk. Hunter indicated that he was not taking any medications and did not have any physical impairment. Officer Gibson conducted the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. Neither of Hunter's eyes pursued smoothly and his eyes had distinct and sustained nystagmus. Officer Gibson testified that Hunter scored six out of six points on the HGN test. The officer then directed Hunter to perform the walk-and-turn test. This test has a maximum of eight errors, with two or more points qualifying as a failure. Hunter did not score any errors. Officer Gibson then demonstrated the one-leg-stand test. Hunter swayed during the test, but he did not register any other errors. This test has a maximum of four errors, with two or more points qualifying as a failure. Officer Gibson then re-administered the HGN test and Hunter had the same scoring as before. Hunter cooperated throughout the tests. The officer arrested Hunter and secured him in the back of the patrol car. A breath test was conducted which registered a breath alcohol concentration of .090 and .088.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Officer Gibson testified that his training and experience included completing Idaho POST Academy, attending the Boise Police Advanced Academy Field Training Program, as well as almost five years of on-the-job experience, which included several hundred DUI investigations. Finally, the officer testified that he had completed a class for advanced roadside impairment and breath testing specialist.
The State charged Hunter with driving under the influence. Hunter moved to suppress the breath test. The magistrate granted the motion, concluding that the officer lacked probable cause to place Hunter under arrest. The State appealed and the district court reversed the magistrate's order. Hunter now appeals.
When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its appellate capacity, we review the magistrate court's findings of fact to determine if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. We then determine if the findings support the magistrate's conclusions of law. Based on the district court's review of the magistrate court's decision, procedurally we either affirm or reverse the district court's decision. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858–59, 303 P.3d 214, 217–18 (2013). The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez–Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995) ; State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, "and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. When seizure occurs without a warrant, the government bears the burden of proving facts necessary to establish an exception to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971) ; State v. Dycus, 154 Idaho 456, 459, 299 P.3d 263, 266 (Ct.App.2013).
Evidence obtained in violation of these constitutional protections must be suppressed in a criminal prosecution of the person whose rights were violated. Dycus, 154 Idaho at 459, 299 P.3d at 266. "A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable cause." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370, 124 S.Ct. 795, 799, 157 L.Ed.2d 769, 774 (2003) ; see also Idaho Code § 19–603. We freely review, de novo, the trial court's legal conclusion of whether the facts established probable cause to support an arrest. See State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 247, 787 P.2d 231, 233 (1990).
Probable cause is "the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty." State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996). In analyzing whether probable cause existed, this Court must determine whether the facts available to the officers at the moment of the seizure warranted a person of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate. Id.; State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 925, 523 P.2d 523, 528 (1974). The application of probable cause to arrest must allow room for some mistakes by the arresting officer; however, the mistakes must be those of reasonable persons, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusion of probability. Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 304 (8th Cir.1969) ; Julian, 129 Idaho at 137, 922 P.2d at 1063. The facts making up a probable cause determination are viewed from an objective standpoint. Julian, 129 Idaho at 136–37, 922 P.2d at 1062–63. In passing on the question of probable cause, the expertise and the experience of the officer must be taken into account. State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 323, 824 P.2d 894, 898 (Ct.App.1991). In evaluating whether the State has met this practical and common-sense standard, the totality of the circumstances is considered. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371, 124 S.Ct. at 800, 157 L.Ed.2d at 775–76.
"The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371, 124 S.Ct. at 800, 157 L.Ed.2d at 775. "There is a large difference between the two things to be proved [guilt and probable cause], as well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them."3 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312, 79 S.Ct. 329, 332, 3 L.Ed.2d 327, 331 (1959) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1309, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1889 (1949) ). Thus, "[f]inely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the [probable cause] decision." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2330–31, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 546 (1983).
Probable cause standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176, 69 S.Ct. at 1311, 93 L.Ed. at 1890–91. Id.
In its Memorandum Decision, the magistrate found:
It is clear Officer Gibson relied heavily on the defendant's failure of the HGN test in making his decision to arrest. Officer Gibson testified he places more importance on that test because the subject cannot practice for the test. This does not comport with the applicable law concerning the reliability of the HGN test.
Relying on its interpretation of State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991), the court concluded:
Here the other field sobriety tests not only failed to corroborate the HGN test, they completely contradicted it. The defendant demonstrated virtually no impairment when performing the one leg stand and no impairment at all when performing the walk and turn test. The results of those tests rendered the HGN test unreliable as a matter of law. The remaining factors considered by the officer, even taken together, fail to rise to the level of probable cause to support an arrest.
(Emphasis added.)
We find this interpretation of Garrett unduly restrictive. Garrett holds that...
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State v. Hunter, 40950.
...328 P.3d 548STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,v.Mark Christopher HUNTER, Defendant–Appellant.No. 40950.Court of Appeals of Idaho.May 6, 2014.Review Denied July 12, [328 P.3d 549]Alan Trimming, Ada County Public Defender; Erik J. O'Daniel, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Eri......