State v. Hurt
Decision Date | 30 April 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. CT2019-0053 |
Citation | 2020 Ohio 2754 |
Parties | STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. KELVIN HURT JR. Defendant-Appellant |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
OPINION
For Plaintiff-Appellee:
D. MICHAEL HADDOX
TAYLOR P. BENNINGTIN
27 North Fifth St., P.O. Box 189
Zanesville, OH 43701
For Defendant-Appellant:
ERIC E. WILLISON
4876 Cemetery Rd.
Hilliard, OH 43026
{¶1} Appellant Kelvin Hurt Jr. appeals from the April 11, 2019 Entry of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state of Ohio.
{¶2} The following statement of facts is adduced from appellee's statement at the change-of-plea hearing on April 9, 2019.
{¶3} In August and September 2018, the CODE Task Force made two controlled buys of methamphetamine from appellant in Muskingum County, Ohio. The first controlled buy, on August 31, 2018, was captured on video.1 Appellant and a confidential informant agreed to a deal in which appellant sold one and a half ounces of methamphetamine for $600. Appellant had a bag of methamphetamine in his hands, which he opened and repackaged a smaller amount of methamphetamine into a smaller bag, which he wrapped and handed to the informant. This purchase yielded 38.89 grams of methamphetamine and took place within 1000 feet of a school.
{¶4} A month later, an informant purchased 25.57 grams of methamphetamine from appellant for around $400. The second sale took place on the sidewalk in front of appellant's residence.
{¶5} Appellant was charged by indictment with one count of drug trafficking (methamphetamine) pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) with a school specification, a felony of the first degree [Count I]; illegal manufacture of methamphetamine pursuant to R.C. 2925.04(A) with a school specification, a felony of the first degree [Count II]; and drugtrafficking (methamphetamine) pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(A), a felony of the second degree [Count III]. Appellant entered pleas of not guilty.
{¶6} On April 9, 2019, appellant changed his pleas to guilty to the following amended counts: Count I, drug trafficking pursuant to R.C. 29225.03(A)(1), a felony of the third degree; Count II, illegal manufacture of Schedule III drugs pursuant to R.C. 2925.04(A) with a school specification, a felony of the second degree; and Count III, drug trafficking pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the third degree. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 10 years.
{¶7} Appellant now appeals from the trial court's Entry of May 15, 2019.
{¶8} Appellant raises two assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶9}
{¶10}
I., II.
{¶11} Appellant's two assignments of error are related and will be considered together. Appellant argues his plea of guilty upon Count II was not voluntary, intelligent, or knowing because it was premised upon a misunderstanding of the charged offense and compounded by ineffective assistance of counsel.2 We disagree.
{¶12} Appellant's arguments on appeal relate solely to Count II, illegal manufacture of methamphetamine with a school specification. We begin by noting that the record is almost nonexistent as to the facts underlying the charged offenses due to the procedural posture of the case as a guilty plea. Appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of illegal manufacture pursuant to R.C. 2925.04(A), which states, "No person shall knowingly cultivate marihuana or knowingly manufacture or otherwise engage in any part of the production of a controlled substance." Count II of the indictment alleges in pertinent part:
{¶13} No request was made for a bill of particulars pursuant to Crim.R. 7(E) and no bill was filed.
{¶14} Appellant now argues he "misunderstood the nature" of the illegal-manufacture charge in Count II when he entered his plea of guilty to that offense. We note that at no time throughout the proceedings did appellant express any confusion or misunderstanding about the offenses he was pleading to. Instead, he implicitly argues that the court should have sua sponte questioned whether he was guilty upon Count II. Appellant's argument is premised upon the following statements during at the change-of-plea hearing:
{¶15} Appellant argues the above indicates a mistake of law as to whether appellant's conduct met the elements of illegal manufacture, i.e., the act of transferring the meth from one bag to another does not rise to the level of "illegal manufacture." Pursuant to R.C. 2925.01(J), "manufacture" means to plant, cultivate, harvest, process, make, prepare, or otherwise engage in any part of the production of a drug, by propagation, extraction, chemical synthesis, or compounding, or any combination of the same, and includes packaging, repackaging, labeling, and other activities incident to production. Appellant argues his act of taking drugs from a larger bag and placing them in a smaller bag is activity incident to sale and/or transportation, not activity incident to production.
{¶16} Appellant has not cited any authority for his underlying premise: that the conduct briefly described at the change-of-plea hearing does not fit the statutory elements. From that premise, however, appellant extrapolates a fatal flaw in the plea process that resulted in an involuntary plea. The issue presented by this case is whether the guilty plea was rendered involuntary on the basis of the conversation between the trial court and appellee, and we find it was not.
{¶17} "" State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). "An ...
To continue reading
Request your trial