State v. Huskey
| Decision Date | 13 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. E1999-00524-CCA-R3-CD.,E1999-00524-CCA-R3-CD. |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee v. Thomas Dee HUSKEY. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
Herbert S. Moncier and Gregory P. Isaacs, Knoxville, TN, for appellant, Thomas Dee Huskey.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Erik W. Daab, Assistant Attorney General; Randall E. Nichols, District Attorney General; and Jennifer Welch, Assistant District Attorney General, for appellee, State of Tennessee.
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and DAVID G. HAYES, JJ., joined.
The defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, brings this interlocutory appeal, contending that the double jeopardy protections of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions bar a retrial following the jury's deadlock on four counts of first degree murder. He argues that the trial court failed to declare a mistrial and manifest necessity did not compel one, that prosecutorial misconduct and judicial overreaching precipitated the jury's inability to reach a verdict, and that the trial court erroneously failed to accept the jury's special verdicts. We conclude that double jeopardy does not bar a retrial.
The defendant was charged with four counts of first degree murder, following the discovery of the victims' bodies in a wooded area near Cahaba Lane in Knox County. The defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to all four counts. On the fifth day of deliberations the jury sent the trial court a note stating that it was unable to arrive at a unanimous decision. The trial court recalled the jury, asked if further deliberations would be beneficial, and then discharged the jury upon receiving a negative response. This court's order granting the defendant permission to appeal limited the issues for review to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial of the case because:
(1) the trial court dismissed the jury after the appellant had been placed in jeopardy without declaring a mistrial;
(2) there was no "manifest necessity" to discharge the jury on the issue of the appellant's factual guilt of each offense; and
(3) the jury's inability to reach a verdict was precipitated by prosecutorial misconduct or judicial misconduct during the course of the trial itself.
The defendant contends that federal and state constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy prevent retrial, arguing that:
(1) the jury's notes on February 12 and 13, 1999, place the defendant in jeopardy with regard to the act of killing;
(2) manifest necessity did not require the trial court to release the jury before accepting its partial verdict on the issue of the act of killing;
(3) the trial court's improper comments to the jury made it impossible for the court to determine that manifest necessity existed;
(4) the trial court denied him due process, including the right to be heard, before it discharged the jury;
(5) prosecutorial misconduct and judicial overreaching resulted in the jury's inability to reach a verdict and caused jeopardy to attach;
(6) the trial court erroneously failed to take the jury's special verdicts on factual guilt or the degree of homicide; and
(7) double jeopardy, res judicata, and collateral estoppel prohibit retrial of the issue of whether he suffered from a mental disease or defect because the jury rendered a special verdict as to that issue.
Because double jeopardy does not bar retrial of the defendant on the four counts of first degree murder, we affirm the trial court's denial of his motion to bar retrial.
We first address the defendant's contentions relating to whether the trial court properly declared a mistrial following the jury's announcement that it could not reach a unanimous decision. The defendant argues that although jeopardy had attached, the trial court released the jury without declaring a mistrial; that no manifest necessity existed to discharge the jury without taking its partial verdicts; and that the trial court's improper comments to the jury made it impossible for a meaningful manifest necessity determination to be had. Finally, he claims that the trial court denied him due process when it discharged the jury without conferring with counsel or allowing him an opportunity to be heard. The state contends that manifest necessity existed due to the jury's inability to reach a verdict and that all of the parties knew that the trial court was going to and did declare a mistrial when it called the jury into the courtroom, following the jury's February 13 note.
Because of the nature of the defendant's contentions, we review the events surrounding the discharge of the jury in some detail. The jury began deliberating on the morning of February 9, 1999. On February 12, the jury sent the court a note, which read:
Your Honor:
We are unable to come to a unanimous decision on mental responsibility. People's decisions are unlikely to change.
We can agree that he has a mental disease or defect, but we cannot decide on the second part on p. 18 # 2 & 3. Can you give us some guidance?
With the jury out, the trial court noted that the jury was referring to the second portion of the insanity instruction relating to the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The defendant requested a mistrial, arguing that the jury was irrevocably hung. The court reread the note to defense counsel, who conferred and then repeated the request for a mistrial, arguing that the jury had deliberated for four days and that the note was not asking for clarification. The court stated that it viewed the jury to be asking for clarification and commented that it was amazed that the defendant did not want the jury to deliberate further on the issue. The court stated its intention to give the jury further instructions on insanity and to allow the jury to deliberate longer.
The following morning, February 13, the court instructed the jury as follows:
Tennessee Code Annotated 39-11-501 provides as follows: Insanity. Insanity is a defense to prosecution if at the time of such conduct as a result of a mental disease or defect, the person lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the person's conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law. As used in this section, mental disease or defect does not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
Therefore, Mr. Huskey would not be legally responsible for his criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as the result of a mental disease or defect, Mr. Huskey lacked the substantial capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law he is charged with violating.
The court returned the jury to its deliberations. The defendant renewed his objection to the new instruction and moved for a mistrial.
Just over two hours later, the jury sent the court another note, stating, "We have deliberated at length and we cannot reach a unanimous decision." The court observed that the note was not a question, and the following discussion occurred:
The Court: I am going to ask them about that. I think clearly, they have deliberated for four and a half days. I just don't see how you can ask a jury to do any more than they have done. I am going to ask them the perfunctory question of whether or not they feel any deliberations would be of any benefit, but I am certainly not going to push them at this point.
I know that they have worked hard, and I know that they have tried to resolve their differences, and it is clear that they are unable to do that. Do you want me to inquire as to the split?
The court agreed to ask the jury only about its numerical split.
Upon the jury's return to the courtroom, the following transpired:
The Court: Ms. Bunch, it is not going to happen?
Juror No. 12: We did take a poll. We did, very nicely, go around the table, and...
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State v. Huskey
...jury, and this court affirmed the trial court's determination that he could be retried for those offenses. State v. Thomas Dee Huskey, 66 S.W.3d 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The defendant has appealed his rape convictions before the retrial of his homicide charges. The defendant has failed ......
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State v. Thompson
... ... Scarbrough, 181 S.W.3d at 660. 14 ... Conversely, in State v. Huskey, 66 S.W.3d 905, 928 (Tenn.Crim.App.2001), our Court of Criminal Appeals examined a claim of estoppel in the context of former jeopardy after a jury had announced that it had unanimously agreed that Huskey had a mental disease or defect but also stated that it could not agree as to his capacity to ... ...
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State v. Leath
...“if the defendant consented to the termination of the proceeding at issue.” Mounce, 859 S.W.2d at 321 ; see also State v. Huskey, 66 S.W.3d 905, 916 (Tenn.Crim.App.2001) (stating that “double jeopardy does not bar a retrial when the defendant asks for a mistrial”). In such situations the de......
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State v. Huskey
...jeopardy did not bar the defendant's retrial and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. See State v. Huskey, 66 S.W.3d 905 (Tenn.Crim.App.2001), app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2001). Presently, the defendant awaits retrial in Knox County Criminal Court on the first degre......