State v. Hutch

• Decision Date: 19 October 1993
• Docket Number: Nos. 15143,15301 and 15422,s. 15143
• Citation: 75 Haw. 307,861 P.2d 11
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene HUTCH, Defendant-Appellant. STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene HUTCH, also known as Eugene Banks, Defendant-Appellant. *
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 11

861 P.2d 11

75 Haw. 307

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene HUTCH, Defendant-Appellant.

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene HUTCH, also known as Eugene Banks, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 15143, 15301 and 15422. ^*

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Oct. 19, 1993.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Defendants in criminal cases have a constitutional right of self-representation that is necessarily implied by the structure of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. The sixth amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his or her defense. It is the accused, not counsel, who must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, who must be confronted with the witnesses against him or her, and who must be accorded compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his or her favor. The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is the accused who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.

The counsel provision supplements this design. It speaks of the "assistance" of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant. The language and spirit of the sixth amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant--not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and the right to defend oneself personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his or her considered wish, thus violates the logic of the amendment.

2. A defendant's sixth amendment rights are not violated when a trial court appoints standby counsel--even over the defendant's objection--to relieve the judge of the need to explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way of the defendant's achievement of his or her own clearly indicated goals. Participation by counsel to steer a defendant through the basic procedures of trial is permissible even in the unlikely event that it somewhat undermines the pro se defendant's appearance of control over his or her own defense.

3. Article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution parallels the sixth amendment's guarantee of a defendant's right to counsel in criminal cases.

4. State courts are obligated to afford defendants the minimum protection required by federal interpretations of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court has deemed the right of self-representation to be implicit in the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and the sixth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, it therefore follows that the same right is guaranteed by article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution.

5. As the ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawaii Constitution, the appellate courts of this state are free to give broader protection under the Hawaii Constitution than that given by the United States Constitution.

6. This court chooses to apply the rationales of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984), to its interpretation of article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution.

7. A criminal defendant's right to self-representation is not absolute.

8. A trial court may not only insist on standby counsel to provide appropriate assistance in the first instance, but may also terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct because the right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.

9. The mere appointment of standby counsel over a defendant's objection does not, as a per se matter, violate article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution. Instead, the level of standby counsel's participation determines whether a defendant's constitutional right of self-representation has been violated.

10. As a general matter, the pro se defendant must be allowed to control the organization and content of his or her own defense, to make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropriate points in the trial. In determining whether the right of self-representation has been respected, the primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his or her case in his or her own way.

11. In proceedings before the jury, the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he or she chooses to present, such that participation by standby counsel without the defendant's consent does not destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself or herself. Accordingly, if standby counsel's participation over the defendant's objection effectively allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, the right of self-representation is eroded.

12. The right of self-representation is adequately vindicated in proceedings outside the presence of the jury if the pro se defendant is allowed to address the court freely on his or her own behalf and if disagreements between counsel and the pro se defendant are resolved in the defendant's favor whenever the matter is one that would normally be left to the discretion of counsel.

13. A trial judge's questioning of a witness is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.

14. A trial judge has the right to examine witnesses to elicit pertinent material facts not brought out by either party or to clarify testimony. Such power is incident to the search for truth in judicial proceedings. At no time, however, must the court assume the role of an advocate for either party. The power or discretion of a trial judge to question a witness is not unlimited or unbounded. While the mere fact that the judge examines a witness at some length is not necessarily improper, it is improper for a judge to conduct an unduly extended examination of any witness. Moreover, the judge should not by the form, manner, or extent of his or her questions indicate to the jury his or her opinion as to the merits of the case, and the judge must be ever cautious that his or her questioning of a witness not show bias toward the witness or disbelief of his or her credibility. The judge should not assume the role of an advocate for either party nor cast aspersions or ridicule upon the witness. This power to interrogate must be judiciously exercised, and the examination ought not to be extended beyond that which is reasonably necessary to elicit needed material facts or to clarify testimony.

15. A defendant's claim of the denial of due process of law and a fair trial because of comments made by the trial judge in the presence of the jury is reviewed on appeal to determine whether the defendant has met his or her burden of demonstrating that the comments prejudiced the jury against him or her.

16. A trial court's findings of fact in deciding a Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) 48(b) motion to dismiss are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support the finding, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, whether those facts fall within one of the rule's exclusionary provisions is a question of law, the determination of which is freely reviewable pursuant to the "right/wrong" test.

17. HRPP 48(b) motions to dismiss are demonstrably "pre-trial motions" within the meaning of HRPP 12(b) because they are raised before the commencement of trial and are capable of determination independently of the trial of the offense with which a defendant is charged. Notwithstanding their status as "pretrial motions," however, they are unconstrained by the requirements of HRPP 12(c), inasmuch as a motion to dismiss for violation of a defendant's HRPP 48(b) speedy trial right may be filed at any time before the trial commences. It would be absurd to require that an HRPP 48(b) motion to dismiss be subject to the requirement of HRPP 12(c) that pretrial motions be filed within twenty-one days after arraignment. HRPP 48(b) provides, inter alia, that a criminal charge must be dismissed if trial is not commenced within six months from the date of arrest or of filing of the charge, whichever occurs first. Obviously, no definitive determination can be made in that regard until trial actually commences.

18. Motions to dismiss pursuant to HRPP 48(b), by their very nature, involve factual issues that must be resolved before they can be decided. For this reason, a trial court commits reversible error when it denies such a motion without stating its essential findings on the record in accordance with HRPP 12(e).

19. Because findings of fact are imperative for an adequate appellate review of a lower court's conclusions of law, cases will be remanded when the factual basis of the lower court's ruling cannot be determined from the record.

Keith M. Kaneshiro, Prosecution Atty., and Doraine Meyer Belnap, Deputy Pros. Atty., on the briefs, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee State of Hawaii.

Wayne M. Rooney, Haleiwa, for defendant-appellant Eugene Hutch.

Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON and NAKAYAMA, JJ., and Circuit Court Judge WATANABE, Assigned by Reason of Vacancy.

LEVINSON, Justice.

The defendant-appellant Eugene Hutch appeals his convictions, following two unrelated jury trials, of theft in the second degree, terroristic threatening in the second degree, and assault in the third degree. On appeal, Hutch urges that: (1)...