State v. Hutchins
Decision Date | 08 July 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 80,80 |
Citation | 279 S.E.2d 788,303 N.C. 321 |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. James W. HUTCHINS. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Atty. Gen., Rufus L. Edmisten by Deputy Atty. Gen., Jean A. Benoy, Forest City, for State.
Wade M. Smith and Roger W. Smith, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.
In the early morning hours of 1 June 1979, defendant was arrested in a rural area of Rutherford County and charged with three counts of first-degree murder. Later that same day, defendant was found to be an indigent, and Mr. David K. Fox, a member of the Henderson County Bar, was appointed to represent him. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Ronald G. Blanchard, who was also a member of the Henderson County Bar, began to assist Mr. Fox in the preparation of defendant's case. 1 During the months of June, July and August 1979, the attorneys filed numerous pre-trial motions, including motions for a change of venue, suppression of certain evidence, and a psychiatric evaluation of defendant. Following hearings on these motions, the cases were removed to McDowell County for trial, and the motion to suppress was overruled. Psychiatric evaluations of defendant were conducted. At all times prior to trial, defendant was incarcerated in the Buncombe County Jail in Asheville.
On 16 August, defendant made a motion through defense counsel that his court appointed attorneys be discharged "for good and sufficient reasons." A hearing was held, and Superior Court Judge Robert D. Lewis denied the motion. 2
On 4 September 1979, Mr. Fox received a letter from defendant who was then confined in the Buncombe County Jail in Asheville. Dated 31 August 1979, the letter read as follows:
I am fire you from my case. I'll not to court with you as my lawyer. You have lie to my (illegible) in other words I don't need you any more at all. That is that. Good-bye.
Mr. Fox responded to the letter from defendant by filing a motion in which he asked that the court dismiss him as defendant's attorney of record because "no meaningful communication" was possible between himself and defendant. According to the motion, since the attorney's initial conference with defendant, he had met with a "stiffening personal resistance ... which soon thereafter involved (sic) into a personal antagonism on the part of defendant" toward the attorney.
A special session of McDowell Superior Court was scheduled for 17 September 1979, and Judge Smith was assigned to preside. Defendant's case was calendared for that session of court. On 5 September 1979, Judge Smith was presiding over a session of Henderson Superior Court. At that time, defendant's attorneys presented the letter to Judge Smith, and he proceeded to conduct an informal hearing in the presence of defendant, defense counsel, the district attorney, and a court reporter. 3
Throughout the day of 5 September and into the next, the court closely questioned defense counsel about the nature of their relationship to defendant. Defendant was examined by the court in order to determine the nature of the problem between him and his court appointed attorneys. During the early part of the hearing, defendant told the court, "I know Mr. Fox is a good lawyer." Upon further inquiry by the court, the following exchange took place:
At a later point in the proceedings, after the court asked defendant who he expected would be ready for trial on 17 September, defendant answered, "... just like I said, Mr. Fox there, I know he's a good lawyer here in town, but he ain't come through with nothin' (sic)." Thereupon, the court and defendant had the following exchange.
When the hearing reconvened on 6 September, Mr. Dennis Winner of Asheville was present. Mr. Winner had been approached by several members of the bar concerning the situation between defendant and his appointed attorneys. The inquiry was directed at the possibility that Mr. Winner would be in a position to assume responsibility for defendant's case. Mr. Winner stated that he was willing to enter the case only if Mr. Fox would remain as chief counsel. The attorney also went on to inform the court that there were several obstacles in the path of his entry into the case, including conflicting court calendars and impending religious holidays.
Following the hearing, the court entered an order making findings of fact that defendant had made no showing which would amount to legal justification for removing either or both of his court appointed attorneys; that the only reason defendant had articulated for wishing to have his attorneys discharged was because of his stated belief that they had not visited him enough to discuss the case; and that there had been no showing that defendant's attorneys were failing to prepare themselves for trial. The court then ordered that defendant's motion for removal of his attorneys and appointment of substitute counsel be denied.
It is defendant's contention on appeal 4 that "the attorney-client relationship here at issue was clearly a marriage of convenience (for the State)" and that the trial court committed prejudicial error in requiring that he and his attorneys proceed to trial when none of them wanted to continue the relationship. Our deliberations have led us to conclude that there was no error.
There are two prongs to our analysis: First, the implications of an alleged conflict between an indigent defendant and his court-appointed attorney; and, second, the obligation of a court to inform a defendant of his right to proceed pro se.
A cardinal principle of the criminal law is that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that in a serious criminal prosecution the accused shall have the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); see generally J. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused: Trial Rights, § 22 (1974). The competency of a criminal defendant's counsel does not amount to a denial of the constitutional right to counsel unless it is established that the attorney's representation was so ineffective that it renders the trial a farce and a mockery of...
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