State v. Hutter

Decision Date19 October 1983
Docket NumberNo. 40016,40016
Citation307 S.E.2d 910,251 Ga. 615
PartiesThe STATE v. HUTTER.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Arthur E. Mallory III, Dist. Atty., LaGrange, Blanchette C. Holland, Asst. Dist. Atty., Newnan, for the State.

Earl Seals, LaGrange, for Alan Joseph Hutter.

WELTNER, Justice.

Hutter was tried and convicted by a jury for molestation of his twelve year-old stepdaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed, Hutter v. State, 166 Ga.App. 608, 305 S.E.2d 124 (1983), and we granted certiorari.

During voir dire, the following colloquy occurred:

"[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I object to not being allowed to individually ask the jurors on voir dire whether or not the fact that they have children.

"[The Court]: I gave you permission to ask that.

"[Defense counsel]: I said individually, your Honor.

"[The Court]: All right. Go ahead.

"[Defense counsel]: I object to not being allowed to individually ask each juror on voir dire whether or not they may be prejudiced because of the fact that they have children.

"[The Court]: Let the record reflect that the court permits him to ask the panel and each one that would have prejudice to identify themselves by raising their hand.

"[Defense counsel]: I can't ask them if they have children. Is that correct, your Honor.

"[The Court]: Yes, sir, you can ask them that. And you can ask that other question to the whole panel and let each one that would answer in the affirmative-- "[Defense counsel]: I understand, your Honor, my objection is based on the court not letting me do it individually."

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court denied Hutter the right to individual voir dire of each juror, in violation of OCGA § 15-12-133 (Code Ann. § 59-705). We do not agree.

"While the common-law practice of impanelling jurors was to present each juror as he was called, to examine, pass, or challenge him, and to swear him before the next juror was presented ... the clear intent of the General Assembly in enacting ... [OCGA § 15-12-133] was to permit the parties in civil cases to examine the individual jurors making up the two panels before interposing their challenges." Keebler v. Willard, 90 Ga.App. 66, 67, 81 S.E.2d 842 (1954). A parallel change of procedure was intended in criminal cases. "Where defendant asserts his right to examine all jurors before striking any of them, it is reversible error for the trial court to deny him that right." Thomas v. State, 247 Ga. 7, 273 S.E.2d 396 (1981), and cites.

Hutter was not denied a right to examine all jurors before striking any of them. Instead, he was denied an opportunity to ask one question seriatim to each of the jurors, and was required to address the question once to the panel as a whole in a manner which would assure an individual response from each juror.

OCGA § 15-12-133 (Code Ann. § 59-705) provides: "In all civil cases the parties thereto shall have the right to an individual examination of the panel of jurors from which the jury is to be selected, without interposing any challenge. In all criminal cases both the state and the defendant shall have the right to an individual examination of each juror from which the jury is to be selected prior to interposing a challenge. The examination shall be conducted after the administration of a preliminary oath to the panel or in criminal cases after the usual voir dire questions have been put by the court. In the examination, the counsel for either party shall have the right to inquire of the individual jurors examined touching any matter or thing which would illustrate any interest of the juror in the case, including any opinion as to which party ought to prevail, the relationship or acquaintance of the juror with the parties or counsel therefor, any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning, or bias which the juror might have respecting the subject matter of the action or the counsel or parties thereto, and the religious, social, and fraternal connections of the juror." Thus it is seen that the right to an individual response--not to an individual question--is the substance of the statute.

The...

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19 cases
  • King v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 30, 2000
    ...a showing of hands, and permit individual follow up voir dire." Lynd v. State, 262 Ga. 58, 59(2), 414 S.E.2d 5 (1992); State v. Hutter, 251 Ga. 615, 307 S.E.2d 910 (1983). (b) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying King's motion seeking to have a questionnaire sent to prosp......
  • Smith v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 12, 1984
    ...is apparent from the record that the defendant was afforded an opportunity for individual voir dire of the jury. See State v. Hutter, 251 Ga. 615, 616-617, 307 S.E.2d 910; State v. Graham, 246 Ga. 341, 343, 271 S.E.2d 627. Compare Henderson v. State, 251 Ga. 398, 399-402(1), 306 S.E.2d 645.......
  • Lynd v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 27, 1992
    ...of discretion. Sanborn v. State, 251 Ga. 169(3), 304 S.E.2d 377 (1983). There was no denial of individual voir dire. State v. Hutter, 251 Ga. 615, 307 S.E.2d 910 (1983). 3. The record supports the trial court's conclusion that the defendant could receive a fair trial in Berrien County and t......
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 17, 1986
    ...stated Georgia law. As noted by the court in Hutter v. State, 166 Ga.App. 608(3), 305 S.E.2d 124, reversed on other grounds, 251 Ga. 615, 307 S.E.2d 910 (1983), this issue has been decided adversely to defendant many times. The charge requested by defendant "is misleading to the extent that......
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